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Abstract 
As the nascent power of Rome grew to dominance over the Mediterranean 
world in the Middle Republic, they carried out mass killing, mass 
enslavement, and urban annihilation. In doing so, they showed an intention 
to destroy other groups, therefore committing genocide.  
This study looks at the kinds of destruction enacted by Romans 
between 343 BCE and 146 BCE, using a novel application of definitions and 
frameworks of analysis from the field of Genocide Studies. It proposes 
typologies through which the genocidal behaviours of the Romans can be 
explored and described.  
Mass killing, enslavement, and urban annihilation normally occurred in 
the context of siege warfare, when the entire population became legitimate 
targets. Initial indiscriminate killing could be followed by the enslavement of 
the survivors and burning of their settlement. While genocide is a valid 
historiographical tool of analysis, Roman behaviours were distinct from 
modern patterns of mass killing in lacking a substantial component of racial 
or ethnic motivation. These phenomena were complex and varied, and the 
utter destruction of groups not regularly intended. Roman genocidal violence 
was a normative, but not typical, adaptation of the Romans of the Middle 
Republic to the ancient anarchic interstate system. 
In antiquity, there was no international law to govern conflict and 
international relations, only customs. This study posits that the Roman 
moral-based custom of fides as an internal preventative regime that inhibited 
genocide through rituals of submission to Roman hegemony. This process 
was flawed, and cultural miscommunication risked causing mass violence. 
Furthermore, the wide discretion of Roman commanders accepting 
submission could result in them flouting the moral obligation to protect 
 ii 
surrendered groups. In such cases, attempts at punishment and restitution 
from other members of the elite were only partially effective. 
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Chapter One 
— 
Introduction 
Natural instincts bid all living human beings not merely 
conquer their enemies but also destroy them. In former  
days it was the victor's prerogative to destroy tribes,  
entire peoples. 
These were the words attributed to Adolf Hitler by Raphael Lemkin in a 1945 
magazine article, in which he promoted to the general public for the first time 
his newly-devised concept of ‘genocide’.1 Lemkin provided a label for what 
Winston Churchill could only refer to as ‘a crime without a name’, or as a 
French prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials put it, ‘a crime so monstrous […] 
that the term “genocide” had to be coined to define it’.2 From its inception, 
Lemkin thought that genocide was a practice endemic to humanity, and that 
its origins could be traced into antiquity. He had intended to publish a 
compendium of historical genocides, but died before the work was more than 
an outline.3 Lemkin shared this belief in the antiquity of genocide, as we 
have seen, with those who had formulated genocidal practices. For Hitler 
and the Nazis, ancient antecedents justified and naturalised their own 
crimes. 
This study looks at aspects of genocide at the time of the Middle 
Roman Republic, from 343 BCE to 146 BCE. It asks whether the Romans did 
carry out genocide, and whether they can be thought of as genocidal. In 
doing so, it shows that the phenomena of Roman destruction were complex, 
and that the same Roman ideological precepts facilitated the destruction of 
others, but simultaneously forestalled more comprehensive mass violence, 
                                            
1 Lemkin 1945, 39. 
2 Ruebner 2005, 1227. 
3 Lemkin and Jacobs 2012, 3–6, 17; Docker 2004. 
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and that the Romans were not a uniquely nor solely bellicose and 
bloodthirsty people.4 The study will demonstrate that genocidal violence was 
a normative, but not typical, adaptation of the Romans of the Middle 
Republic to the ancient anarchic interstate system.5 This study aims to 
establish that the concept of genocide can be useful as a jumping off point to 
interrogate the topic of ethnicity and imperialism in the ancient world, and 
how they intersected. It is some small step towards making more visible the 
hundreds of thousands of lives destroyed by various means by Middle 
Republican imperialism.6 It furthermore aims to generate a specific, 
informed, and novel investigation into genocide in this period, to better 
inform arguments made outside the specialist fields of Ancient History and 
Classics.  
There is a strong rationale for this sort of engagement with the 
scholarly field sometimes known as Genocide Studies. As we have already 
seen, notions about group destruction in antiquity have been embedded in 
the idea of ‘genocide’ as a crime and a framework of analysis since its 
inception, and in the rationales of génocidaires themselves before it even 
had a name. Indeed, classical moments of destruction had long inspired 
romantic artworks, such as that on the cover page of the present work, or 
calls to destroy other nations or peoples.7 However, otherwise first-rate 
scholars working in Genocide Studies frequently show poor scholarship 
when it comes to the ancient world. Ideas or approaches that have long 
been disproved or made obsolete in Ancient History and Classics are 
asserted. Fundamental errors of the sort that the minimum of research, even 
looking at a certain well-known online encyclopaedia or children’s books, 
                                            
4 W. V. Harris [1979] 2006; see also MacMullen 2011, 89–91. 
5 Eckstein 2006. 
6 Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 7. 
7 As when the First Earl of Shaftesbury argued in Parliament in the mid-seventeenth century 
that Carthage should provide a model for the destruction of the Dutch, T. Harris [2004] 2008. 
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would have corrected.8 Reference to the classical world is used by many of 
these scholars in a superficial and solipsistic manner, as a way of signalling 
their learned academic credentials. This probably also informs the frequency 
with which the Greco-Roman etymology of the word ‘genocide’ itself is 
invoked, even about which some have managed to show confusion.9 There 
have been few positive engagements with the evidence for genocide in the 
ancient world, and a tendency to comment sweepingly on the antiquity, or 
conversely the modernity, of genocide. Some of these engagements will be 
discussed below. This is important, because Genocide Studies is a branch of 
Critical Theory; its practitioners seek not only to analyse and describe real 
world genocidal phenomena but to prevent their future occurrence.10 The 
desire to address this gap, and provide a thorough and informed 
investigation that will fulfil this need, guides this study. 
What is genocide? 
The label ‘genocide’ is not only a relatively new coinage, but is also a highly 
contested term.11 It was originally devised by Lemkin in the 1940s, as a 
direct response to what would become known as the Holocaust in the West, 
and the Shoah in Hebrew. Its range of definitions are myriad.12 As 
determined by Lemkin, it was defined as,  
The destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group […] with the 
aim of annihilating the groups themselves […] Genocide is 
directed against the national group as an entity, and the 
                                            
8 E.g. Mann 2005, 16 thinks decimation was done as a matter of course to subjugated 
foreign populations; cp. ‘Decimation (Roman Army)’ 2017 (Wikipedia); Deary 2016, 30–31 
(Horrible Histories). 
9 E.g. Charny 1999a, 2:451. 
10 Savigny and Marsden 2011, 270; Preventism is deeply embedded in Genocide Studies 
and its development as a field, see: A. Jones 2010, 388–400; Kuper 1985; Charny 1984; 
Totten 2004. 
11 Genocide’s synthetic origin being betrayed by the modern tendency to mix etymologically 
Greek and Latin components in portmanteau. 
12 Thus A. Jones 2010, 15–18 identifies sixteen academic definitions in addition to Lemkin’s 
original and the UN Convention, and adds his own at 22-23. 
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actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their 
individual capacity, but as members of the national group.13 
Lemkin’s tireless activism in promoting this term led rapidly to its adoption by 
the incipient United Nations in the form of the Convention on the Prevention 
of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC). The Convention provides its own 
definition in its Article II: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.14 
Most academic definitions incorporate aspects of Article II of the UNGC, due 
to its widespread global adoption and legal normative force. This, however, 
has not been unanimous, some de-emphasising or omitting intentionality or 
requiring mass fatalities. This ambivalence and pluralism has given rise to 
numerous category definitions subsumed either within or alongside that of 
genocide itself.15 
Genocide Studies literature 
Since the development of the concept of genocide by Lemkin, and its 
adoption by the United Nations, a burgeoning literature has led to the 
development of the field of Genocide Studies. Numerous works have refined, 
extended, and redefined the definition of genocide. They have also laid the 
ground work for the use of the concept of genocide as an historiographical 
tool. There have even been the first, tentative steps into the interpretation of 
                                            
13 Lemkin 1973, 79. 
14 United Nations 1948, Article 2. 
15 Mann 2005 Table 1.1; Andreopoulos 1997; Morsink 1999; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000. 
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genocidal phenomena in antiquity. Following its acceptance as a term by the 
UNGC, there was a low level of academic discourse, mostly aimed at 
explaining or coming to terms with the Holocaust. Beginning in the 1980s 
and exploding in the 1990s the field increased, partly in response to 
contemporaneous acts identified as genocide or genocidal, Kosovo and later 
Rwanda taking the focus of systematic sociological and anthropological 
review towards understanding and preventing this crime. Here I concentrate 
on key texts and structural analysis of genocide, and there is a large corpus 
of either eyewitness accounts or analysis of specific case studies which are 
not considered below. 
The neologism of ‘genocide’ being a response to encapsulate a crime 
considered beyond mass murder, legal definitions of genocide are 
fundamental to many understandings. This is especially so given the Critical 
Theory agenda of many workers within the field of Genocide Studies or in 
fields that overlap with it.16 The scholarly work of many of authors is informed 
by an explicit desire to formulate and implement strategies to prevent its 
propagation and to punish its perpetrators. This can only reasonably be 
effected through engagement with international law, promoting and 
supporting existing preventative regimes or making proposals for the 
evolution of international, supranational, and national legal and state 
mechanisms for the prevention and punishment of genocide. Almost all 
authors on this subject therefore refer to the UNGC, especially to its Article 
II.17 This text is the foundational point of reference for most of the academic 
discussion on genocide, as the articles contained set out the basic criteria for 
defining the crime in current international law. It introduces three important 
features of relevance to the present study: the role of intention; that genocide 
does not necessarily relate just to race crimes; and, that mass killing is but 
one means of achieving genocide.18 The preamble also has the contracting 
                                            
16 Savigny and Marsden 2011, 270–76. 
17 United Nations 1948. 
18 This openness has led to a fringe of the academic research into genocide that take an 
extremely broad approach to what exactly the term can constitute. They both take potential 
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parties ‘RECOGNIZING [sic] that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted 
great losses on humanity’ by way of justifying the need for such a treaty, 
though the legislative focus remained obviously rooted in the contemporary. 
This is in likelihood a clause related to Lemkin’s intended, though never 
executed, grand historical treatment of genocide through all periods of 
history.19 We know from outlines in his notebooks and book proposals that 
this was to include the Classical world. 
Although legal perspectives inform the work of most Genocide Studies 
scholars, and are increasingly important following the establishment of the 
permanent International Criminal Court and commencement of its first trials 
based on UN convention, the subset of works to take a predominantly 
legalistic approach to the issue, including its definition, is smaller. They tend 
to view the issue of genocide as being a legalistically normative one, which 
is to say one that can be contained and expressed within the customary 
legal frameworks of the international community. As such, issues of intent 
and culpability feature in depth, being crucial to the prosecution of 
perpetrators. These legalistic accounts tend to reaffirm the normative legal 
status of genocide as a crime within the scope of human rights violations and 
of war crimes, as opposed to being a crime so phenomenologically and 
metaphysically distinct that it escapes containment by mundane structures of 
legal definition and process. 
The trend among sociologically-informed scholars of Genocide Studies 
has also shifted towards the consideration of genocide as a valid object of 
analysis, rather than something unknowable. This has been the case since 
the time of the meeting and subsequent proceedings of the First 
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, organised in 1982 
in Israel by the Jerusalem-based Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide.20 
                                            
human rights issues over the suppression of cultural markers of identity as within the 
bounds of the partial destruction of a group as such, as per the UN Convention. The obvious 
flaw is delimiting exactly where sociocultural relations of power become genocidal. For 
examples, see Morsink 1999; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000. 
19 Lemkin and Jacobs 2012, 3, 6. 
20 Charny 1984. 
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Highly controversial even before it was held, the proceedings of this 
conference proved influential. It provided a representative selection of the 
state of the burgeoning sociological study into genocide, as well as papers 
looking to prevent its future occurrence. In this regard, it consolidated the 
dominant approaches to genocide in scholarly literature. About the same 
time as the conference in Israel, works by Helen Fein and Leo Kuper 
confirmed the importance of the field of Genocide Studies, shaping and 
encouraging much of its future growth.21 There had been a shift away from 
the paradigms of the generation of literature that followed the Holocaust, 
whereby genocide was positioned as outside the bounds of language, a 
horror that could be enumerated but not analysed. Developments of the later 
twentieth century led to the incorporation of genocide as a valid category of 
sociological and historical inquiry, no longer ontologically separate, being 
catalysed by these influential works. 
This non-exceptionalist approach was henceforth increasingly 
advanced, although there remain some works that place themselves within 
the context of the methodological study of genocide yet take a moralistic 
stance that is reminiscent of previous ontologically exceptionalist positions.22 
This shift to non-exceptionalist and non-essentialist approaches to some 
extent reflected general changes in academic paradigms, but was also 
informed by the increasing chronological distance from the Holocaust on the 
one hand, and the development of contemporary events. Catastrophes such 
as those perpetrated in Kosovo and Rwanda provided very real examples of 
genocidal acts. They were witnessed through global media in a newly 
immediate manner and exhibited marked differences from the events of the 
Holocaust. As such, attribution to a base and unspeakable evil did not seem 
an appropriate reaction, and scholarship attempted to adapt to account for 
and predict the occurrence of genocide. 
                                            
21 Fein 1984; also, Fein [1993] 2009; Fein 1993; Kuper 1985. 
22 Staub 1989; Card 2010. 
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With these developments, even those who proposed the ontological or 
metaphysical apartness of the Holocaust as an event embraced the need to 
submit it to comparative analysis. In 1994 Steven Katz, for example, 
expanded the perspectives he had put forwards in 1989 that the Holocaust is 
a valid target for historical inquiry yet phenomenologically distinct in 
character.23 Deploying a broad sweep of historical times and places, 
including Roman genocide, he argued that the Holocaust is the only true 
example of genocide to date. It was a generally well supported comparative-
history approach, albeit one marked by generalisation, undoubtedly due in 
part to the extensive scope. 
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s theoretically informed and well-
received work of 1990 developed an interesting, though not entirely 
comprehensive, typology of genocide that distinguishes between ideological 
and empire-building motivations, which are useful in providing one 
framework to escape self-fulfilling twentieth-century causal explanations.24 
Their historical focus extends from slavery in the ancient world, one of the 
few works to consider this facet, to the modern day. In doing so, Chalk and 
Jonassohn introduced the analysis of veracity, reliability, and the extent of 
historical claims of the destruction of others. Similarly, Michael Freeman 
argued that although modern instances have exhibited aspects unique to the 
nation-state model, genocide is not the exclusive preserve of modern 
history.25 Interestingly, the author agrees that prior formulations were ‘correct 
to associate genocide with the process of civilization’ but argues against 
equating civilization with modernity.26 Discussion of the ancient past is 
however reliant on information contained in other sociological works or on 
outdated historical works. Indeed, the comparative approach had become by 
the 1990s a common theme among academic works on genocide, either in 
monograph or multi-author edited volumes, along with a diversification of 
                                            
23 Katz 1994; Katz 1989. 
24 Chalk and Jonassohn 1990. 
25 Freeman 1995. 
26 Freeman 1995, 209. 
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methodological viewpoints, such as anthropological ethnography of violence, 
or sociology.27 
The most wide-reaching and effective comparative account has been 
the ambitious work of Ben Kiernan, predominantly in his 2009 monograph 
but he has elsewhere written about the destruction of Carthage, which he 
described as ‘the first genocide’.28 He has argued for the need for historically 
sensitive treatments of pre-modern genocide: 
Historians must analyse actions and events of the pre-
modern era in the context of intellectual and cultural 
stipulations discussed at the time, and of knowledge 
paradigms available to people of that era. […] To dismiss 
past episodes of mass killing by explaining them as merely 
part of a very different society would be to grant 
historiographical immunity to an entire era or dominant 
community.29 
His treatment of the classical past is refreshingly grounded, and the 
references that he used are to recent work by historians, distinguishing 
himself from the woefully outdated Classical scholarship deployed by other 
commentators on genocide. However, discussion of the classical past in his 
monograph is brief due to the vast timescale under consideration, and his 
engagement with the ancient historiography is solely through a limited 
selection of modern secondary works. Kiernan's thesis that genocide through 
the ages is linked to agrarianism is perhaps not entirely convincing, but 
nonetheless this is a work that needs to be considered in any account of 
ancient genocide.  
Also of note in terms of explicitly comparative historiographical 
approaches to genocide is an article in World Politics by Scott Straus, in 
which he identifies several emerging aspects of the contemporary literature 
on Genocide Studies, in particular the fields of idealism, political 
                                            
27 See Rosenbaum 1996; Chorbajian and Shirinian 1999; Hinton 2002; Fein 1993. 
28 Kiernan 2009; Kiernan 2004. 
29 Kiernan 2014, 460. 
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development, and state interest.30 Straus argues for an open and flexible 
analysis of genocide as a useful tool. 
Several works have in recent years stressed the role of state formation 
in the modern age as the causative factor in the instigation of genocidal 
violence. Thus, Martin Shaw sees genocide, which he does not see as 
needing to be based on the UN Convention, within the conceptual domain of 
warfare, either as its overspill or as warfare directed against the modern 
state.31 This is by necessity an argument rooted in the expression of violent 
force by organised states, here meaning the modern nation-state. Excepting 
Shaw's polemic of global, unifying pacifism, this account therefore complies 
in many ways with the Rationalist theory of International Relations. The work 
of Jacques Sémelin uses an ideological approach similar to Shaw’s. 
Although he focuses on notions of purification of the nation-state of 
perceived outsiders, it presents genocide as related to a form of revisionism 
that takes a ritualistic form of mass murder. Mark Levene hypothesises 
genocide as entrenched in the rise of the international system of the nation 
state, though allowing simultaneously for a high degree of contributory, 
contingent factors.32 It is also necessary, according to Levene for phobia to 
be present as opposed to rational agency for genocide to occur. The second 
volume of this work covers a broad span of time, but suffers from the 
selective pressures of attempting such an opus, though he does see 
genocidal features in premodern states. 
Eric Weitz also posits genocide as a trait of revisionist utopian symbolic 
power backed up by state monopoly of violence.33 Weitz’s work was 
somewhat limited in the selective criteria of the cases looked at, undermining 
the comprehensiveness of his conclusions, which appear to be self-serving. 
Furthermore, his approach is rooted in the historiography of totalitarianism, 
                                            
30 Straus 2007. 
31 Shaw 2003. 
32 M. Levene 2005. 
33 Weitz 2003. 
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and perhaps does not keep up with developments in historical understanding 
of the experiences of empire and (post)colonialism. This is contrary to the 
views of Michael Mann, who relates genocidal violence, which he explores in 
the guise of murderous ethnic cleansing, as being causally linked to 
democracy and failed democracies.34 He asserts that prior to the modern 
age of the nation-state genocide was not possible due to the predominant 
power-relation being one of class and feudalism rather than race or ethnicity. 
He has some intriguing analysis, though his treatment of the premodern past 
is lacking in rigour and he makes very basic and easily checkable factual 
errors. 
Within the modern attempts to understand genocide, there is a 
consensus that the intentionality of the agent to destroy the victim is a 
prerequisite. However, there are some suggestions that a category of 
accidental or negligent, which is to say not specifically intentional, genocide 
could be valid. Alexander Greenawalt, for example, takes issue with the 
eminence of intent in defining genocide and suggests from a legal viewpoint 
that culpability can be assigned according to the understanding of 
perpetrators of what the outcome of their actions are, therefore providing a 
further point of problematisation in defining the category of genocide.35 Other 
inquiries have not so much called into question the role of intention in the 
agent, but rather what that intention should be. Thus, Stuart Kaufman tested 
International Relations (IR) Realist theory against that of symbolic politics in 
the cases of Sudan and Rwanda.36 Kaufman found that IR Realist models 
are flawed in their explanation of them and instead that the political use of 
symbols of ethnicity had a much greater causal role. 
The heterogeneity of the approaches to, and definitions of, genocide 
have led to the production of several overviews and general guides. Adam 
Jones’s broad introduction to genocide as a sociological, and to a lesser 
                                            
34 Mann 2005; Mann 1999. 
35 Greenawalt 1999. 
36 Kaufman 2006; Cf. Mamdani 2001. 
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extent legal, topic is useful and comprehensive. He discusses fully the 
plurality of definitions of what constitutes genocide, as well as making his 
own proposals.37 On the ancient past, Jones uses Carthage as a possible 
example of the relatively new taxon of ‘urbicide’; although Jones’s discussion 
on this topic lacks development or historiographical awareness, it suggests a 
useful route to re-analyse the fall of the Punic city. The multi-authored 
volume The Historiography of Genocide similarly provides a broad overview 
of many of the issues of definition and the history of the modern emergence 
of, as well as understanding of, genocide.38 It also contains many case 
studies from varied historiographical contexts, demonstrating the applicability 
of the theory to diverse epochs, although none of them are ancient.  
The aforementioned work by Kiernan represents what is perhaps the 
best treatment of the period yet by a Genocide Studies scholar, although 
varying from the present study in several key features of scope, approach, 
and conclusion. Grenke devotes ten pages of his Genocide from Antiquity to 
the Beginning of the Twentieth-Century to the subject of ‘mass destruction 
and genocide among the Greeks and Romans’.39 His approach is broadly 
sound, but reliant on out-of-date Classical scholarship. In common with most 
genocide scholars, his citations are to specific mass market translations of 
the sources rather than the traditional numbering by book and section. This 
both hampers the usefulness of his account, and betrays an unfamiliarity 
with the materials common to those from outside the fields of Ancient History 
and Classics. As with Kiernan, his broad diachronic study shows the 
usefulness, and limitations, of comparative analyses, and further validates 
historiographical approaches to genocide. A treatment with greater Classical 
historiographical awareness is Hans van Wees’ chapter in the Oxford 
Handbook of Genocide Studies.40 This represents the only rigorous, albeit 
                                            
37 A. Jones 2010, 15–18 Box 1.1; cp. the muddled attempts to define genocide but without 
consensus and failure to build a theoretical approach beyond nomenclature in Andreopoulos 
1997; or the disjointed and confusing array of ideas in Charny 1999b. 
38 Stone 2008. 
39 Grenke 2011. 
40 van Wees 2010; see more recentlt, van Wees 2016. 
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brief, treatment of the subject of ancient genocide by a knowledgeable 
ancient historian in print to date.41 Van Wees confirms the applicability of 
ideas of genocide to the ancient evidence. 
From this brief survey of a selection from the vast body of Genocide 
Studies works, several points are germane: historiographical approaches to 
genocide are valid; genocide may be an ancient practice, or it may be a 
distinctly modern phenomenon; the first steps into researching ancient 
genocide have been taken but there are large gaps in the literature; and, the 
definitional bases and parameters of investigations into genocide are plural 
and contested. 
A definition of genocide 
This study will not attempt to adopt any of the more convoluted matrices or 
schemes of types of genocide, such as for example that proposed by Israel 
Charny, and eschews the many obscure related concepts that have been 
proposed by this literature over the years, such as democide, planeticide, 
omnicide, ethnocide, linguicide, and politicide.42 Rather it adopts the 
pragmatic and open approach of Straus, who observed that the 
heterogeneity of observed instances of genocide, combined with issues 
related to the plurality of definitions, means that genocide should be 
considered as one possible outcome of political violence that can be traced 
back to several causative factors of differing agency.43 The definition used 
here is therefore deliberately broad, to capture the range of events and 
behaviours in the Middle Republic that might be thought of as genocidal. 
                                            
41 The soon to be published monograph Mass Violence and Genocide in the Roman World 
by T. Taylor 2017 will cover only the early second century CE to fourth century CE, and has 
not been seen in advance of this study. A further multiple-author volume Cultural History of 
Genocide in the Ancient World edited by T. Taylor is forthcoming. 
42 Charny 1999b, 1:7–9, 15–16. 
43 Straus 2007. 
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For the purposes of this study, genocide is defined as: a set of actions 
and/or outcomes resulting from an intention to destroy a group, wholly or in 
part.  
This definition conforms to that of the UNCG and allows for the 
inclusion of methods of destruction beyond that of mass killing. Thus 
defined, genocide is performed by actors or agents against a victim group, of 
sufficient scale to imperil that group, and achieved by means of a set of 
strategies that intend to realise the goal of the destruction of that group.44 
These labels are not meant to suggest a one-way relationship, with Rome 
the sole actor and victims as passive recipients of its aggression.45 Indeed, 
some scholars see the victims’ agency as essential in bringing the potential 
for violence to a tipping point.46 
As the definition of genocide is predicated on the destruction of 
population groups, the effects of the battlefield are ignored in this study. 
While casualties, prisoners of war, and enslavements resulting from armies 
engaging in the field could be extremely high, such killing is normative under 
conventional understandings of warfare as an extension of political will in the 
tradition of Carl von Clausewitz.47 Those fighting in armies on the battlefield 
did so electively, and capture or death were possibilities that they could have 
expected from doing so. Genocidal destruction of groups therefore must 
apply the military mentalities, rationales, and competencies against general 
populations. This, as will be seen, predominantly occurred in the context of 
the storming of cities. The same mentalities and psychological drivers of 
battlefield violence no doubt pushed besiegers towards group violence when 
storming cities.48 Any member of the population could prove themselves a 
deadly defender. The hazard can be amply demonstrated by the killing of 
                                            
44 A. Jones 2010, 19–21. 
45 Eckstein 2006, 158–76; Miles 2010, 12. 
46 Mann 2005, 4–7. 
47 Clausewitz [1832] 1997. 
48 Wheeler and Strauss 2007; Sabin 2000. 
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Pyrrhus of Epirus by an old Argive woman throwing tiles from a roof, and the 
frequent scenes of mass mobilisation of all sections of society to prepare for 
a siege.49 During assaults on urban places there was likely more slippage 
between the categories of combatant and non-combatant, as we might now 
term them. This likely increased the deadliness of violence towards general 
population groups in some circumstances. Nonetheless, battlefield violence 
is distinct from genocidal violence against population groups, and therefore 
is excluded from analysis of this study.  
Groups in antiquity 
Genocide theory is ‘groupist’, in that it is specifically concerned with the 
destruction of varying kinds of victim groups. This sort of groupism has been 
criticised for encouraging the uncritical adoption of ‘categories of 
ethnopolitical practice as […] categories of social analysis’.50 Indeed, while it 
should be stressed that these groups should not be taken to be 
substantiative, or even primordial, they nonetheless have a real-world 
presence as social constructs performed by their members or imposed by 
the perpetrators. Because theories of genocide are predicated so strongly on 
the notion of the destruction of victim groups, the nature of what validly 
constitutes these groups is contested. The UNGC, the most widely accepted 
definition of genocide, defines the types of victim groups as ‘national, 
ethnical, racial or religious’.51 
The primary point of controversy nowadays is whether the destruction 
of political groups should be included, as they were left out of the UNGC’s 
definition due to the reservations of the then-Soviet Union. For the purposes 
of the present study, this issue can be sidestepped; organised political 
groups were not a phenomenon in antiquity as they are in the modern world. 
The Romans often executed members of factions that were opposed to their 
                                            
49 Plut., Pyrrh., 32-4. 
50 Brubaker 2004, 36–37; cp. Calhoun 2003; See Moses 2010, 22–25. 
51 United Nations 1948, Article II. 
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interests in foreign communities, and such executions could on occasion be 
extensive but were usually limited to leaders. However, there was nothing in 
the way of a widespread identification and extirpation of organised political 
groups.  
Whereas religious buildings and sites, and therefore the rites and 
practices associated with them, were destroyed by the Romans, these will 
be shown to be incidental to the religions themselves as identifiable groups, 
although such destruction contributed to the destruction of local communal 
identities in other ways. The Bacchanalian Affair, discussed in chapter two, 
provides an example from this period more akin to the destruction of political 
groups; however, it clearly qualifies as the destruction in part of a religious 
group, and there was a xenophobia towards the Eastern qualities of the cult 
and its Hellenic origin links it to the domain of ethnicity. 
Ethnicity, race, and racism 
It has long been the academic consensus that race is a social construction 
rather than an objective biological reality.52 The language of race has been 
replaced by that of ethnicity, although this was a gradual process that really 
began to make its mark on the fields of Ancient History, Classics, and 
Archaeology around the turn of the 1990s.53 With this change of 
nomenclature, came a shift in the conceptualisation of the nature of past 
groups, allying with attempts to shift these fields into the postcolonial, 
postmodern era, and a rejection of previously-endemic, problematic, 
racialised precepts.  
Nonetheless, debates about racism have recently undergone some 
resurgence. Benjamin Isaac proposed the existence of proto-racism in 
                                            
52 Barth 1969; A. D. Smith 1988; Isajiw 1974; Huxley and Haddon 1935; see Bernard Harris 
and Waltraud Ernst 1999, for the development of racialised paradigms 1700-1960. 
53 S. Jones 1997; Shennan 1989; Cornell and Lomas 1997; J. M. Hall 1997; cp. Husband 
1909. 
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antiquity, a force of prejudice based on ancient conceptions of pronounced 
difference, particularly as related to biological descent or geographic 
origins.54 In this regard, he resurrects with a wider evidence-base, the 
argument made four decades previously by A.N. Sherwin-White that racial 
prejudices existed at the time of Imperial Rome.55 Isaac moves the argument 
beyond conceptualisations of racialism predicated on skin colour. An 
important study, it has not been received without criticism.56 Less 
problematic, but also less useful to this study, have been attempts to 
consider the role of the reception of antiquity in creating modern notions of 
race.57 Against this discourse of racial or ethnic prejudice, is a scholarly 
tradition that stresses the openness of the Romans to outside influences and 
peoples, de-emphasising their Othering of outgroups.58  
The discernible existence of ethnic groups, or of Roman perceptions of 
them, provide a primary class of victims for this study of genocidal practices. 
They can be considered another form of the ‘imagined communities’ by 
which humans group themselves, or are grouped by others.59 Identification of 
the nature of the victim group is essential to identifying genocide, and 
ethnicity is a key component. In the modern world, ethnicity is a common 
factor in violence; one 2005 study, for example, claimed that three quarters 
of then-ongoing armed conflicts were ethnic or communal.60 Ethnically 
motivated intents to commit genocide have been linked to social 
psychological symbolic interactionalism.61 
Ethnicity, race, and nationality are entwined concepts, each predicated 
on a sense of shared descent and culture. In attempting to distinguish them, 
Steve Fenton offered the following definitions: 
                                            
54 Isaac 2004; Isaac 2006. 
55 Sherwin-White 1967. 
56 Haley 2005; Lambert 2005. 
57 McCoskey 2012. 
58 Gruen 2012; Snowden 1983; Brunt 1965, 286. 
59 B. R. O. Anderson 1991. 
60 Marshall and Gurr 2005; cited in Kaufman 2006, 45. 
61 Kaufman 2006. 
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Race refers to descent and culture communities with two 
specific additions: 
1. idea that 'local' groups are instances of abstractly 
conceived divisions of humankind; and 
2. the idea that race makes explicit reference to physical 
or 'visible' difference as the primary marker of 
difference and inequality. 
Nation refers to descent and culture communities with one 
specific addition: 
1. The assumption that nations are or should be 
associated with a state or state-like political forms 
Ethnic group refers to descent and culture communities with 
three specific additions: 
1. that the group is a kind of sub-set within a nation-
state; 
2. that the point of reference of difference is typically 
cultural difference, and cultural markers of social 
boundaries, rather than physical appearance; 
3. often the group referred to is 'other' (foreign, exotic, 
minority) to some majority who are presumed not to 
be 'ethnic'.62 
Fenton’s definitions, reflecting wider biases in the Social Sciences, are 
overly presentist in their presumption of the universality of European-style 
nation-states, within which ethnic groups reside. With some minor 
modification, this scheme can be useful to describing groups in the ancient 
world at the time of the Middle Roman Republic. The implication that only 
race ‘has a strong association of biological difference linked to a universal 
classificatory system’ is valuable, and provides in more succinct terms the 
rationale of Isaac’s definitions of proto-racism.63 If we were to take ‘nation’ in 
the above scheme to have two meanings—one bound with civic identities 
and one with wider, regional ethnic identities, from which specific, localised 
instances of ethnicity are produced—we can make these definitions useful 
for the purposes of exploring ancient groups. 
                                            
62 Fenton 2010, 22, emphasis original. 
63 Fenton 2010, 23; Isaac 2004, 25–38. 
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 In the ancient world, civic identity was characteristically restrictive and 
localised. Most polities were limited to one metropolitan settlement, which 
controlled a territory that possibly contained lower order settlements. The 
identity models of urban and proto-urban settlements were based in culture 
and in descent. Most cities traced their descent to a founder figure, usually 
mythical and often plainly retroactively derived from the settlement’s name. 
Many cities traced their descent back to colonial foundations, which, whether 
imagined or real, functioned to link them by fictive descent to other polities in 
the interstate system.64 The lineages of descent and of origins that cities 
could accrue could be complex, overlapping, and self-contradictory, Rome 
itself being a good example.65 The apparent dissonance was no bar to the 
functional role that such descent played in the definition of groups.  
Ethnicities were understood as constructed in relation to both territorial 
or regional, and civic identities. This is most distinct of Hellenistic poleis,66 
but there could also be substantial overlap between state authorities and 
urban or proto-urban native settlements of Italy and elsewhere.67 The linkage 
between ethnicity and civic affiliation is shown by the manner in which 
federalisation could produce, or be based upon, a shared sense of ethnicity 
and descent.68 Cities and other (proto-)urban settlements were probably 
more important in the ancient world to the formation and maintenance of 
group identities than they are today. The groups of the ancient world, to 
which we can use the word ‘ethnicity’, were usually of smaller population 
size. They could be regional in nature. The Latins, Sabines, and so forth 
would be an example.69 Furthermore, because the key organisational 
structure was that, very roughly speaking, of the city-state, we need to 
consider ethnicity on a much smaller scale. Subethnic groups of peoples 
                                            
64 J. M. Hall 1997, 34–106. 
65 Dench 2005. 
66 Hansen 1995, 5–7; Hansen 1996, 194–95; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 62–63. 
67 Herring 2008, 283–84. 
68 J. M. Hall 2015. 
69 Accessible compendiums on the peoples of ancient Italy: G. J. Bradley, Isayev, and Riva 
2008; G. J. Bradley and Farney forthcoming; Popoli e Civiltà Dell’Italia Antica 1974. 
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belonging to the same city-ethnic were in many cases likely of greater 
importance to the individual than the supra-ethnic groups, or regional 
ethnics, in which their city-ethnic nestled. The annihilation of urban places 
could constitute the destruction of that group.70 
The notion of descent is recurrent in the nouns Latin afforded to 
describe groups of peoples. While populus seems to have been a neutral 
group noun in this regard, most inherently embedded a meaning of 
derivation; natio, gens, genus, and stirps all bear connotations of descent by 
kinship.71 They were flexible appellations, variously translating into English 
as, among other synonyms, ‘clan’, ‘tribe’, ‘family’, ‘race’, or ‘nation’. The 
synonymous, albeit rarer, use of the word semen to denote descent and 
belonging to a group makes it clear that there was an understanding that 
membership had a biological dimension.72 Indeed, such genetic theories of 
the descent of physiognomic traits can be traced at least as far as 
Herodotus’ fifth-century BCE description of the black skin and ejaculate of 
Ethiopians and Indians.73 The Romans of the Middle Republic without doubt 
did see physiognomic differences between themselves and others, as the 
much-debated descriptions of Hanno and his daughters in Plautus’ Poenulus 
show.74 Associations between geographically-bounded descent and moral or 
customary stereotypes, often linked to geographic determinism, also suggest 
the appreciation of pronounced difference which could in some way be 
inheritable. Environmental conditions were thought to mould both body and 
character.75 These differences were believed to have been created a 
dichotomy between the peoples of highland and lowland habitats, but were 
not immutable.76 These ideas likely did not amount to racialised worldviews, 
                                            
70 van Wees 2010, 243–44. 
71 Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1982 for examples of their numerous usages. 
72 Cic., Leg. agr., 2.35.95, Cic., Phil., 4, 5, 13; Liv., 1.47; Var., R., 2.2.4; Plaut., Rud., 2.2.23. 
73 Hdt., 3.101.2; Eur., Supp., 219-225. 
74 Franko 1996; Franko 1994; Gratwick 1971; On Hanno’s daughters, I am indebted to the 
presentation by J. Allen 2017, which will hopefully soon appear in print. 
75 Cic., Diu., 2.96-97; Vitr., 6.1.3-5; Manilius, Astronomica, 4.711-730; Sen., De ira, 2.15; 
Plin., Nat., 2.79-80; Ptol., Tetr., 2.2; Veg., 1.2; cp. Apul., Apol., 24. 
76 Gal., Comm. on Airs, Water, Places, 24; Strabo, 2.5.26, 4.6.3, 4.6.6, 5.2.7; Cass. Dio, 
54.24.3; Isaac 2004, 93, 204, 410. 
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although they may have represented a proto-racist basis for ethnic 
prejudices. 
Groups 
Whether the communities that suffered deliberate complete or partial 
destruction at Roman hands can be considered as racial or ethnic in 
composition, they are nonetheless groups. They typically shared cultural and 
societal traits, as well as common descent. They imagined themselves, or 
were imagined by outsider Romans, to belong to the same community. 
Mohammed Abed argues for a similarly inclusive definition instead of 
pedantry over definitions, and draws our attention to the suffering that the 
destruction of such groups causes: 
If the members of a group consent to a life in common, if the 
culture of the group is comprehensive, and if the social 
structure of the group is such that membership cannot easily 
be renounced, then the flourishing of the group's culture and 
social ethos will have profound and far-reaching effects on 
the well-being of its individual members. Systematic 
destruction of cultural and social institutions under these 
conditions will eventuate in individuals suffering […] ‘social 
death’ is the harm that distinguishes genocide from other 
forms of political violence.77 
The issue of ‘social death’ will have importance in the discussion of mass 
enslavement as a form of genocide in chapter three. The nested nature of 
group identity in the ancient world, in which ethnic membership, self-
ascription, and etic attribution operated in complex ways, means that we 
should consider the destruction of these various groups of varying 
sociocultural types. 
What is ‘destruction’? 
Having defined what constitutes a ‘group’—and if we are to understand that 
genocide in the ancient world constitutes a set of actions and/or outcomes 
                                            
77 Abed 2006, 308. 
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resulting from an intention to destroy a group, wholly or in part—then we 
should also define what constitutes ‘destruction’. Destruction can be defined 
as: 
Some form and measurable degree of damage inflicted on 
an object, a system or a being, usually exceeding the stage 
during which repair is still possible but most often […] 
examined for its impact with destructive events interpreted in 
terms of a punctuated equilibrium, extraordinary features 
that represent the end of an archaeological culture or 
historical phase and the beginning of a new one.78 
Groups are systems, dynamically produced by the interaction of their 
constituents, and such systems can, while subject to incremental changes, 
be stable in their features over long durations. Such equilibrial systems may, 
however, undergo periods of sudden, dramatic change, or be ‘punctuated’, 
often because of a new, external pressure.79 Destruction is therefore a crisis 
that causes a previous sociocultural condition, of the continuity of a cohesive 
group or community, to cease to be. Destruction is both process and 
outcome. The concept of punctuated equilibria contrasts with the slower 
evolution of social, economic, or political affairs, and usually represents a 
dramatic change in a short time span, usually a single event. 
This study identifies three primary methods by which the Romans 
brought other groups to destruction during the Middle Republic: mass killing, 
physically destroying the members of the group; enslavement, violently 
removing the members from the group; and urban annihilation, destroying 
the means of structuring the way of life of a group. Some of these 
destructions will be archaeologically marked by a destruction layer sealing 
the site, others by sudden changes in settlement behaviour, whilst others will 
only be traceable in written sources. 
                                            
78 Driessen 2013, 6; See also: Engels, Martens, and Wilkin 2013; Rakoczy 2008a. 
79 Gaddis 2002, 84-88; Tucker 2009; Gould 2007, 229ff. 
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Historical context 
The period of this study was one of significant expansion of Roman power. 
In 343 BCE Rome was an important local power, just about known outside 
Italy but relatively unimportant in terms of the oecumene, the ancient 
Mediterranean world system.80 The Romans were in control of the Latin 
League of nearby city-states, and had incorporated the territory of several 
other nearby states, most notably the Etruscan city of Veii in 393 BCE.81 In 
343 BCE, they became engaged in a series of conflicts known to us as the 
Samnite Wars, with the inhabitants of Samnium to the south of Campania. 
Probably a series of ad hoc skirmishes and annual campaigns rather than 
strategically planned imperial ventures, at least at first, by 290 BCE they were 
victorious against the Samnites, and had expanded their hegemony over 
larger swathes of peninsular Italy. A series of wars with other powers drew 
the Romans increasingly onto the international scene: first seeing off 
Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, in 275 BCE; then committing forces overseas for the 
first time in 264 BCE when, travelling to Sicily, they engaged in the first of 
their wars with Carthage. It concluded in 241 BCE, but another would start in 
218 BCE when Hannibal crossed the Alps from Spain. By 201 BCE when the 
Romans were victorious in this Second Punic War, they were thoroughly 
occupied conquering Spain, and had fought their first, albeit somewhat 
phoney, war with Macedonia. Further wars in the East with Macedonia would 
increasingly enmesh Rome in Hellenistic affairs.  
By 146 BCE Rome was no longer a leading local state, but had fought 
its way to be the hegemonic leader of the entire oecumene. They confirmed 
this power by the destruction in that same year of two great cities in wars to 
the West and East: the Punic republic of Carthage, and the leading city of 
the Achaean Greeks, Corinth. The Greek historian Polybius had intended to 
end his work charting Rome’s rise to dominance in 168 BCE. The events of 
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the following decades prompted him to extend it to 146 BCE, thinking that it 
was when the Mediterranean world had truly been united. This was the 
symploke, the interweaving of states, of the Mediterranean system.82 In the 
words of Diodorus Siculus, ‘once they held sway over virtually the whole 
inhabited world, they confirmed their power by terror and by the destruction 
of the most eminent cities’.83 
The remarkable success of the Romans in extending their hegemony in 
these two centuries has generated diverse historiographical explanations 
about the nature of Roman imperialism.84 The most influential study of the 
past few decades has been W.V. Harris’s War and Imperialism in 
Republican Rome, 327-70 BC.85 Drawing on a wealth of evidence, Harris 
dismantled the narratives of defensive imperialism that had previously been 
dominant,86 stressing the exceptional bellicosity and imperialism of the 
Roman state. Subsequent studies stressed the roles of fear, greed, and 
glory in Roman imperialism.87 Recent studies have, however, reassessed 
this narrative. Paul Burton’s study has echoes of Ernst Badian’s model of 
clientelae, though predicated on interstate social relations of amicitia.88 In 
this, Burton borrows from the Constructivist branch of International 
Relations, following the important, neoliberal-influenced IR Realist study of 
A.M. Eckstein in 2006.89 Eckstein’s approach concentrates on the Roman 
Republic, but recontextualises it as a peer polity within the Mlediterranean 
interstate anarchy. These studies do not undermine Rome’s bellicosity or 
imperialism in rising to power, but do provide alternative models to Harris’ 
                                            
82 Walbank 2010. 
83 Diod. Sic., 32.4 5, trans. adapted from F.R. Walton: οὗτοι δὲ σχεδὸν τὴν ἀρχὴν πάσης τῆς 
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exceptionalism. They allow for greater agency of other states within the 
international system, and for the role of opportunism. Studies such as 
Michael Fronda’s on Southern Italy in the Hannibalic war, provide evidence 
that support the importance of the decisions and actions of other 
communities in interacting with Roman imperialism.90  
Evidence and sources 
Uncovering the history of destruction in the Middle Republic poses problems 
when it comes to evidence, difficulties starkly different from investigations of 
modern genocide. We utterly lack what modern historians would consider 
primary documentary evidence for this period. Even the fasti, although 
generally reliable for the Middle Republic, were drawn up later.91 This study 
therefore draws on what remains of the ancient literary accounts and 
archaeological materials. 
The destruction of groups is difficult to detect in the archaeology.92 For 
a start, the uncovering of datable mass graves would provide valuable data 
on how this mass destruction was carried out. Sites such as mass graves or 
in-situ skeletal remains could help us to interpret violence in the past.93 
Sporadic evidence of this type does contribute in a limited way to our 
knowledge of mid-Republican violence.94 We do know that in the Late 
Republic, the urban poor at Rome had recourse to disposing of their dead in 
either mass burials at several locations, of which the puticuli uncovered by 
Rodolfo Lanciani provide archaeological evidence, or in mass crematoria, 
while during epidemics dumping in the Tiber or public sewers was 
common.95 Back-filled ditches, large pyres stacked with bodies or the 
exposure in situ of the bodies of the slain would have been the likely fates of 
                                            
90 Fronda 2010. 
91 C. J. Smith 2011. 
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93 Marta Dockalová 2005; Hoffmann 2013, 86; Lacomba and Galvez 1995; Generally, see 
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the victims of Roman mass killing. Similarly, the material remains of cities 
and other settlements can be helpful in interpreting the nature and scope of 
violence, as shall be shown, but their destruction layers seldom lend 
themselves to an incontrovertible interpretation when it comes to the lives of 
the former inhabitants, and therefore their groups. On the other side, there is 
precious little archaeological evidence available with which we could identify 
mass killing by the Romans in this period. Evidence is lacking for triumphal 
display and representation of violence at Rome. We know from literary 
sources that there was a tradition for this.96 Comparative evidence, such as 
reliefs on Trajan’s Column or the François Tomb from fourth-century Vulci, 
suggest how the Romans might have represented and responded to their 
own violence towards others, or the methods by which they carried out 
violence against them. 
The literary evidence is patchy and little of what survives is 
contemporary to the events they describe. Polybius’ Histories are essential 
for the period after 218 BCE, but out of forty books those after book 5 are 
fragmentary or lacunose and books 17, 19, 37, and 40 are missing entirely. 
His eyewitness account of the fall of Carthage is therefore missing. Our other 
great surviving source on this period, the Augustan historian Livy is also 
fragmentary, and missing entirely for the years 292-219 BCE.97 Diodorus 
Siculus, a contemporary of Livy, is important in places, although fragmentary 
past 302 BCE.98 The Antiquitates Romanae of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
another Augustan Greek, are occasionally helpful, but, as the name 
suggests, focussed on Early Rome; originally ending in 264 BCE, the latter 
half of his twenty-book work is fragmentary. There are, however, a host of 
lesser historical works that frequently offer up information, including Appian, 
Cassius Dio, and later epitomists Florus, the anonymous epitomiser of the 
Livian Periochae, Zonaras, Orosius, and Eutropius. These are further 
removed in time than the Augustan historians or Polybius. To these survivors 
of the genre of history writing, it is necessary to observe that important 
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supplementary information can be found in several other sources. Most 
useful are various works by Cicero, by Plutarch, especially his historically-
minded Vitae Parallelae, and by the geographers Strabo and Pausanias. 
There is no surviving continuous narrative for the years 293-264 BCE, a fact 
which undoubtedly led to an underreporting of incidents of relevance to this 
study that date to that period. This cannot be avoided. 
Many of the later sources derived, sometimes very closely, from still-
extant antecedents, while testimonials suggest something of the other 
historical sources that they might have followed.99 We are aware of more 
than a hundred Roman writers of history alone, although only a tiny fraction 
of their work survives, and an even smaller slice of the pre-Sallustian 
works.100 We are, for example, aware of early works of the Roman historians 
contemporary to the period of this study by Q. Fabius Pictor, Cato the Elder, 
L. Cassius Hemina, Paullus Clodius, P. Rutilius Rufus, although none now 
exist except in fragments.101 Our source materials are therefore uneven. This 
has led to deep scepticism about the veracity of the historical record as we 
have received it. Karl-Wilhelm Welwei, for example, thought that the 
numbers for the pre-202 BCE enslavements discussed in his authoritative 
monograph were inventions of later annalists.102 Some even deride the 
presence of quantities in any of the histories of Rome as pure invention, 
symbolism, and formula.103 T.P. Wiseman has argued across several works 
that early Roman historiography is wholly insufficient to reconstruct more 
than glimmers of their subject matter.104 There are, however, positive 
arguments for the basic veracity of our sources. Although imperfect and 
subject to various authorial biases, the ancient historians were attempting to 
reconstruct truthful accounts of their pasts, and were constrained by 
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103 See however the analysis of Greek poetry and history by Rubincam 2003; Rubincam 
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expectations that they should not deviate beyond the known facts of 
history.105 In many cases, our historians demonstrate their willingness to 
carry out research into the past, and to sifting through their available 
historiographical materials.106 They almost certainly had access to some 
public and private archival records, including family histories, although how 
far back they went and in what detail is debatable.107  
Nonetheless, the evidence presented by our sources must be 
considered with the general caveat that it may be inaccurate, particularly 
when it comes to the possibility that numbers and events are exaggerated. 
Our sources are not above naming and shaming their own sources where 
they think that they have caught them being hyperbolic, Strabo saying that 
‘both generals and historians easily fall into this type of deception, by 
exaggerating their deeds’.108 Generals will, like historians, have been 
constrained by the need to match the accounts of others, and were not free 
to embellish their deeds without checks.109 By the Augustan age, strong 
genre expectations emerged with the evolution and speciation of single-war 
monographs, autobiographical memoirs, and expanded histories in the 
annalist tradition.110 The Roman tradition was heavily influenced by the 
Greek—indeed the first Roman historian, Fabius Pictor, wrote in Greek—as 
well as their own indigenous tradition of record keeping as consolidated into 
the Annales Maximi.111 Attempts to draw intertextual links will also have 
governed lexical choices.112 For the present study, this may mean that 
literary representations of the sacking of cities are unduly influenced by 
tropes. Indeed, this topos was noted by ancient authors, as when Polybius 
                                            
105 Lendon 2012, 41–45. 
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attacked Phylarchus for his overly pathetic approach to writing about the 
miseries visited on a town during a sack.113 However, Polybius himself opts 
for some of the very same techniques of pathos of which he is so critical 
when it comes to others. Livy, too, was clearly self-aware of such topoi in the 
writing of history and of his own use and relationship to them.114  
 In summary, the evidence is far from complete. However, there are 
sufficient attestations of acts of group destruction within the literature, as well 
as supplementary archaeological materials, that this evidence should be 
confronted.  
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided according to the types of sets of actions and/or 
outcomes resulting from an intention to destroy a group, wholly or in part. 
The chapters correspond to the methods by which the Romans of the Middle 
Republic destroyed other groups as defined in this introduction, comprising 
in order of appearance: mass killing, being the method of genocide 
recognised near universally; mass enslavement, which argues that the 
‘social death’ of the members of entire communities destroyed those groups; 
urban annihilation, which looks at the ever-present threat to the existence of 
cities in the ancient world, and whether this threatened the groups that 
inhabited them; and this theme is continued in the following chapter on 
forced urban relocation, which looks at whether transductions represented 
attempts to destroy ethnic groups. Evidence and tables of incidents are 
provided with each of these chapters. While some cases fall firmly into one 
or another category of destruction, many incidents of Roman genocidal 
behaviour were multimodal and correspond to multiple chapters. For ease of 
comparison, the reader may consult the appendix of incidents at the end of 
the present study. 
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Following the typological chapters, the issue of submission is discussed 
in chapter six. It focusses on the Roman concept of fides, and its application 
as a praxis of interstate relations. This custom structured Roman 
approaches to destroying other groups, and provided the conceptual 
frameworks both to de-escalate violence against other communities as well 
as to enact their destruction. 
The concluding chapter provides an overview of the typologies and 
causations of genocide discussed throughout the preceding chapters. It 
posits overall arguments about the validity of the model of mid-Republican 
genocide, when and against whom the Romans used genocidal violence, 
and provides an explanatory mechanism for variance in behaviour from 
potential victim group to potential victim group.  
  
Chapter Two 
— 
Mass killing  
Introduction 
As discussed previously, definitions of genocide are highly contested, yet all 
accept the role to be played by mass killing. Because of this, the Middle 
Republican Roman use of mass killing to destroy groups is the first type of 
genocide discussed in this work. Mass killing need not have destroyed the 
whole group to have been genocide; the partial eradication of a victim group, 
its destruction in part, is genocidal if the intention was to cause the 
destruction of the group. As we shall see, where they carried out genocidal 
mass killings, the Romans rarely sought the wholescale destruction of the 
victim group through murder, but complemented it with the other types of 
destruction discussed later in this study. Mass killing of at least part of the 
victim group was normative, forming a standard pattern of Roman behaviour 
towards other communities. However, it was typically constrained to 
scenarios that met certain criteria, in particular to the event of the storming of 
an enemy settlement. Mass killing outside of these conditions was generally 
non-normative, occurring infrequently and generally considered as deviating 
from Roman customary behaviours. This chapter looks first at Roman norm-
abiding genocidal mass killing, then at instances that fell outside or flouted 
these norms.  
Talking about mass killing 
The preferred language in this chapter is the term ‘mass killing’. Mass killing 
implies the destruction of a relatively large number of persons, in one or 
more instances of killing. Other terms such as massacre and mass murder, 
are less neutral, and suggest an assumption of moral censure, although they 
can also be appropriate. Massacre typically denotes a single event involving 
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the killing of many persons, usually by an aggressor wielding an 
overwhelming military superiority over a helpless or relatively undefended 
victim group. Similarly, mass murder implies an illegal or unlawful action, 
perpetrated in one or more instances of killing. The use of this term would 
perhaps, in most cases of Middle Republican killing, be inappropriate, 
retrojecting modern assumptions of international law into ancient contexts.  
As there is a modern-English lexis of mass killing, the Romans too had 
a vocabulary or lexical field with which they could refer to mass killing. Most 
of these form twinned pairs comprising a related noun and verb.115 
Deletum/deleo meant to ‘annihilate’ / ‘to erase, efface, obliterate, blot out’ but 
is often used of the annihilation of a city as a city (on which see chapter 3), 
rather than specifically denoting the mass killing of inhabitants. Strages, a 
relatively uncommon term, has a range of meanings including ‘overthrow, 
destruction, ruin, defeat, slaughter, massacre, butchery, carnage’, but does 
not differentiate between types of carnage, from battlefield to natural 
disaster. For example, Livy used it of a boulder falling calamitously from the 
Capitol onto the street below.116 Diruo/diripio meant ‘to tear asunder, tear in 
pieces’ and could imply mass killing or any tumultuous sacking of a city. This 
term was investigated by Adam Ziółkowski, (discussed below), who identified 
it as the primary lexis governing how the Romans sacked cities.117 However, 
it need not necessarily mean killing and indeed among its senses are those 
of demolishing either physical objects such as cities or, in a transferred 
sense, organisations or even made to refer to pay or bankruptcy.118 
Trucidatio, which is again uncommon, indicated ‘a slaughter, massacre, 
butchery’. When used, it is usually in relation to battlefield fighting, but can 
also be used of massacre. This sense of massacre could include post-battle 
rout, which could become ‘no longer a fight, but a butchering as of cattle’, 
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showing that there was an appreciation of the difference between fair 
combat and asymmetrical slaughter as there is with English ‘massacre’.119  
Occisio/occidio (alternatively spelled obcisio/obcidio) meant ‘a 
massacre, slaughter, murder’ and ‘a massacre, utter destruction, 
extermination’ respectively. While these are better indicators of the act of 
killing than most of this lexical field, the latter is subject to transference to a 
meaning like deletum, and therefore cannot indicate the mass killing with 
complete security. The use of occisio to describe anything from a single 
killing to an entire extirpation suggests that this lexis is not part of a 
specialised terminology, but ordinary parts of speech. Indeed, in many 
cases, the killing is assumed and subsumed into a term describing a wider 
effect.120 Although this represents a lexis by which mass killing could be 
discussed, and provides the opportunity for attenuation of nuanced 
discussion, it does not seem that the Romans had by this point developed 
any kind of taxonomic terminology for mass killing. The expressions that 
reach us from the sources betray a lexical set through which such killing 
could be discussed, but any attempt to take such language as specific and 
specialised is fraught.  
Mass killing in urban centres 
Once the carnage that resulted from battlefield confrontations between the 
Romans and their enemies are put to one side, it is the massacre of the 
population of urban centres that comprise most of their genocidal mass 
killings. Indeed, the killing of the inhabitants of urban centres was part of an 
expected set of behaviours for the Romans, forming a norm within the 
customary laws of war between peoples or polities. Livy noted that the mass 
killing of besieged populations was normative by the rights of war (belli 
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iure).121 Their inhabitants could expect this treatment if their city were to be 
taken by storm.122 Polybius also describes killing as ‘usual in the storming of 
cities’.123 The constraint of the norms of mass killing to scenarios of the 
assault and sacking of urban sites or settlements is demonstrated by the 
censure for those who carried out immoral massacres on rural populations. 
Thus, Polybius’ declaration of norms was made in contradistinction to the 
strategy supposedly employed by Hannibal of killing all adults encountered 
by his army on their march through Umbria and Picenum after the Battle of 
Trasimene. Such behaviour was the purview of the unusually cruel, 
motivated in this case by Hannibal’s ‘innate hatred’ (μῖσος ἔμφυτον) of the 
Romans.124 Later, Cicero would compare the cruelty of Hannibal to the 
probity of Pyrrhus although both invaded Italy.125 Furthermore, Cicero clearly 
thought that civil war entailed widespread bloodshed beyond combatants. He 
could later address Julius Caesar’s clemency by saying to him, ‘you are 
alone, I say, by whom in victory no-one was killed unless they were 
armed’.126 
The Romans thought that the partial mass killing of inhabitants as a 
norm of war had precedence at least as far back as their quasi-legendary 
past. Dionysius of Halicarnassus recounted the Roman story of Tarquinius 
Superbus’ capture of Suessa Pometia in a manner reminiscent of later, more 
historical episodes. Having taken it by storm, Tarquinius ‘being now master 
of the city, put to death all he found in arms’, carrying off the remainder as 
booty along with the gold and silver.127 Soon after, the inhabitants of Gabii 
were surprised to find that, their city having been betrayed to Tarquinius, 
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123 Polyb., 3.86.10-11, trans. W.R. Paton: καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν πόλεων καταλήψεσι. 
124 Polyb., 3.86.11. 
125 Cic., Amic., 28: cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et 
Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus; alterum 
propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit. 
126 Cic., Deiot., 12.34. 
127 Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom., 4.50.4-5: γενόμενος δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς τοὺς μὲν ἐν τοῖς 
ὅπλοις διέφθειρε. Cf. Liv., 1.53.2-3. 
 
Mass killing 
35 
they were not also to be massacred indiscriminately.128 While Dionysius 
attributed this apparent clemency from Tarquinius to his need to gain foreign 
supporters to help prop up his tyrannical regime, that the historian thought 
that those involved should have anticipated mass killing tells us about later 
practice, and possibly earlier practice too. Killing at least part of the 
inhabitants of a captured city was the norm, letting them go the exception.  
Ancient historiographic attitudes towards normative mass killing were 
not necessarily straightforward. Livy showed himself capable of flagging the 
moral turpitude of negative exempla among Roman leaders for harsh, unfair, 
and brutal treatments of victims.129 Yet his opprobrium results not from the 
acts themselves but rather the ways in which they flouted the mos maiorum. 
Livy’s presentation, in common with the genre of ancient history writing, is 
influenced by a heightening of effect by the wretched nature of victims of 
Roman aggression, without necessarily censuring its use. This is not a 
contradictory or dissonant approach, but rather characteristic of ancient, and 
indeed Roman, attitudes to what we would deem to be wartime atrocities. It 
was just the way things were. The views of most ancient commentators of 
the historical genre echo the realpolitik of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue that 
‘in human considerations justice is what is decided when equal forces are 
opposed, while possibilities are what superiors impose and the weak 
acquiesce to’.130 Of course, the consequence of that dialogue was the 
massacre of the Melian adult males by the Athenians following their eventual 
surrender under duress. Mass killing, as a reality of mid-Republican Roman 
practice, would be carried out in one of two modes: indiscriminate or 
selective. 
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Indiscriminate urban mass-killing 
While our sources are often vague, and mass death can only be inferred by 
broad references to their destruction, explicit notices of the indiscriminate 
mass killing of urban inhabitants are frequent. This killing could encompass 
the entirety of the population, killing every man, woman, and child. More 
commonly however, it was partial, and encompassed the killing of everyone 
within a constrained duration. The genocidal effects of indiscriminate mass 
killing of a population group are not hard to comprehend. The classical 
model for how Romans carried out killing as part of sacking urban 
settlements was laid out by Polybius, in his account of Scipio the Elder’s 
sack of Carthago Nova in 209 BCE: 
When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops had 
entered he sent most of them, as is the Roman custom, 
against the inhabitants of the city with orders to kill all they 
encountered, sparing none, and not to start pillaging until the 
signal was given. […] on this occasion, such slaughter was 
very great owing to the numbers of those in the place.131 
Polybius, who himself witnessed Roman military behaviours while 
accompanying Scipio’s adopted son Scipio Aemilianus (i.e. Scipio the 
Younger), was both in awe of the discipline behind this phased method of 
securing urban sites—and the subsequent collectivisation of the booty—and 
of the violent spectacle that Roman indiscriminate killing produced. 
Recording that often towns captured by the Romans were treated to this 
violence, with not just humans but animals butchered on the streets, he 
                                            
131 Polyb., 10.15.4-6, trans. adapted from W.R. Paton, F.W. Walbank, and Ch. Habicht: ὁ δὲ 
Πόπλιος ἐπεὶ τοὺς εἰσεληλυθότας ἀξιόχρεως ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἐφῆκε 
κατὰ τὸ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, παραγγείλας κτείνειν τὸν παρατυχόντα καὶ 
μηδενὸς φείδεσθαι, μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς ὠφελείας ὁρμᾶν, μέχρις ἂν ἀποδοθῇ τὸ σύνθημα […] 
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supposed that the purpose of this custom of brutal and spectacular mass 
killing was to ‘inspire terror’ in others.132 
Ziółkowski criticised this Polybian model of phased assault, arguing that 
the Roman mode of sacking cities was governed by a chaotic tearing apart 
of the city, in which killing was associated with uncontrolled plunder and 
rape, as indicated by the semantic field of diripio.133 Polybius’ relationship 
and attitudes towards Rome and the Romans were complex, and subject to 
much debate in modern historiography.134 Indeed, as part of his agenda was 
to explain Roman matters to a Greek audience newly under Roman sway, 
he tends towards over-schematisation or misunderstanding. However, he 
was well placed to comment on the sack of Carthago Nova, having access to 
evidence from multiple oral and documentary sources.135 Ziółkowski draws 
too much on diripio to explain the sacking of towns and this colours his 
approach accordingly. The wider lexis of mass killing, discussed above, 
suggests that there was a broader range of possibilities and of describing 
what it was that Romans did to captured cities. Ziółkowski puts too much 
emphasis on the individualist determinism of legionaries, for example in not 
killing women to rape them.136 In any case, in many of the examples that he 
cites as counters to Polybius’ model, there are indeed signs of the regulation 
of killing, especially through the giving of signals to start or stop. It was likely 
that indiscriminate killing was in part due to the speed and ferocity of the 
Roman assault, which would have ensured the best chance of victory at the 
least risk to the attacking forces.137 It is therefore likely that it was a normal 
part of the way in which the Romans sacked cities, although in many cases 
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the intention might not have been to destroy the group per se through killing, 
rather the speedy and effective securing of a hostile urban environment. 
Livy describes how he imagines a Roman sack to look with his account 
of the storming of Velitrae in 494 BCE. The Romans, flushed with victory on 
the battlefield and the routing of their opponents,  
Pursued their enemies beyond [the camp] to Velitrae, where 
vanquished and victors burst into the city in one body. More 
blood was shed there, in the promiscuous slaughter of all 
sorts of people, than had been in the battle itself. A very few 
were granted quarter, having come without arms and given 
themselves up.138 
Livy’s chief interest is in how the Romans came to enter Velitrae, that the 
storming of the town unusually resulted ad hoc from a battlefield rout, rather 
than the fact of the bloodshed itself.139 Its depopulation may have been 
behind Rome’s subsequent sending out of a colony to it.140 That Roman 
forces would destroy the greater part of the human life of a polity goes 
without censure from the historian. As with Velitrae, mass killing of 
inhabitants of captured cities, or those in the process of being captured, was 
often linked with a retributive purpose. This is the case with the retributive 
mass killing that was carried out of Lucerians and Samnites at Luceria in 314 
BCE, the complete erasure of which only being forestalled by Roman leaders 
beseeching the Plebeian Assembly, with the outcome of its refoundation as 
a colony.141 At Casilinum the inhabitants were subjected to caedes 
promiscue, ‘general slaughter’, which ensued from an abortive attempt on 
the part of the Campanian residents to parley just as the Roman assault got 
underway.142 Livy's commentary that the siege was already in progress may 
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in this case be a signal that was intended to assert the legitimacy of the 
killing, which, as at Velitrae, possessed an almost farcical tone as the 
Roman soldiers burst through opened gates and engaged in indiscriminate 
slaughter. By the Late Republic, it is likely that the point at which the 
battering rams first touched the walls indicated the start of the siege proper, 
after which the chances of clemency from the Romans were much 
diminished.143 Although presented as chaotic, the historian is nonetheless 
careful to establish the legitimacy of Roman killing in this instance.  
Other cases of mass killing resulted from similarly confused 
circumstances. At Orongis, a Spanish town, in 207 BCE there was a mass 
killing that ensued from the voluntary opening of the city gates by the 
inhabitants, who feared the imminent, indiscriminate slaughter of both 
themselves and the Carthaginian garrison.144 They were in this case killed 
unintentionally, presenting themselves in what the Roman besiegers mistook 
to be a sally. Livy is specific in noting that there was no further bloodshed, in 
contrast to his own expectations as well as those he ascribes to the 
Orongians. This city was singled out for attack because Scipio, noting the 
extended field of operations, was minded that ‘to circle troops around against 
the cities singularly would be a longer work than it was great’ but that he 
nonetheless did not wish to concede the territory of the Bastitanian 
Maesesses to Carthaginian control uncontested.145 Instead he sent his 
brother Lucius against Orongis, as the richest city (opulentissima urbes) in 
that location, as a show of strength to intimidate the whole territory. This sort 
of strategic consideration in the selection of victim groups seems to have 
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been common. It suggests that the destructive processes of Roman 
imperialism could and did have at times explicit and considered goals in 
terms of influencing broader interstate systems and in the expansion of 
hegemony, beyond the short-termism of personal or economic 
considerations often ascribed to Republican imperialism. Of course, the 
presence of silver mining in the area may suggest a long-term economic 
rationale.146 
In many of the examples of normative indiscriminate mass killing, the 
accounts survive in our sources because of some other point of interest. 
Thus, when Geronium refused to surrender to Hannibal when the chance 
was offered, it was besieged and its inhabitants put to sword in 217 BCE. 
However, Polybius was mainly interested in this event not because of the 
killing but because most of the walls and houses, which is to say the urban 
infrastructure, were preserved by Hannibal for subsequent military use.147 
This latter point is marked more than the killing. This passage also suggests 
that the mass killing of captured inhabitants may have been normative to 
other peoples, and argues against the notion of Roman exceptionalism in 
this regard. While it may be an example of Polybius building up an image of 
punica fides,148 the seeming normalcy of the Romans also committing mass 
killing upon capturing urban centres should caution us against assuming that 
this is the case. Other descriptions of the storming of cities in our period of 
interest indeed support the notion of chaotic mass killing of inhabitants. 
Sometimes, as with Velitrae, this killing is mentioned incidentally to another 
point of more interest to the author, and presumably their audience. This is, 
for example, the case with M. Claudius Marcellus’ sack of parts of Syracuse. 
Livy’s focus remained on specific points of curiosity, such as the manner of 
Marcellus’ decision making, and the despoliation and transportation of 
aesthetically prominent cultic objects. The killing of Archimedes is also 
                                            
146 Lowe 2009, 75. 
147 Polyb., 3.100; cp. Liv., 22.18.7, who says that the town was already abandoned do to the 
collapse of a wall, but is inconsistent, 23.9. 
148 Cp. Gruen 2012, 115–16. 
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notable in Livy’s description, but that is a special case from the general 
carnage, and likely prominent in no small part due to the stories that accrued 
to his composure and disinterest in the face of his own demise.149  
In other cases, as with the description of the pitiful destructions of 
human lives at the capture of Carthage in 146 BCE, the chaotic nature of 
mass killing takes foreground. Probably drawing on eye-witness Polybius, 
Appian wrote that, after taking the harbour, Scipio Aemilianus moved on the 
Byrsa, the densely packed area of the citadel, where street-to-street fighting 
commenced:  
Then came new scenes of horror. The fire spread and 
carried everything down, and the soldiers did not wait to 
destroy the buildings little by little, but pulled them all down 
together. So the crashing grew louder, and many corpses 
fell with the stones into the midst. Others were seen still 
living, especially old men, women, and young children who 
had hidden in the inmost nooks of the houses, some of them 
wounded, some more or less burned, and uttering horrible 
cries. Still others, thrust out and falling from such a height 
with the stones, timbers, and fire, were torn asunder into all 
kinds of horrible shapes, crushed and mangled. Nor was this 
the end of their miseries, for the stonemasons, who were 
removing the rubbish with axes, mattocks, and boat-hooks, 
and making the roads passable, tossed with these 
instruments the dead and the living together into holes in the 
ground, sweeping them along like sticks and stones or 
turning them over with their iron tools, and man was used for 
filling up a ditch. Some were thrown in head foremost, while 
their legs, sticking out of the ground, writhed a long time. 
Others fell with their feet downward and their heads above 
ground. Horses ran over them, crushing their faces and 
skulls, not purposely on the part of the riders, but in their 
headlong haste. Nor did the street cleaners either do these 
things on purpose; but the press of war, the glory of 
approaching victory, the rush of the soldiery, the confused 
noise of heralds and trumpeters all round, the tribunes and 
centurions changing guard and marching the cohorts hither 
                                            
149 Liv., 25.25.7, 31.8-11, 31.9-10; Cic., Rep., 1.21; Cic., Fin., 5.19.50; Val. Max., 8.7.ext.7; 
Plin., Nat., 7.125; Plut., Marc., 19.4; Zonar., 9.5. 
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and thither—all together made everybody frantic and 
heedless of the spectacle before their eyes.150 
The terrible sights, smells, and sounds of such a scene are palpable, and we 
might conjecture that they left a strong impression on Polybius. Carthage 
was the largest metropolis in which the Romans carried out mass killing in 
the Middle Republic, and the density of the high-rise habitations meant 
greater slaughter. In such circumstances, it appears that killing might have 
been wholescale without necessarily being an intended outcome. 
Nonetheless, indiscriminate, wholescale killing of this kind will have risked 
destroying the group, whether it was intended or not. 
Incidents involving smaller cities provide further examples of mass 
killing. Myttistratum seems to have been sacked as part of the First Punic 
War campaigns of the summer of 258 BCE. In both Zonaras, our fullest 
account, and in Polybius, the city is taken following stout resistance, the 
former repeating what was presumably Cassius Dio's assertion that the 
defence was achieved in part due to Carthaginian assistance.151 In Zonaras' 
account, in the manner of the previous examples of mass killing, the 
storming of the city was the result of the voluntary opening of the gates by 
                                            
150 App., Pun., 19.129, trans. adapted from H. White: Ἄλλη δ᾿ ἦν ἐκ τοῦδε ὄψις ἑτέρων 
κακῶν, τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς ἐπιφλέγοντος πάντα καὶ καταφέροντος, τῶν δε ἀνδρῶν τὰ 
οἰκοδομηματα οὐ διαιρούντων ἐς ὀλίγον, ἀλλ᾿ ἀθρόα βιαζομένων ἀνατρέπειν. ὅ τε γὰρ 
κτύπος ἐκ τοῦδε πολὺ πλείων ἐγίγνετο, καὶ μετὰ τῶν λίθων ἐξέπιπτον ἐς τὸ μέσον ἀθρόοι 
νεκροί. ζῶντές τε ἕτεροι, πρεσβῦται μάλιστα καὶ παιδία καὶ γύναια, ὅσα τοῖς μυχοῖς τῶν 
οἰκιῶν ἐκέκρυπτο, οἱ μὲν καὶ τραύματα φέροντες οἱ δ᾿ ἡμίφλεκτοι, φωνὰς ἀηδεῖς ἀφιέντες. 
ἕτεροι δ᾿, ὡς ἀπὸ τοσοῦδε ὕψους μετὰ λίθων καὶ ξύλων καὶ πυρὸς ὠθούμενοι καὶ 
καταπίπτοντες, ἐς πολλὰ σχήματα κακῶν διεσπῶντο ῥηγνύμενοί τε καὶ κατασπασσόμενοι. 
καὶ οὐδ᾿ ἐς τέλος αὐτοῖς ταῦτα ἀπέχρη· λιθολόγοι γὰρ ὅσοι πελέκεσι καὶ ἀξίναις καὶ κοντοῖς 
τὰ πίπτοντα μετέβαλλόν τε καὶ ὡδοποίουν τοῖς διαθέουσιν, οἱ μὲν τοῖς πελέκεσι καὶ ταῖς 
ἀξίναις, οἱ δὲ ταῖς χηλαῖς τῶν κοντῶν, τούς τε νεκροὺς καὶ τοὺς ἔτι ζῶντας ἐς τὰ τῆς γῆς 
κοῖλα μετέβαλλον ὡς ξύλα καὶ λίθους ἐπισύροντες ἢ ἀνατρέποντες τῷ σιδήρῳ, ἦν τε 
ἄνθρωπος ἀναπλήρωμα βόθρου. μεταβαλλόμενοι δ᾿ οἱ μὲν ἐς κεφαλὰς ἐφέροντο, καὶ τὰ 
σκέλη σφῶν ὑπερίσχοντα τῆς γῆς ἤσπαιρον ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· οἱ δ᾿ ἐς μὲν τοὺς πόδας ἔπιπτον 
κάτω, καὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς ὑπερεῖχον ὑπὲρ τὸ ἔδαφος, ἵπποι δ᾿ αὐτοὺς διαθέοντες ἐς τὰς ὄψεις 
ἢ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἐκόλαπτον, οὐχ ἑκόντων τῶν ἐποχουμένων ἀλλ᾿ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς, ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾿ 
οἱ λιθολόγοι ταῦτ᾿ ἔδρων ἑκόντες· ἀλλ᾿ ὁ τοῦ πολέμου πόνος καὶ ἡ δόξα τῆς νίκης ἐγγὺς καὶ 
ἡ τοῦ στρατοῦ σπουδή, καὶ κήρυκες ὁμοῦ καὶ σαλπικταὶ πάντα θορυβοῦντες, χιλίαρχοί τε καὶ 
λοχαγοὶ μετὰ τῶν τάξεων ἐναλλασσόμενοι καὶ διαθέοντες, ἔνθους ἅπαντας ἐποίουν καὶ 
ἀμελεῖς τῶν ὁρωμένων ὑπὸ σπουδῆς. 
151 Zonar., 8.11; Polyb., 1.24.10-11. 
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the besieged, the Carthaginian garrison having departed, leading to 'the 
Romans killing all' (οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πάντας ἐφόνευον) that they came across. 
Presumably the prior state of siege made this legitimate in the eyes of the 
ancient commentators, as no word is said against it. The indiscriminate 
killing continued until checked by the consul A. Atilius Caiatinus, offering any 
captured inhabitants as booty to whomever captured them. Diodorus Siculus 
merely notes that: 
The Romans, having put Myttistratum under siege for the 
third time, captured it, razed the city to the ground, and sold 
the surviving inhabitants as spoils of war.152 
This offers confirmation of sorts that the survivors were enslaved but tells us 
little about mass killing. It seems not to have been significant enough for him 
to warrant mentioning. 
The polity of the Aeolian island of Lipara became, in 252 BCE, the only 
recorded instance of a strategically mandated mass killing during the First 
Punic War, as opposed to one carried out ad hoc by the soldiers as seems 
to have been the case at Myttistratum.153 Only Zonaras records that all the 
inhabitants were killed (πάντας ἀπέκτεινε) at the command of the consul P. 
Servilius Geminus.154 However, other sources together with Zonaras allow 
the postulation of a reason for this genocidal action. The consul had 
delegated the command of military operations on the island to Q. Cassius, a 
blood relation, with strict orders to continue the siege but to avoid battle. 
Cassius seems to have disregarded these orders, leading to the loss of 
many of Servilius’ men, the firing of the line of siege works and the capture 
of the camp.155 The demotion of his subordinate on the one hand and the 
taking and slaughter of Lipara on the other seem to have been corrective 
                                            
152 Diod. Sic., 23.94. 
153 van Wees 2010, 250. 
154 Zonar., 8.14, incorrectly giving the name Aurelius Servilius in that location. 
155 Val. Max., 2.7.4; Front., Strat., 4.1.31; Polyb., 1.39.13; Diod. Sic., 23.20. Diod. Sic., 
14.93.5 suggests that at least the descendants of a certain Timasitheüs were permitted to 
survive because of the services of their ancestor. 
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measures. Servilius may have been influenced by the need to maintain the 
public image of the gens Servilii, of which the Gemini formed a branch, as 
stern disciplinarians, as well as by exemplars of correction from the Roman 
canon, of which tradition this was itself to become part.156 
The Hispanic town Iliturgi, along with its neighbouring Castulo, was 
massacred in 206 BCE.157 Livy stressed the justified retribution that the 
assault against the towns, which are described as equal in ‘greatness and 
guilt’, represented. Not only had they gone against Roman interests, being in 
rebellion to Roman hegemony, but had maltreated and put to death soldiers 
from the destroyed armies of the Scipios who had fled there. They were 
supposedly prepared to defend themselves as a tacit admission of their guilt, 
which Livy equates to a declaration of war from the Romans, a formal ritual 
of declaration seemingly not being a necessity.158 In this case, the 
conclusion was implied to have been predetermined due to the earlier 
mistreatment of Roman soldiers, but it is notable that, the retributive 
motivation notwithstanding, as in other cases this is an example of a polity 
which resisted and was subsequently subject to mass killing.  
The fate of the African city of Locha in 203 BCE is a clear signal that 
indiscriminate slaughter could result from Roman assault on urban centres in 
a chaotic and undisciplined manner, even under commanders as famed for 
their strict command and control as Scipio the Elder.  
They also besieged a large town called Locha, where they 
suffered great hardships. But as they were putting up the 
scaling ladders, the Lochaeans offered to leave the city 
under a truce. Thereupon Scipio sounded a retreat; but the 
soldiers, angry at what they had suffered in the siege, 
refused to obey. They scaled the walls and slaughtered both 
women and children indiscriminately. Scipio dismissed the 
survivors in safety; he then deprived the army of its booty 
and compelled the officers who had disobeyed orders to 
                                            
156 Cf. Farney 2007 on aristocratic family presentation; Roller 2004 on exemplarity. 
157 Liv., 28.19-20. 
158 Liv., 28.19.5. 
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cast lots publicly, and punished three of them, upon whom 
the lot had fallen, with death.159 
Hans van Wees correctly notes that this incident was the only mass killing 
perpetrated during the Roman counter-offensive in North Africa after 
Hannibal’s long occupation of Italy.160 Even the mass killing at Locha was 
evidentially not willed by the Roman elite, but was the result of near 
mutinous behaviour by the ordinary soldiers. On the one hand, this episode 
shows that the inducements and customs of indiscriminate killing were 
strong within the military culture of the Romans. On the other hand, were 
mass killing the only approach to the capture of urban settlements, then the 
its instance at Locha would not be the only recorded example from this 
campaign. 
Phocaea was in 190 BCE similarly subject to diripio by Roman soldiers 
acting against the wishes of their commander.161 The use of this lexis here 
suggests that the lives of the Phocaeans were imperilled, as does the notice 
that all that the praetor Aemilius Regillus could do in the moment was to 
gather all the free citizens (omnia liberos) in the forum to protect them from 
harm. The strategy towards the Phocaeans was to accept them into Roman 
fides, but they were nonetheless subject to indiscriminate killing by Roman 
soldiers at their own instigation. The sack followed the Romans' admittance 
through the voluntarily opened city gates. Their motivation must either have 
been psychological or pecuniary, therefore, with Livy ascribing their 
disobedience to their distaste in accepting the Phocaeans submission, that it 
was ‘an unworthy deed for the Phocaeans, never faithful to alliances, always 
inimical enemies, to escape with impunity’.162 Desire to punish, that is to say 
a retributive impulse, as well as the treacherousness of the former enemy 
                                            
159 App., Pun., 15; possible that ‘Locha’ = ‘Salaeca’ near Utica in Liv., 29.34 but the 
association is by no means secure. Cf. Locha/Salaeca discussed at Hoyos 2007, n. 72 
p.102, along with issues of Appian’s Punic Wars era place names. 
160 van Wees 2010, 250. 
161 Liv., 37.32.11-14, 37.32.11-14. 
162 Liv., 37.32.11: indignum facinus esse, Phocaeenses, numquam fidos socios, semper 
infestos hostes, impune eludere. 
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are provided as valid, or at least plausible, reasons for Roman soldiers to 
plunder and kill against the orders of their commanders. The perceived 
treacherousness was similarly used to justify the killing at Capsa, carried out 
in the surrendered town during the Jugurthine War ‘against the rights of war’ 
(contra ius belli), as well as the 214 BCE pre-emptory massacre of the 
inhabitants at Henna.163 Likewise, the Siciliote city of Henna came to be 
distrusted by the head of the Roman garrison there, L. Pinarius, who 
suspected that the Hennaians might be intending to surrender the town to 
the Carthaginians. He called the citizens to a public assembly and, at a 
prearranged signal, had his soldiers massacre them indiscriminately. The 
gates were barred to prevent escape. 
Selective mass killing in urban centres 
As mentioned above, instead of the indiscriminate killing of all or part of the 
populace of an urban centre, the Romans could kill selectively. Part of the 
victim population could be selected to be saved, or conversely to be killed. 
The two primary criteria used in these cases were gender and age. In most 
circumstances, the mass killing of either of these categories could lead to the 
destruction of the wider group, impairing its ability to reproduce itself. 
Typically, in those circumstances, battle-age males (i.e. the male pubes) 
would be killed on sight, presumably because they comprised the greatest 
threat to the attacking Romans during the sack or of resistance in the 
future.164 This was, for example, the case at Corinth in 146 BCE where, ‘while 
the Romans killed many of those caught there [most of its inhabitants having 
already fled], Mummius sold the women and children’.165 At times, this killing 
would be carried out after the initial storm had been carried through, as M. 
                                            
163 Capsa: Sall., Iug., 91.5-7; Henna: Liv., 24.37.1-39.13; Front., Strat., 4.7.22; Polyaen., 
Strat., 8.21.1; Plut., Marc., 20.2; also, CIL, I2 608 = 7.1281. 
164 Liv., 9.31.3: vi cepit atque omnes puberes interfecit; Liv., 34.10.1-2, drawing on Valerius 
Antius: oppidum Iliturgi receptum et puberes omnis interfectos. 
165 Paus., 7.16.8: τῶν δὲ ἐγκαταληφθέντων τὸ μὲν πολὺ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι φονεύουσι, γυναῖκας δὲ 
καὶ παῖδας ἀπέδοτο Μόμμιος. Note παῖδας here may in fact indicate girls rather than 
children: Gaca 2010. 
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Licinius Lucullus did at Cauca in 151 BCE, although he comes in for criticism 
from Appian for overstepping his authority and his actions prompted the 
adverse reaction of souring neighbouring cities against the Romans.166 The 
implication however is that adult males were often selected for destruction 
out of the population, and that this could be willed at a strategic level.167 
Sometimes the young and the old would be slaughtered. At Haliartus 
for example, these two sets were grouped together as targets of Roman 
aggression, while the more mobile combatants fled to the arx: 
In the first tumult of the capture of the city the seniors and 
the prepubescents, whom chance brought in the way, were 
everywhere killed.168  
Presumably they were killed for lack of anything better to do with them, as 
they were lacking much value either as booty or for violent sexual 
gratification. The genocidal killing of infants would have been a concept 
familiar to many Romans, not least from the passionate exhortation of 
Agamemnon to his brother in the Iliad: 
Of them let not one escape sheer destruction and our 
hands, not even the boy whom his mother carries in her 
womb; let not even him escape, but let all perish together 
from Ilios, unmourned and unseen.169 
This appeal to root-and-branch genocide,170 however, did not seem to gain 
much purchase in the Roman literary or historiographical milieu. 
Nonetheless, killing of infants for whatever reason was an effective way to 
                                            
166 App., Hisp., 52. 
167 The expected demographic gender imbalance in the slave population is difficult to detect. 
This may have been offset by the, sometimes colossal, numbers of men enslaved on the 
battlefield. In any case, the slave population likely regressed quite rapidly towards the mean 
gender balance; Scheidel 2010. 
168 Liv., 42.63.10: in primo tumultu captae urbis seniores inpubesque, quos casus obvios 
optulit, passim caesi. Cf. Strabo, 9.2.30. 
169 Hom., Il., 6.56-60, trans. Murray: ἦ σοὶ ἄριστα πεποίηται κατὰ οἶκον / πρὸς Τρώων; τῶν 
μή τις ὑπεκφύγοι αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον / χεῖράς θ᾽ ἡμετέρας, μηδ᾽ ὅν τινα γαστέρι μήτηρ / κοῦρον 
ἐόντα φέροι, μηδ᾽ ὃς φύγοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα πάντες / Ἰλίου ἐξαπολοίατ᾽ ἀκήδεστοι καὶ ἄφαντοι. 
170 van Wees 2010, 240–43. 
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assist in the destruction of the victim group as would, to a lesser extent, the 
killing of the elderly. 
Women, especially those in fertile age-brackets (i.e. the female pubes), 
were often reserved and spared the bloodshed. Of course, being saved in 
these cases might be small consolation, and the killing of a large part of the 
population, such as all the men, would endanger the cohesion of the group 
(i.e. constituting a set of actions and/or outcomes resulting from an intention 
to destroy a group, wholly or in part).171 This is so even before accounting for 
further predations on the so-called saved. Modern commentators posit the 
twin attractions of female captives for immediate sexual gratification of the 
soldiers or to be sold into slavery—which itself could involve sexual 
slavery.172 The specific motivations for sparing women are often left 
ambiguous in the sources, however, and there is a risk of over- or 
misinterpreting the calculus behind the actions of the Romans. Indeed, if 
comparative evidence is anything to go by, most modern historians of the 
ancient world significantly undervalue the brutality of sexual assault in these 
sorts of circumstances, and undervalue the effect it can have on community 
cohesion.173 Modern comparisons should warn us that while an attractive 
woman could be a prize—especially for long-term bondage—neither age, 
physical attractiveness nor even gender truly constrain the use of mass rape 
against captured civilians.174 This holds for wartime abuses in general, but 
particularly when the destruction of the group is intended. In many cases, 
these rapes are fatal, or closely followed by the killing of the victim, and 
therefore form part of the general mass killing of the population. They are 
designed to terrorise, subjugate, and humiliate the raped as well as their 
families and the wider community. The action symbolically punctures the 
                                            
171 Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia often comprised the killing of the men of the group after the 
women had been bussed out; A. Jones 2010, 216. 
172 Ziółkowski 1993, 83. 
173 Gaca 2016; 2014; 2011a; 2011b for recent attempts to intervene against this trend, 
chiefly from the point of view of Greek wartime practices.  
174 Rape of males: Stemple 2008; Depersonalisation of the victim by gang rapists minimises 
the actual characteristics of the victim: Seifert 1994, 56. 
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integrity of the group by the violation of its members, and by the interference 
of its biological propagation, reinforced by the killing of men. The gender 
selective killing of battle-aged men suggests that Roman killing behaviours 
were gendercidal in character, seeking a genocidal outcome through the 
elimination of a gendered section of the population.175 Jones has posited a 
relationship between gendercide as a ‘harbinger of “root-and-branch” 
campaigns of genocide’;176 while Roman behaviours do not seem to have 
customarily included the further direct killing of the remaining parts of 
groups, the fates that lay in store for them mean that we could see the 
selective mass killing of men in the storming of cities as a first step in the 
wider extirpation of the group. 
Illustrative of the selective norms at play in such cases is Livy’s account 
of Hannibal’s siege of Saguntum in 219 BCE, the event which provided the 
casus belli for the Second Punic War. Although the reported speech is that 
of Hannibal’s spokesperson, Alco, and the subsequent mass killing at 
Hannibal’s instigation, the speech is indicative of Livy’s understanding as an 
Augustan Roman of the normativity of mass killing when urban centres were 
sacked. Alco offered a settlement in that he told the Saguntines, ‘your 
persons and those of your wives and children [Hannibal] preserves 
unviolated’.177 Shortly afterwards the manner of the violation that could await 
them is made clear when Alco posits the alternative to accepting the 
conditions of surrender, saying to them, ‘but I think even this you must prefer 
to suffer than allowing your persons to be slaughtered, your wives and 
children seized and dragged off before your eyes, by the rights of war.’178 
While preparing to kill themselves and destroy their property by fire instead 
of submitting, the Saguntines’ distraction allows Hannibal to take advantage 
and capture the town by storm. Although this might seem to be an example 
                                            
175 A. Jones 2010, 326–27; A. Jones 2004, chap. 2. 
176 Jones in Stone 2008, 244–45. 
177 Liv., 21.13.7. 
178 Liv., 21.13.9: sed vel haec patienda censeo potius quam trucidari corpora vestra, rapi 
trahique ante ora vestra coniuges ac liberos belli iure sinatis. 
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of Livian punica fides, the author is apologetic about the stratagem, saying 
that the order to kill all the adults was an inevitable result of the threat that 
the inhabitants would have posed to the city and to his troops.179 It is 
ambiguous, but from the context of the passage in Livy, it can be inferred 
that perhaps the omnes puberes interficerentur might in fact have related to 
only the adult males. Presumably, the children were either seized or left 
exposed to die.  
Although other selective criteria could be used, especially in the 
scourging and execution of sometimes considerable numbers of the elite in a 
captured or surrendering polity, by and large these do not represent a 
destruction of the group as such. In general, political groups are generally 
excluded from definitions of genocide, although this is one of the more 
controversial definitional criteria. More pertinently, however, these killings 
are usually retributive or precautionary against selected individuals rather 
than an entire group. Furthermore, by and large, the elite were not 
annihilated in their entirely. On the contrary, Rome showed a continued 
interest in promoting the interests of sympathetic elite parties or individuals 
in foreign towns throughout the Middle Republic.180 This meant that in many 
circumstances the killing of elites was restricted in scale, intentionally leaving 
the group as such intact. The chief selective pressures therefore were age 
and gender. These seem to have been intersectional, with the selective 
criteria ‘creating overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination or 
disadvantage’.181  
                                            
179 Liv., 21.14.3-4: non cunctandum in tali occasione ratus Hannibal, totis uiribus adgressus 
urbem momento cepit, signo dato ut omnes puberes interficerentur. quod imperium crudele, 
ceterum prope necessarium cognitum ipso euentu est; cui enim parci potuit ex iis qui aut 
inclusi cum coniugibus ac liberis domos super se ipsos concremauerunt aut armati nullum 
ante finem pugnae quam morientes fecerunt? 
180 Although this link can be overstated. Ridley 2000, 15–16 refutes the axiom that Hannibal 
and Rome were favoured by the Italian lower and upper classes respectively; Lomas and 
Roselaar 2012. 
181 ‘Intersectionality, N.’ 2016. 
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Norm-flouting killing 
It has been argued in this chapter that mass killing was a normal part of 
warfare, at least under certain circumstances. However, against this norm, 
there were suggestions of moral disapproval of actions that therefore 
breached those norms, the exceptions that prove the rule, as it were. In 
some of these cases, the scenario as enacted was contrary to the moral 
spirit of the right to kill, and in some way unduly harsh, particularly where it 
was inflicted against friendly populations without warrant. Although the 
sources establish the normalcy and normativity of the mass killing of 
inhabitants by Romans when storming a city, there are recorded a significant 
minority of settlements whose inhabitants found themselves thus 
slaughtered despite having surrendered or in some other way not having 
been taken by storm. This might technically have been permissible under the 
conditions of the fides into which they had put themselves, but seems to 
have been generally considered to be bad form. In these cases, the 
implication is that the cities were sacked as if they had been captured in hot 
blood. It lends credence to the Polybian template of mass killing through its 
comparison with norm-flouting killing. 
Ambiguity about when mass killing was legitimate can be seen in 
Sallust’s account of the mass killing of adults and enslavement of the other 
inhabitants of the Numidian city of Capsa, which had surrendered following a 
surprise (and ignoble) attack. The compounded ignobility of the event, which 
was ‘in violation of the usages of war’, was however explained away:  
[The policy of massacring the town] was not adopted from 
avarice or cruelty in the consul, but was exercised because 
the place was of great advantage to Jugurtha, and difficult of 
access to us, while the inhabitants were a fickle and 
faithless race, to be influenced neither by kindness nor by 
terror.182 
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Military necessity supposedly required this outcome, and in any case the 
fides into which the inhabitants had entered was inherently false, and 
therefore need not be respected. The legitimating effect of taking a city by 
force, and the contrary, can be seen in the political machinations in Livy 
regarding whether or not M. Fulvius Nobilior had taken Ambracia through 
siege, and thus whether his settlement and despoliation of it were 
legitimate.183 A similar post-hoc legitimisation is evident in the case of 
Pinarius at Henna, who ordered a massacre because he could not trust the 
Hennaians’ fidelity, as it was by Serv. Sulpicius Galba in relation to the 
Lusitanian massacre whereby a key argument of his original defence was 
that the Lusitanians were secretly preparing to attack his forces. 
Under this model, the normative modalities of Roman warfare in which 
mass killing was perhaps a customary expectation—that is to say, in the 
context of the violent storming of urban settlements—precluded the 
systematic killing of the countryside population. It is for this reason that 
Roman practices of mass killing should by and large not be conflated with 
ideas of ethnic cleansing. This is the ‘deliberate, systematic, and forced 
removal of a particular ethnic group from a specified territory’ because the 
group is regarded as ‘undesirable or dangerous by the more powerful group 
with designs on the territory’.184 Ethnic cleansing is therefore typically 
considered to be a multimodal form of genocide, in which a territory is 
intended to be cleansed of an unwanted ethnic group by several means, 
including killing, deportation, systematic rape, and destruction of property.185 
Some of these other elements will be considered elsewhere in this work, and 
the focus in this section will remain on the murderous forms of ethnic 
cleansing. There are clear suggestions that mass killing outside of the 
context of the capture of cities was considered by classical commentators to 
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have been aberrant within the customary rules of war. Thus, Hannibal’s 
execution of any Romans that his armies could lay their hands upon during 
their march across Italy was described by Polybius as being akin to being ‘as 
at the capture of cities by assault’.186 This implies that whereas mass killing 
was customary in taking an urban settlement, killing members of an ethnicity 
outside of this context was not, and Polybius attributes this policy of 
ethnicised killing to Hannibal’s ‘deep-seated hatred of Rome’. Hannibal’s 
intention to kill Romans in the countryside as well as in the towns was 
therefore, to Polybius, a symptom of an excessively and aberrantly violent 
spirit. We should not see Hannibal’s actions as normal in the context even of 
the drawn out and at times fraught Second Punic War as has been the case 
in modern scholarship.187  
The tendency to interpret Roman actions as a form of murderous ethnic 
cleansing, was formerly more prevalent and, for example, Vedia Izzet noted 
that W.V. Harris’s interpretation of settlement change in Etruria was 
tantamount to a claim of ethnic cleansing.188 Often this supposed process 
was linked to the creation of mono-ethnic viritane land distributions or 
colonial foundations.189 Current models however increasingly stress the 
presence of native incolae in these locations and their role as sites of 
integration.190 Cities subjected to mass killing often subsequently rebounded, 
such as Luceria in 314 BCE and Veltirae in 494 BCE, possibly because they 
could be rapidly repopulated by survivors who had remained in the 
surrounding countryside during the siege or assault. These factors suggest 
that the widespread and systematic killing of non-Romans was not a 
customary practice. Doubtlessly, inhabitants of the countryside in hostile or 
vanquished territories likely had to fear the depredations of Roman soldiers, 
but Roman mores prohibited the extended extermination through killing of 
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the group at large, even if individuals might become incidental casualties of 
war. 
Servius Sulpicius Galba and the Lusitanian massacre 
Although countryside inhabitants doubtlessly suffered as a result of the 
endemic violence of the Middle Republic, one of the events that most 
prominently flouted the customary norms of warfare discussed in this chapter 
was the massacre of Lusitanians under the orders of Galba in 150 BCE. 191 
This event represents one of the most thorough attempts at extirpation 
through killing by any Roman state actor in this period, and has clear 
indications of meeting the criteria for genocide. The fullest source for this 
episode is in Appian, but textual confirmations come from Suetonius, Cicero, 
Aulus Gellius, Orosius, Valerius Maximus and most importantly the 
Periochae of Livy.192 From these sources we know that Cato included details 
about the affair, chiefly in the form of information embedded in and around 
his speech against Galba at the latter's trial for misconduct. This was 
inserted into book four of Cato's Origines at a late stage in his life, and 
although it does not survive beyond fragments today, Cato's intervention 
certainly preserved and transmitted details about the massacre to the 
surviving sources.193  
The lead up to the massacre supposedly saw Roman generals 
depopulate Lusitania. This assertion is ambiguous, but may intimate 
previous massacres of a smaller or less perfidious character. The praetor 
Galba systematically and with planning and intention betrayed a tribe with 
whom a treaty was in place. Having divided the population into thirds, and 
having had them lay down their arms, he sent in troops to carry out a 
planned massacre of the entire captive populace. This stepwise, 
premeditated process—which has echoes of Aemilius Paullus' enslavement 
                                            
191 App., Hisp., 12.59-60; Liv., Per., 49-50. 
192 Suet., Galb., 7.1; Cic., Brut., 89; Gel., 1.12.17, 13.25.15; Oros., Hist., 4.21.10; Val. Max., 
8.1.2, 9.6.2; Liv., Per., 49 (also POxy., IV 0668); App., Hisp., 59-61. 
193 Gel., 1.12.7, 13.25.15. 
Mass killing 
55 
of the Epirote Molossians in its systematic division of the victim group timed 
to preclude each finding out about the fate of the others—indicates 
unambiguously that there was an intention to destroy the group as a group in 
its entirety. The massacre was likely the result of frustrations, in both the 
leaders and the regular members of the Roman army, which accumulated 
into an extreme of group annihilation. The Spanish provinciae were 
notoriously hard fought for the Romans, and to a greater extent constituted a 
warzone for most of the period 218-16 BCE.194 It had precipitated the creation 
of new praetorships to ensure the permanent presence of Roman imperium 
in the provinciae, essentially turning them into one of the first Roman 
experiments in annexation, and had even required the adjustment of the 
Roman consular year to a January commencement in order to fit operational 
needs in Spain.195 Right from the initial years of the Roman campaign there, 
a number of notable and brilliant commanders had been killed, most notably 
the Scipio brothers, and legions lost. What is more, the Spanish tribes did 
not seem to abide by the rules as the Romans understood them. The 
humiliating terms of peace obtained by some proconsuls had been rejected 
vehemently back in Rome.196 Other peace terms had been rejected 
unilaterally by the Spanish tribespeople once it had become favourable for 
them to do so. This did not fit with Roman understandings of what it meant to 
submit to their fides. The situation was therefore one of cumulative 
radicalisation, and of escalating modalities of warfare.  
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The entrenched cultural difficulties in implementing Roman control in 
this sphere is in contrast with the emergence from the late 180s BCE, with the 
disputations of Callicrates with the Senate, of an explicit and unambiguous 
expectation ‘that being favourable to Rome was openly equated with 
absolute readiness to obey Rome's orders’.197 Romans, especially when 
implementing a relationship of fides, had by the middle of the second 
century, come to expect their will to be obeyed. The repeated intransigence 
of the peoples of Spain must have exerted an enormous psychological and 
political pressure on Rome’s troops and leaders in the field to end the 
conflict and secure their victory—not to mention their safety, booty, and 
glory—by the most brutal of means. The Lusitanian massacre of 150 BCE 
under Galba would later provide a model for a massacre perpetrated by T. 
Didius in around 93 BCE, in which he supposedly killed all inhabitants of a 
Celtiberian town named by Appian as Kolenda.198 There too, the hardships 
of the campaign might have encouraged an excess of genocidal violence, 
following nine months of siege.  
The Lusitanian massacre led to an unsuccessful prosecution of Galba 
at Rome for breaching normative laws of war and fidelity, the failure of which 
confirms the reluctance of the Roman people to indict those who committed 
the wholesale destruction of civilian groups through killing. Galba had 
claimed—as, according to the testimony of the Livian epitomes, was 
recorded in a speech against Lucius Cornelius Cethegus—that the massacre 
was necessitated by circumstances: 
The Lusitanians encamped near him were killed because he 
determined that, following their custom, they had sacrificed a 
                                            
197 Astin [1989] 2003, 8:300–301, 310. 
198 App., Hisp., 99.432: the town and the destruction of its people are otherwise unattested. 
Seen by J. Richardson 1996, 85 as the transference of ‘a policy (if it can be dignified with 
that name) which had previously been used in Lusitania’ to the Celtiberians. 
 
Mass killing 
57 
man and a horse and under the pretext of peace had 
intended to attack his own army.199 
Yet this argument seems to have been insufficient in the eyes of the Senate 
and the political class at Rome. Knowing that he was about to be convicted, 
Galba secured his acquittal by displaying his own children, still in the toga 
praetexta, as well as those he had guardianship over, and by speaking so 
‘pitiably on his own behalf’ that the audience was moved to exculpate him.200 
These turns of events reveal several factors of the mode of Roman 
imperialism that led to the Lusitanian affair: that the Senate presumed 
authority over, and the right to annul the actions of, generals in the field;201 
that nonetheless, Romans with imperium in the field could carry out acts of 
violence due to distance from Senatorial authority; and, that the censorship 
regime back in Rome could be relatively weak and ineffectual.  
The cumulative effect helps to explain the pressure towards extremes 
of violence, but this was not an act that was accidental, or a result of the 
actions of soldiers in the heat of the moment. Rather, it was a deliberate set 
of actions that seem to have been planned and executed according to a 
blueprint. What is more, the campaigns in the provinces of Spain were 
accompanied by a long-term process of gubernatorial corruption and 
haughty behaviour on the part of the Romans, which the Senate were 
compelled to begin to restrain from 177 BCE, with mixed success.202 Clearly, 
the interest of most ancient authors was less in the fact that the Lusitanians 
were massacred as in the fact that Galba perpetrated the matter in such a 
perfidious manner and that he escaped attempts at prosecution. His acquittal 
being brought about because of a display of pitifulness, his later acquisition 
of the consulship, and his later still reputation as an orator and statesman, all 
suggest that the interest of our Greco-Romans sources were in the affairs of 
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the Roman state actors rather than in the Lusitanian victims themselves. 
This suggests the sort of atmosphere that allowed the Lusitanians to be 
massacred in the first place.  
Notably this was the killing of one segment, likely equating to one tribe, 
of the broader Lusitanian ethnic group. Of course, this is to use Greco-
Roman ethnic definitions; discerning the self-identifications of the various 
and varied ancient tribes of the Iberian Peninsula is impossible, and most 
observations of socio-political organisation must be gleaned from the Greco-
Roman sources, assisted somewhat by epigraphic and archaeological 
materials.203 The massacre cannot and should not in itself be taken to mean 
that the Lusitanian ethnicity was targeted for destruction in its entirety. The 
Lusitanian massacre was not motivated by an ideology of ethnic or racial 
destruction, although it was likely informed by a general disregard for, or 
even prejudice against, them on the Roman part. Rather, Galba showed his 
willingness to extirpate this group in a more strategic, self-contained manner. 
Although the stepwise method and premeditation might echo modern 
genocides, especially the Holocaust, the motivation did not.  
The Bacchanalian Affair 
The Bacchanalian Affair is the final major area of analysis in this chapter. It 
shows some interesting characteristics, and in many ways represents a 
model for systematic, murderous repression that was otherwise not followed 
by the Romans. The Bacchanalian Affair was the suppression in 186 BCE of 
the adherents of the Bacchanalia. The term denotes a cult named for its 
ritual sites (Bacchanals), in turn deriving their name from Bacchus, the Italian 
syncretised form of Dionysus.204 The cult was imported from the Greek East 
into Italy via the cities of Magna Graecia, and remained most popular in the 
more southerly parts of the peninsula, but the lucus stimulae at the foot of 
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the Aventine was to feature prominently in the sources205 It was a mystery 
cult and initially restricted access to female bacchantes only. This latter 
criterion was modified under the leadership of the priestess Annia Paculla, 
who first admitted men to the cult rights at specific meetings. Around this 
time, the evidently growing popularity of the Bacchanalia led to a sort of 
moral panic or political crisis, and the Senate moved to suppress them. 
These fears seem to have rested on some combination of anxieties about 
the corrupting influence of Greek religion on Italians and more importantly on 
Roman citizens, about the concealed nature of the activities of the 
bacchantes, and about rumours of the immorality of cult activities. Pretext 
was found, according to Livy, through a complaint to the magistrates of 
mistreatment of citizens. Although the historicity of this complaint is dubious, 
it is plausible that such a complaint might have initiated a wider political 
backlash, or even have rendered the Senate or members within it pretext to 
carry out an already mooted pogrom. The presence of members of elite 
families among those affected might tell against a unanimous will to act 
before provoked however. The senatus consultum de bacchanalibus was 
issued, prohibiting the cult, its members, and their activities;206 the 
punishment was to be the death penalty.  
Systems of mass killing in the Bacchanalian Affair 
A commission was tasked with investigating the supposed crimes. The 
numbers involved in the repression were evidently immense. At Rome, some 
seven thousand were supposed to have been killed as a result. As with any 
kind of witch-hunt, metaphorical or literal, the repression grew as more were 
arrested and ever more names named. Exculpation was granted only in 
exceptional circumstances in consequence of application for special 
permission. By all signs, the suppression through juridical mass killing 
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seems to have been successful. Although orgiastic cults would survive in the 
Italian peninsula, the Bacchanalian cult seems to have been effectively 
exterminated. This reaction was at variance with previous suppressions of 
superstitio, such as that of 213 BCE, which were largely handled through non-
violent state coercion.207 
As with Galba’s massacre of the Lusitanians, the killing of the 
Bacchanalian Affair was systematic in nature. However, whereas the 
Lusitanian massacre was illicit, the Bacchanalian Affair used the pre-existing 
mechanisms of state jurisprudence and magisterial imperium to bring about 
the repression of the Bacchantes in Rome and Italy. In parallel to 
representation of self-annihilation in Spanish cities discussed above, the 
progression of executions in part relied on the patriarchal structure of the 
pater familias. Condemned women were, where possible, turned over to 
their male relatives to execute their sentences, relying on pre-existing quasi-
legal and customary structures of paternal authority.208 The Affair also 
parallels expulsions of Greeks or practitioners of stereotypically Greek 
occupations from the city of Rome on the grounds of their supposedly 
corrupting influence, and possibly persecutions of Christians because of the 
perceived threat that they posed by their rejection of Roman religio, and 
therefore the Roman mos maiorum and social order.209 The patriarchal 
arrangement of the Roman family was employed to effect the scale of the 
application of the death penalty demanded by the organs of the Roman 
state. Patres familias were co-opted into being state agents as part of their 
duties as possessors of patria potestas. No doubt legendary tales of 
Romans who killed their children out of principle, often for transgressive acts, 
served their function of cultural role modelling.210 
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Intentions of the Bacchanalian Affair 
The reasons for the Bacchanalian Affair are uncertain. Most likely it 
represented a peak of hysteria about the influence of foreign cults as a 
vector for corruption. Their lack of interest in pursuing other similar orgiastic 
cults suggests that some confluence of factors meant that the Senate for 
some reason developed a consensus that the Bacchanalia were uniquely 
threatening. Crucially, the Bacchanalia were couched in terms of a 
conspiracy against the state in a way that other orgiastic mystery cults did 
not come to be; the Senate and Rome’s magistrates had historical 
experience with both having to deal with such conspiracies or revolts, as well 
as with using fears or accusations of conspiracy to an end in repressing 
opposing individuals or groups.211 Certainly, the Bacchanalian Affair 
represented a shift in the outward display of confidence of the Senate in 
treating the peoples and municipalities of the Italian peninsula as within the 
remit of Roman moral and social control.212 
The only criterion for condemnation was participation in the cult rather 
than ethnicity, nationality, citizenship, and so forth. Construed as a 
conspiracy against the state, it was perhaps prompted more by a fear of 
'parallel structures' that threatened state control. Whether we should 
therefore deem it an instance of genocide is questionable. To consider it 
through the prism of modern interstate, normative law throws up questions 
as to whether to consider the Bacchanalian Affair a repression of a political 
or religious group. Under the UNGC the former would not be genocide per 
se but the latter might be. This sort of hair splitting is, however, neither 
desirable or necessary for the conclusions about the Middle Republic and 
genocide that the Bacchanalian Affair engendered. It provides a genocidal 
blueprint, showing that the Roman state had, by 186 BCE, the reach, power, 
will, and bureaucratic means by which to intentionally effect the near-total 
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destruction of an identified group through the means of mass killing. That the 
Romans did not replicate this model of persecutory and genocidal extirpation 
again in this period is telling. Having the means to carry out such pogroms, 
the Romans chose not to replicate it. This suggests that the Romans were 
not interested per se in a model of purity. Concerns about the corrupting 
influence of foreign contact were pervasive throughout Roman history as we 
know it, yet it took additional concerns, chiefly fear of conspiracy against the 
Roman state and its hegemony, to prompt the extra-ordinary carnage of 186 
BCE.  
Weapons of mass destruction 
Killing requires tools. The choice of weapons by which mass killings were 
carried out by the Romans were based on pragmatism and expediency, but 
also on symbolism. Naturally, genocidally minded Romans had no nuclear, 
chemical, or biological means of mass killing. They could not create the 
death camps of Nazi Germany, by which millions of humans could be 
processed through gas chambers, even had they wanted to. However, 
genocide need not require such technology. The origin of the term ‘weapons 
of mass destruction’ has been traced by the Oxford English Dictionary to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury’s 1937 Christmas broadcast, republished in The 
Times, where it was used about the aerial bombardment of Guernica.213 The 
development of high explosives and of small arms into their modern highly 
effective, highly available forms has been crucial in amplifying the killing 
power of the various types of agents of mass killing. The lessons of Rwanda, 
where much of the killing was perpetrated by machete and other peasant 
tools, serve as a reminder that not even this level of ordinance is required for 
genocidal mass killing to be effected if other means and the intention exist.  
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Roman methods of killing were dependant on the scenario: the 
perpetrator, the context, the victim, and the time. For example, after 
defeating Carthage, Scipio the Elder punished Latin deserters with 
beheading by axe (securi percussit) while Roman ones were crucified.214 
Crucifixion was in general reserved for the punishment of slaves and 
deserters in the Middle Republic. Yet in the days before the Servile Wars, 
that is before 135 BCE, crucifixion had not yet seen widespread usage 
against whole groups, instead being the preserve of individuals for specific 
crimes.215 The inherent spectacularity of crucifixion is likely to be associated 
with its role as a deterrent rather than as a practical method of extirpation. 
The regular method of execution was by beheading, typically after the 
victim had been scourged.216 This set of practices was enmeshed with ritual 
and symbolic significance. It was not for nothing that the symbols of 
magisterial power in the Republic were the fasces, the bound rods and axe 
carried by their lictors. Although by the Middle Republic execution was no 
longer a direct form of sacrifice for the Romans, it retained a definitive 
sacrality.217 This method of killing was on occasion used en masse, but was 
not characteristically employed for wholescale killing. The axe was not a 
combat weapon for the Romans. The larger groups killed by beheading were 
typically rebel elite socii who had taken up prominent partisan positions and 
were condemned by whichever magistrate with imperium had either 
captured their town or received its surrender. This use of killing was 
necessarily intended, even when encompassing hundreds of persons, to 
restrict violence to the so-called anti-Roman ringleaders, and was used to 
further Roman political aims while preventing wider violence being levelled 
against the broader populace. It was therefore by and large antithetical to 
genocidal uses, and intended not to destroy out-groups. The closest that 
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normal execution came to such group destruction was in the Bacchanalian 
Affair, which utilised Roman legal and customary frameworks to carry out a 
socio-political purge of a religious in-group. The Bacchanalian Affair was the 
closest that the Romans of the Middle Republic came to carrying out a 
pogrom, and was entirely characterised by judicial and quasi-judicial ways of 
killing. There is little evidence of spontaneous mob-instigated killing of whole 
groups in this temporal context beyond those killings targeted at specific 
individuals.218  
It was the sword that was the dominant weapon of mass destruction for 
the Romans. By the time Polybius was writing, the gladius hispaniensis—the 
Spanish sword—had won out as the weapon of choice for the armies of the 
Republic, having been adopted from military interactions in Spain.219 It had a 
reputation not just for its high-quality design and suitability for Roman 
manipular and cohortal modes of combat,220 but also for the terror that could 
be spread upon witnessing the aftermath of the gladius's devastating 
brutality. We have seen above Polybius’ comments about Carthago Nova, 
that often the spectacle of people and dogs cut in two, and animals 
dismembered, could be seen in captured towns, and that he thought this was 
to inspire terror.221 Livy describes the effect that such butchery could have 
on potential enemies: 
Philip's men had been accustomed to fighting with Greeks 
and Illyrians and had only seen wounds inflicted by javelins 
and arrows and in rare instances by lances. But when they 
saw bodies dismembered with the Spanish sword, arms cut 
off from the shoulder, heads struck off from the trunk, 
bowels exposed and other horrible wounds, they recognised 
the style of weapon and the kind of man against whom they 
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had to fight, and a shudder of horror ran through the 
ranks.222  
W.V. Harris rightly observed that the ‘quosque viros’ in this passage implied 
that this was not just a commentary about the weapons of the Romans; the 
effectiveness of the Roman soldier and their weapons were congruent.223 
Swords and daggers were the weapons most used to effect mass killing in 
the Middle Republic. A large body of soldiers were trained in their use and 
had possession of them, unlike for example the executioner’s axe. What is 
more, the Romans were most likely to kill wholescale when storming densely 
populated urban centres, actions which were the preserve of the sword-
armed soldier. 
Conclusions 
We have seen that the Romans carried out mass killings, and that these 
either intentionally or knowingly destroyed their victim groups. These 
practices were not unrestrained however, and the Romans did not routinely 
seek to kill every member of an opponent group. Such killing seems to have 
been systemic rather than systematic. Mass killing was generally 
constrained to the duration of the storming of urban centres, a scenario in 
which violence would be unleashed against the general population. Once the 
urban centre was secured, by and large the killing stopped. Before that, it 
might be either indiscriminate or it might target subsets of people, typically 
adult males. The genocidal effects of Roman assaults were therefore by-
products of a mode of war that directed violence against urban centres as 
centres of political and military control. This custom constituted a norm of 
war. Those mass killings that fell outside this norm—killing rural dwellers, or 
killing in cold blood after the moment of the sack—risked censure and 
                                            
222 Liv., 31.34.4-5: nam qui hastis sagittisque et rara lanceis facta vulnera vidissent, cum 
Graecis Illyriisque pugnare adsueti, postquam gladio Hispaniensi detruncata corpora, 
bracchiis cum humero abscisis, aut tota cervice desecta divisa a corpore capita patentiaque 
viscera et foeditatem aliam vulnerum viderunt, adversus quae tela quosque viros 
pugnandum foret, pavidi vulgo cernebant. Ipsum quoque regem terror cepit nondum iusto 
proelio cum Romanis congressum. 
223 W. V. Harris [1979] 2006, 52; contra Toynbee 1965, ii. 438. 
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possible restitution. This possibility is explored further in chapter six. The 
closest that the mid-Republican Romans came to a systematic pogrom was 
the killing pursuant to the Bacchanalian Affair, which was embedded within 
the judicial processes of dealing with conspiracies against the Roman state. 
It shows a capability for systematic mass killing of groups that the Romans 
did not replicate again. Although the Romans possessed the means to kill en 
masse, asymmetric military power over potential victims, and the opportunity 
to carry out killing, they often abstained from or restricted this behaviour. 
Generally, when they did use mass killing, it was motivated by several 
factors and under circumstances that legitimated such carnage.  
Of the motivations for genocidal mass killing, strategic aims were 
important. Killing ensured the most rapid overwhelming of potentially 
dangerous scenarios, providing the best amelioration of the hazards of urban 
assault and street-to-street fighting. Siege warfare could be extremely 
perilous to the besieger, especially in the presence of the sophisticated 
defensive architecture that had been developed by many Mediterranean 
cities in response to Hellenistic siege techniques.224 This possibly 
encouraged the mid-Republican prominence of the corona muralis which, 
among other decorations, not only prompted great competition between 
elites as a sure route to high renown (and therefore the highest offices) but 
may have also been intended to incite Roman soldiers to even attempt to 
assault the enemy walls at all.225 Mass killing was also strategically 
terroristic, shocking and demoralising current or potential enemies into 
submission. Such killing was intended to operate as a symbolic deterrent to 
other groups locally and further afield, working as a tool of international 
relations. The Romans found success with it at Iliturgi in Spain and at 
Agrigentum in Sicily, both incidents bringing other communities in their 
regions into the Roman fold out of fear. 
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One of the pieces of evidence often adduced as a motivator of Roman 
militaristic bellicosity, and especially in favour of excess bloodletting, is the 
so called de iure triumphi or triumphal laws, recorded by Valerius Maximus 
who states: 
It was enacted by law that no one should triumph who had 
not killed five thousand of the enemy in a single 
engagement. For our ancestors held that the dignity of our 
city would be heightened not by the number of triumphs but 
by their glory.226 
While it might commonly be assumed that this stipulation would lead to a 
pressure to increase the number of victims being killed, or to an over-
reporting of those who had been, there is little evidence that this criterion 
was present in the era of the Middle Republic.227 Valerius Maximus cites the 
claiming of triumphs for trivial victories and the false reporting of enemies 
killed as necessitating the legislation, which is to say the violence before the 
law was overstated. What is more, his evidence dates to the changed 
political system of the Principate, and attests that the law ‘was propped up 
by another law’ ascribed to L. Marius and M. Cato, which can be dated to 62 
BCE.228 Not only is there no positive evidence for it the Middle Republic 
period, but there are counter examples—such as M. Fulvius’ demand for a 
triumph in 187 BCE on grounds of having captured Ambracia during which 
3,000 had died, or the double triumph over the Ligurian Apuani granted 
without battle to P. Cornelius Cethegus and M. Baebius Tamphilus in 181 
BCE.229 Middle Republican politics featured much jockeying, bargaining and 
politicking in order to gain the honour of holding a triumph within the city, 
which suggests a much more fluid and contestable situation rather than one 
governed by any ‘laws’ or explicit criteria.230 
                                            
226 Val. Max., 2.8.1: lege cautum est ne quis triumpharet nisi qui quinque milia hostium una 
acie cecidisset: non enim numero sed gloria triumphorum excelsius urbis nostrae futurum 
decus maiores existimabant. Cf. Oros., 5.4.7. 
227 Beard 2007, 209–12. 
228 Val. Max., 2.8.1: legis alterius adiutorio fulta est, quam L. Marius et M. Cato tribuni plebis 
tulerunt. 
229 Fulvius: Liv., 39.4-13; Pittenger 2008, 200–210. Cornelius and Baebius: Liv., 40.38.9.; 
the relevant lines of the Fasti Triumphales are missing, Degrassi 1954, 103.  
230 Bastien 2007; Pittenger 2008; Östenberg 2009. 
‘Genocide’ and Rome, 343-146 BCE  
68 
The Roman troops doing the killing needed motivation to do so too. 
That they were usually expected to kill in the heat of the moment, and not in 
cold blood, probably facilitated this behaviour. There seems to have been 
little ideological fervour to motivate them, no utopian vision requiring the 
elimination of othered groups. They do however seem to have been 
susceptible to the motivation of revenge, such as when there was difficult or 
recidivist warfare, or when a previously-accepted dedicant into Roman fides 
demonstrated unfaithfulness.231 On a more personal level the opportunity to 
enrich themselves through pillaging seems to have been a large part of the 
reason for volunteering to serve in the army during much of the Middle 
Republic, and the opportunity to pillage a captured town represented a good 
source of income.232 In relation to spheres of operation that became known 
for a lack of economic booty in recompense for the dangers hazarded, it 
could become difficult to recruit the required numbers of citizens to fill out the 
legions.233 Chaotic scenes of rape and rapine went together with mass 
killing, as inhabitants were killed protecting their loved ones or property, or 
were tortured in the hope that they might reveal hidden loot.  
However, the assumption that Roman soldiers were solely, or indeed 
uniquely, bloodthirsty should be resisted. Ameliorating any potential blood 
guilt was important to those whose role it was to do the dirty work of killing. 
There was clearly a hierarchy of permissibility in relationship to killing. Jörg 
Rüpke derived a set of plausible principles, chiefly from literary 
representations of the Horatii and Curiatii, that killing was broadly speaking 
unproblematic in war, was to be minimised between allied states but could 
be legitimate nonetheless, and that in war the commander should order the 
killing for it to be legitimate.234 Unrestricted killing was not the absolute 
purview of the Roman legionary, but was contextually dependent. The 
devolution of the legitimacy of killing stemmed from the possessing of 
imperium, which was contextually dependent also. A commander with 
                                            
231 See Fein 1984 on retributive genocide. 
232 Examples abound, see Liv., 2.25.5 (possibly a doublet for 2.17.6); Liv., 43.1.9. 
233 Astin [1989] 2003, 8:194–95. 
234 Rüpke 1992. 
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imperium could find it challenged if accusations that he acted outside of his 
remit were levelled by political opponents. Thus, licit mass killing had to be 
within the legitimate chain of command of the Roman military state-structure. 
Even within the legitimate command structure, textual glimpses of 
purificatory, possibly even expiatory, rites indicate that blood guilt and the 
corrupting influence of killing was taken seriously. We know that in Greek 
contexts rituals for purifying blood guilt were elaborated, with various actions 
designed to forestall different consequences.235 Roman analogues are less 
well known, but even the army celebrating a triumph, the apogee of 
legitimate killing in service of the Roman state, entered Rome following the 
purificatory rites of the lustrum to absolve them of any corruption. Indeed, 
from one point of view, the triumph may represent an elaborated purificatory 
rite as well as being the unsurpassable state spectacle of the Middle 
Republic.236 There were likely many other ways in which the potential 
damage of blood guilt was mitigated in this period of which we are no longer 
cognisant. The conclusion must be however that the Romans were mindful 
of the potential negative effects of their own violence to those carrying it out, 
and that having embedded this awareness into their religio they were 
concerned about not unleashing unrestricted state violence per se.  
Although such cases of genocidal agency are likely representative of 
further atrocities of which no attestation survives, in general Roman 
expansion was accompanied by fewer instances of murderous clearance 
and mass killing than the history of the colonialism and imperialism of the 
past few centuries of the modern era might predispose us to assume. 
Nonetheless, the expansion of their hegemony and empire was 
accompanied by genocidal uses of mass killing that destroyed victim groups. 
  
  
                                            
235 Green 1997, 322 comm. on Ap. Rhod., Argon., 705-717, including references to other 
Greek examples. 
236 Warren 1970, 49; Holliday 2002, 22–23; cp. Beard 2007, 92, 246. 
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Table 1. Incidents of Roman mass killing of groups, 343-146 BCE 
BCE Victim Quantity Sources 
314 Luceria All Liv., 9.26.2-3 
314 Sora 
 
Liv., 9.24.1-25, 31.13 
313 Fregellae 200 Enn., Ann., 168-169; Diod. Sic., 
19.101.1-3; Liv., 9.28.2-3, 31.13 
311 Cluvia Adult males Liv., 9.31.3 
296 Cimetra 830 Liv., 10.15.6 
293 Velia, Palumbinum & 
Herculaneum 
>5,000 killed or 
captured 
Liv., 10.45.11 
284 Senones Adult males App., Sam., 13; App., Gallica, 9; 
Liv., Per., 12; Oros., Hist., 3.22.12-
15; Polyb., 2.19.11  
265 Volsinii Servile class Flor., 16.1; Liv., Per., 16; Plin., Nat., 
31.31; Zonar., 8.7  
258 Myttistratum 
 
Diod. Sic., 23. 9. 4; Zonar., 8.11; 
Polyb., 9.10.11 
254 Panormus 
 
Diod. Sic., 23.18.5; Polyb., 1.38.9-
10; Zonar., 8.14; Flor., 1.18.12; 
[Aur. Vict.], De vir. ill., 39.2; Sen., 
Ep., 114.17; Cic., Rep., 1.1 
252 Lipara All Zonar., 8.14 
229 Illyrians 
 
Flor., 1.21.4  
213 Henna 
 
CIL, VI 1281; Front., Strat., 4. 7. 22; 
Liv., 24.39.4-6; Polyaen., Strat., 
8.21 
212 Syracuse 
 
Diod. Sic., 26.20.1-2; Liv., 25.28.1-
31.15, 26.31-32, 31.31; Cic., Ver., 
2.4.120; Val. Max., 5.1.4, 8.7; Plin., 
Nat., 7.125; Sil., 14.627-683; Flor., 
1.22.33-34; Plut., Mor., 19.7-12, 
21.1-7; Zonar., 9.5; Cass. Dio, 15.5 
212 Telesia, Compsa, 
Fugifulae, Orbitanium, 
Blandae, Aecae 
25000 killed or 
captured 
Liv., 24.20 
210 Agrigentum All Eutr., 3. 14; Liv., 26.40.13; Oros., 
4.18.2; Zonar., 9.7  
209 Carthago Nova  App., Hisp., 23; Cass. Dio, 
16.57.42; Diod. Sic., 26.21.1; Eutr., 
3.15; Flor., 1.22.37-40; Liv., 26.49f; 
Polyb., 10.17.6; 19.8; Oros., 4.18.1; 
Zonar., 9.8 
207 Orongis 
 
Liv., 28.4.4; Zonar., 9.8  
206 Iliturgi / Ilurgia All Liv., 28.19.1-23.5; Val. Max., 9.11 
ext.1; Sil., 16.277-591; App., Hisp., 
32-33; Eutr., 3.16.2; Jer., Ab Abr., 
1813; Zonar., 9.10 
200 Antipatrea All Liv., 31.27.4  
200 Chalcis All Liv., 31.23 
177 Histrian towns. 
Nesactium, Mutila, 
Faveria 
 
Liv., 41.11.8 
173 Carystus 10000 Liv., 42.7.8-9; Cic., Off., 1.36; Liv., 
42.7.1-9.6, 10.9, 21.6-7, 45.15.10 
171 Haliartus 
 
Liv., 42.63.11; Strabo, 9.411  
151 Cauca All App., Hisp., 52 
150 Lusitanians All App., Hisp., 59 
146 Corinth Adult males Oros., Hist., 5.3.5; Zonar., 9.31; 
Paus., 5.10.5, 7.16.7-8; Flor., 
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1.32.5; Oros., Hist., 5.3.5; Festus, 
Breviarium, 7.2 
146 Carthage Majority App., Pun., 127-133; Oros., Hist., 
4.23.2-6; Zonar., 9.30-31; Flor., 
1.31; Polyb., 39.8.6; Cic., Leg. agr., 
2.51; Diod. Sic., 32.4; Liv., Per., 51; 
Liv., Epit. Oxyrh., 51.137-39; Vell. 
Pat., 1.12.5; Val. Max., 1.1.18; Dig., 
7.4.21; Jer., Ab Abr., 18.71 
  
Chapter Three 
— 
Mass enslavement 
Introduction 
The enslavement of massive numbers of people was a prime way in which 
the Romans of the Middle Republic committed genocide. The relationship of 
enslavement to genocide has been relatively neglected. Where slavery 
usually enters the literature on genocide, it is usually in relation to sexual 
slavery and systematised programmes of wartime rape.237 Recent outrages 
by Islamic State in the Levant, for example, have been identified as probably 
constituting the crime of genocide, in part on the basis of their systematic 
use of sexual slavery, and the use of ‘rape camps’ for ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia has been well documented.238 Roman slaves, male and female, were 
indeed vulnerable to sexual exploitation, either during the moment of their 
enslavement or during their subsequent servitude, but the Roman genocidal 
use of mass enslavement went far further.239 There has been some scholarly 
recognition of the wider, contemporary role of enslavement as a method of 
community destruction.240 
                                            
237 Bloxham and Moses 2010, 71–74, 245; Stone 2008, 526, 529–30; Baaz and Stern 2009; 
Snyder et al. 2006; Gottschall 2004; Card 2008; Card 1996; Card 1997; Diken and Laustsen 
2005; Sjoberg 2011; Miller 2009; B. Allen 1996 is considered something of an urtext on this 
subject; but see also Seifert 1994; on war-rape and sexual servitude in ancient contexts, 
see: Gaca 2011b; Gaca 2014; Gaca 2016; Vikman 2005. 
238 ISIL/ISIS: Kennedy 2017; Ahram 2015; United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and Office of the high Commissioner and the Secretary-General 2015; Bosnia: B. 
Allen 1996; Faber and Stiglmayer 1994; Kozaric-Kovacic et al. 1995. 
239 Polyb., 10.18, 9.3-5, for example, suggests that the rape of inhabitants during the 
sacking of cities was normal. 
240 Gauthier 2009; Saunders and Mantilla 2002; Aidi 2005; Edelman 1998; Meron 1986; 
Biondi 2007; Gonzalez-Calvo 2000; Drescher 1999; Docker 2004; Jennings 2011; Scherrer 
1999; A. Jones 2010, chap. 1. 
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There have furthermore been some, usually cursory, considerations of 
genocidal enslavement in antiquity, of which a few are notable. Chalk and 
Jonassohn considered it as part of their paradigm of comparative-genocide 
analysis, but did not expound on their ideas.241 Adam Jones, in his wide 
ranging Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, briefly discusses the 
genocidal enslavement of out-group women in the Odyssey and in 
Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue.242 Conversely, Ben Kiernan, arguing for an 
agrarian-genocidal ideological model for the Spartans, ignores the issue of 
slavery and its connection to the Helots.243 Finally, Hans van Wees pinpoints 
the usefulness and relevance of slavery to understanding ancient modes of 
genocide, noting that it resulted in the ‘complete dispersal of a community’ 
and that the ‘irrevocable destruction of a group in this way could be counted 
as a form of genocide, even if few were killed’.244 Considering how deeply 
embedded the institution of Roman slavery was—whether or not it should be 
considered a ‘slave society’ or ‘slave state’245—the use of mass enslavement 
against other groups made it one of their prime methods of genocide. 
Social death 
The effects of enslavement must indeed have been profoundly devastating 
to the individual. Anxiety over the possibility of being reduced from liberty to 
enslavement was a legitimate fear, present from Plautus’ plays through to 
Principate-era jurists.246 As well as the deprivation of liberty and autonomy, 
physical controls, and vulnerability to physical and sexual violence, being 
enslaved meant the complete loss of former identity.247 The enslaved could 
be renamed arbitrarily by their new masters, whose household religion they 
                                            
241 Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 33. 
242 A. Jones 2010, 464. 
243 Kiernan 2009, 45–49. 
244 van Wees 2010, 245–46. 
245 Scheidel 2011; Stewart 2012; Influential is Finley 1973, 71; Finley 1980, 86; Followed by 
Hopkins 1978, 99ff.; K. Bradley 1987, 1; Garnsey 1996, 2–3; Finley’s terminology is slightly 
updated but definition largely followed in Dal Lago and Katsari 2008; See Alston 2011, 3–11. 
246 Plaut., Rud., 215-8; Isodore of Seville, Definitions, 5.27. 
247 F. H. Thompson 2003, 217–44; Stewart 2012, chap. 2 and bibliography in p.80, n. 3. 
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were expected henceforth to observe.248 At Rome, manumission was 
supposedly common, and achievable after a term of six-years’ service, 
although this might vary considerably in practice.249 The best chance for the 
restoration of a group under enslavement was for them to be sold at markets 
near to their home and ransomed. For most, however, there was a slim 
chance that they could re-join their native group, if it still existed, upon 
eventually gaining freedom, but resocialisation while enslaved and probable 
physical and psychological alienation from their homeland made this 
unlikely. Formally, those at Rome who were later manumitted did not re-join 
their natural group, but entered a new category of the libertini.250 The 
process by which a slave would be ‘violently uprooted from his milieu […] 
desocialized and depersonalized’ has been aptly labelled ‘social death’ by 
Orlando Patterson.251 The link between social death and the genocide of the 
community has been noted by Claudia Card, but has received insufficient 
wider appreciation.252 From the point of the originating community, the 
symbolic death that the enslaved underwent was in real terms the same as if 
they were killed. When this was done en masse either to entire groups, or 
large segments of them, enslavement was genocidal. 
Patterns of mass enslavement 
Data-led approaches 
Interest in the demographics of slavery has long meant that the subject has 
been more metric-led than most areas of Classical history. It is therefore 
                                            
248 Strabo, 7.3.12; Varro, Ling., 8.9. 
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250 Freedpersons were socialised such that they were prevented from developing a class 
consciousness of themselves as libertini, K. Bradley 1987; cp. Alston 2011, 2–7. 
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useful to compare the best available data on mid-republican slavery with that 
on genocidal mass enslavement. 
The below Table 2 presents the figures compiled by Walter Scheidel for 
enslavements between 297-167 BCE.253 While not comprehensive for the 
current period of study, they cover most of it. Scheidel follows both the 
chronological divisions and the calculations of Karl-Wilhelm Welwei for the 
Third Samnite War and first two Punic Wars, and of Adam Ziółkowski for the 
period 201-167 BCE.254 These calculations are by nature based on highly 
partial information, subject to vagaries of bias and of survival, and Welwei 
was himself deeply sceptical about the veracity of the numbers enslaved 
pre-202 BCE contained in his own work, seeing them as the inventions of the 
annalists.255 
Table 2. Reported enslavements of war captives, 297-167 BCE (from Scheidel 2011, 295, table 14.3) 
Period # of enslaved 
Third Samnite War (297-290 BC)  58,000-77,000 
First Punic War (264-241 BC)  107,000-133,000 
Gallic War (225-222 BC)  32,000 
Second Punic War (218-202 BC)  172,000-186,000 
Various wars (201-168 BC)  153,000 
Sack of Epirus (167 BC)  150,000 
Total  672,000-731,000 
To provide comparative data, like-for-like figures for genocidal mass 
enslavements were recalculated but eliminating, as previously discussed, 
those enslavements resulting from battlefield engagements. These numbers 
are provided in Table 3 below.256 The numbers that result are very different 
in quantity and distribution. The difference between the two sets of data, and 
the variation in difference, is charted in Figure 1. 
                                            
253 Scheidel 2011, 295, table 14.3. 
254 Welwei 2000, 159–60; Ziółkowski 1986, 74–75; cp. Volkmann 1990, 113. 
255 cf. Stewart 2012, 5 n.19. 
256 For sources, see Table 4 below. 
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Table 3. Reported enslavements excluding battle captives, 297-167 BCE 
Period # of enslaved 
Third Samnite War (297-290 BC)  5,000? 
First Punic War (264-241 BC)  61,500 
Gallic War (225-222 BC)  1,000 
Second Punic War (218-202 BC)  62,000 
Various wars (201-168 BC)  97,500 
Sack of Epirus (167 BC)  150,000 
Total  377,000 
The proportion of those enslaved in a genocidal manner seems to have 
been greater in the First Punic War, the various wars of 201-168 BCE and the 
so-called sack of Epirus in 167 BCE. The line of incidence—which shows the 
number of genocidal, non-battlefield mass enslavements recorded for each 
period—gives a further idea of the distribution. Thus, for example, the 
Second Punic War has a relatively low total of enslaved for the number of 
incidents of enslavement, indicating many incidents with a low or unrecorded 
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Figure 1. Chart comparing maximum and minimum reported enslavements of war captives (from 
Scheidel 2011) with reported enslavements excluding battle captives, 297-167 BCE 
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yield each, whereas 167 BCE is shown as an outlier in having a high total but 
extremely low incidence value of one. Due to the apparent existence of 
periodic trends in the data, and the data-driven approach of research into 
Roman Republic slavery, I examine the incidents of mass enslavement using 
the same periods, before examining the difference between enslavements 
that complemented other forms of community destruction and those that 
destroyed communities wholesale.  
Samnite Wars, 343-290 BCE 
Figure 1 suggests a large difference between the total numbers enslaved 
and the number of people subjected to genocidal mass enslavement during 
the Third Samnite War. This trend holds for the entire period of the Samnite 
Wars, starting in 343 BCE. In these years, there are only four sites of mass 
enslavement that seem genocidal as opposed to battlefield-related: Silvium 
in 305 BCE; and Velia, Palumbinum and Herculaneum in 293 BCE. These 
mass enslavements were characteristically smaller in scale, and less secure 
in their attestation than later mass enslavements. The enslavement, for 
example, of 5,0000 at Silvium, an Apulian city, is only attested by Diodorus 
Siculus.257 It is not precisely clear who it was that was enslaved. The town 
was garrisoned by the Samnites. It may have been they who were enslaved, 
not the wider group of the inhabitants of the town, although the storming and 
sacking of the city suggest the latter. 
Likewise, the evidence for the enslavement during the antepenultimate 
year of the Samnite Wars of people from Velia, Palumbinum, and 
Herculaneum is scant; Livy tells us that after a short siege of each by consul 
Spurius Carvilius Maximus, they were stormed and captured, and that ‘in 
these three cities the captured and the dead came to 10,000 people, such 
that those seized were a slim majority of the total’.258 Therefore, a little over 
                                            
257 Diod. Sic., 20.80.2. 
258 Liv., 10.45.9-11; quote: 10.45.11: in his tribus urbibus capta aut caesa ad decem milia 
hominum, ita ut paruo admodum plures caperentur.  
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5,000 people were probably enslaved, but according to what proportions of 
the three settlements is impossible to say. In the same year, the other 
consul, L. Papirius Cursor, attacked the Samnite city of Saepinum, which he 
captured by storm along with 3,000 people.259 Livy is however vague in 
these passages, referring to capture and not specifically enslavement, 
deepening our uncertainty and possibly referring to prisoners of war instead. 
Our poor knowledge of these events is further confounded by the probability 
that the Velia and Herculaneum in question are distinct from the well-known 
settlements with which they share their names and are otherwise unattested, 
and that Palumbinum is otherwise unknown.260 Spurius Carvilius, was the 
first of the Plebeian gens Carvilii to attain the consulship and to appear on 
the Fasti Triumphales, and his memory was well storied into Pliny’s day.261 
The possibility that Livy consulted their family records and those of the 
ancient gens Papiria, or that Fabius Pictor contained further details, hints at 
a potential underlying reliability, but does not permit much further analysis. 
Beyond issues with the evidence, the paucity of genocidal mass 
enslavements in this period reflects different mentalities towards war and 
destruction among the Romans, and a different interstate context than later 
in our period. The settlement patterns of the Samnites were not conducive to 
the capture of large numbers of inhabitants, being primarily characterised by 
low urbanisation and a high-density network of defensive hillforts.262 
Moreover, the low use of mass enslavement to destroy communities 
supports the idea that the so-called ‘Samnite Wars’ are an anachronistic 
convention, and that these conflicts were more akin to a series of raids and 
one-off campaigns, and show little coordinated and long-term strategic 
planning, at least until near their conclusion.263 This reduced the Romans’ 
resource commitment, necessary to pursue sieges and deport masses of 
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people, the consequent logistical ability and warcraft necessary to effect 
these outcomes,264 as well as the imperial mentality that enabled their 
envisaging.  
First Punic War, 264-241 BCE 
This trend continued for the period between the end of the Samnite Wars 
and the commencement of the First Punic War. The Pyrrhic War in the South 
necessitated major military resources, but produced little genocidal 
enslavement. Fighting the invading army did not require the waging of war 
against population groups and captives were of the military kind. To the 
North, Rome was involved in a series of campaigns fought against tribes of 
the Cisalpine Gauls in Northern Italy.265 Comprised of annual raiding 
campaigns with little evident overarching strategy, there is little recorded in 
the way of mass enslavement that could be classed as genocidal. The 
Roman assault led by Publius Cornelius Dolabella against the Gallic 
Senones tribe in 284 BCE, resulted in the enslavement of the women and 
children, while the adult males were killed, at least according to the late 
evidence of Appian.266 If he was reliable in this, the exception might be due 
to the Roman desire for revenge for the murder of Roman ambassadors by 
the Senones.267 Otherwise, the historian may have been influenced by stock 
representations of the killing of young adult males and the enslavement of 
the survivors among conquered populations.  
With the onset of the First Punic War, as the data tables and chart 
presented above shows, there seems to have been a major increase in the 
scale and incidence of genocidal mass enslavement. This reflects a real-
world change in the way that the Romans were engaging with other peoples, 
as well as a coincidental rise in Latin historical epic poetry, with Naevius and 
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Ennius, and Roman history writing, especially the influential but now 
fragmentary works of Fabius Pictor, Claudius, Curtius Rufus, and Cato the 
Elder.268 What is more, developing on the Lex Ovinia of 312 BCE, the Senate 
was increasingly asserting authority over Roman policy, enabling imperial 
strategies that could look beyond the immediate. The clash of two republics 
with imperialist agendas were more likely to produce genocide, which is 
prevalent in periods of contraction and expansion of empire, and this was 
expressed in the increased use of mass enslavement.269 The scale of 
enslavement dramatically increased, starting with 25,000 people hauled off 
from Agrigentum in 261 BCE.270 They were probably a proportion of the 
freeborn citizens, but may have comprised the servile strata. Within just over 
half a decade, the inhabitants of the Siciliote cities of Mazara, Myttistratum, 
Camerina, and Panormus would similarly be subjected to mass enslavement 
following their violent capture by Roman armies.271 The residents of 
Panormus seem to have been given opportunity to be ransomed, but 13,000 
of them who could not afford their liberty were subsequently sold off.272 This 
practice of locally ransoming the enslaved might have been more 
widespread than the scant references suggest, as it was common for 
prisoners of war. That would complicate the destructive effects of social 
death on communities.273 Each of these settlements had required multiple 
attempts at capture, and the mass enslavement of their populaces was 
inflicted to punish them and reassert Roman status. 
The campaigns of the 250s BCE also provide us with rare attestations of 
enslavements of non-urban populations, as the Romans enslaved 
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inhabitants of Corsica and Sardinia and of the countryside around Clupea.274 
Many of the several thousand slaves from Corsica and Sardinia will have 
been captured from Olbia in Sardinia and from the Corsican capital Aleria, 
the capture of which L. Cornelius Scipio celebrated on his epitaph. 
Archaeological evidence suggests it was a thriving town until the Roman 
conquest, and so probably provided many of the slaves taken following its 
sack.275 Polybius says that 20,000 were taken from Clupea itself, whereas 
Eutropius and Orosius both give a figure of 27,000 as having been enslaved 
from its general region, probably derived from the same missing source. 
Orosius adds that ‘300, or more, strongholds’ were plundered.276 This detail 
also survives in Florus and may suggest that the other two later historians 
got their information on this point from Livy.277 The capture of many small 
settlements and forts, might be added to Polybius’ slaves from Clupea to 
make up the discrepancy.  
Gallic War, 225-222 BCE 
The subsequent Gallic War in Northern Italy saw a reversion to the mode of 
warfare that predominated before the war with Carthage. There was little 
evident imperial strategy, as opposed to reciprocal raids between the Boii 
and the Romans. Following the decisive Roman victory at Telamon, they 
seem to have turned their attention to more long-term imperial strategy in the 
cisalpine Gallic region.278 The result was the practical expulsion of the Gallic 
tribes but even when the major settlements of Acerrae and Mediolanum 
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were captured by the Romans no genocidal mass enslavements were 
recorded.279 
Second Punic War, 218-201 BCE 
The Second Punic War brought an escalation in the Roman use of mass 
enslavement. Hannibal’s invasion of Italy posed an existential threat to the 
Roman state, threatening to unravel the patchwork of alliances that formed 
their incipient empire and even to sack Rome itself.280 However, in the initial 
years of the Hannibalic War, the Romans were fighting among their own 
territories, and were therefore engaged in a mode of warfare predicated on 
battlefield engagements and Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator’s strategy of 
delayed confrontation. The three rebel towns of the Hirpini sacked in 215 
BCE—Vercellium, Vescellium, and Sicilinum—probably produced a little over 
5,000 slaves, although it may have been as low as 1,000 if an emendation of 
the fifth-century Puteanus manuscript of Livy is followed.281 The inhabitants 
of Malta and Sardinia were subjected to enslavements, although the 2,000 
and 1,500 people, respectively, taken likely posed little threat of destroying 
their communities.282 Antinum, a Marsic city captured in 213 BCE was of 
some greater importance and correspondingly rendered over 7,000 slaves, 
but its continued existence after this suggests that this was not so great a 
number as to destroy the people or that it was subsequently resettled.283 
However, the situation changed as the Romans went increasingly on 
the offensive on multiple fronts. In 212, the Turdetani in Spain were enslaved 
in their entirety, as well as the capture of Syracuse in Sicily producing 
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slaves.284 That same year seven rebel settlements in the Samnium area, 
especially those associated with Caudium, were captured and some ‘25,000 
of the enemy in these cities were captured or killed’.285 The ambiguity of this 
statement obscures any attempt to divine how many were enslaved, but it 
does make clear the connection between the killing and enslavement of 
inhabitants as typologies of community destruction. In the following year, the 
inhabitants of Locrian Anticyra in Greece were enslaved, in conjunction with 
the Aetolians.286 Polybius is unambiguous in saying that the women and 
children were enslaved, but probably only highlights them for rhetorical 
effect, and implied that all the inhabitants who had survived the Roman naval 
bombardment and surrendered were enslaved.  
The coming of the last decade of the third century BCE saw a drastic 
escalation in genocidal enslavement. Aegina was taken in 210 BCE and 
enslaved.287 5-8,000 were taken from North Africa, although it is difficult to 
tell the effects of this on its communities due to the vagueness of the 
reports.288 The city of Manduria was taken by force by Fabius in 209 BCE, as 
other peoples in Southern Italy offered their renewed deditio to Rome, and 
3,000 enslaved.289 The sacking of Agrigentum in 210 BCE and Tarentum in 
209 BCE dwarfed these however.290 Both were Greek cities of major influence 
in their regions, Agrigentum for its strategic position in Sicily and Tarentum 
for its pre-eminent harbour and its influence over the neighbouring Italian 
tribes. Both had renounced the socii et amicitia of Rome to side with 
Hannibal and the Carthaginians. Once they had captured them, through ruse 
and the complicity of partisans inside, the general populations of the 
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captured cities were subjected to enslavement en masse. At Agrigentum, 
there was an initial indiscriminate mass killing, with the Romans enslaving 
those who survived. They aimed to destroy the entire group, shutting the 
gates to prevent the escape of the desperate inhabitants. The number 
enslaved must have been considerable; although it had been depopulated 
somewhat by successive wars and the earlier Roman enslavement in the 
First Punic War, Sicilian-born historian Timaeus estimated its population at 
800,000 inhabitants.291 At Tarentum too, those who survived the general 
slaughter of the storming were enslaved, numbering about 30,000. The 
Tarentines had previously been treated with leniency in conflicts with the 
Romans and its population spared.292 The Romans were done with leniency 
and increasingly comfortable storming settlements and enslaving the 
survivors.  
Earlier in the same year as the mass enslavement of the Tarentines, 
Scipio the Elder conquered Carthago Nova, capital of the Carthaginians’ 
Spanish empire.293 However, they were treated very differently to the cities 
of Magna Graecia. Scipio took the opportunity to ostentatiously display his 
clementia by not enslaving the population as they expected he would. He is 
presented as having committed publicly to vouchsafe the sexual inviolability 
of the Spanish noble women under Roman guard, which might have been 
effective propaganda for Scipio both with the locals and back home in 
Rome.294 His astute politicking and self-presentation as a man of clemency 
following the capture of Carthago Nova, no doubt coupled with the 
onerousness of Carthaginian demands for their war effort and the ascendant 
military strength of Rome, led to many of the Iberians renouncing 
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Carthaginian hegemony for Rome’s.295 He was seemingly put in the position 
of having to refuse the title of king from the Iberians.296 However, while 
declining the opportunity to enslave the community at large, not all escaped. 
Those of an ill-defined artisanal class (Polybius: ‘χειροτέχνης’, translated 
‘opifices’ by Livy) were made public slaves of the Romans with the promise 
that ‘if they showed goodwill and industry in their several crafts he promised 
them freedom upon the war against Carthage terminating successfully’.297 
They seem to have been distinct from the citizens yet not slaves, and may 
have represented an order of quasi-serfs. He furthermore press-ganged a 
selection of the most able-bodied male inhabitants to similarly serve in the 
navy. Scipio was thus able to benefit from increasing the productive, free 
labour available for the Roman war effort while still avoiding the destruction 
of the population as a group, winning a public relations victory by preserving 
its citizenry as a group. This seems to have been a general policy of Scipio 
in Spain, as he supposedly systematically released any Spanish captives 
without ransom from the eighty cities that he captured through surrender or 
assault.298 
Various wars, 201-172 BCE 
Few large settlements were targeted for enslavement by the Romans in the 
early years of the second century BCE. The great campaigns of the Second 
Punic War had ended in 201 BCE with the battle of Zama. The Second 
Macedonian War (200-197 BCE) that immediately followed it was largely 
predicated on the Flamininus’ public policy of freedom for the Greek states, 
and therefore the Hellenic cities were mostly spared being targets of Roman 
aggression.299 Some settlements in the Hellenistic East must have been 
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enslaved however, as Philip V of Macedon had issued orders to ransom the 
enslaved inhabitants of Dymae wherever they were found.300 Also, in 188 
BCE all the surviving inhabitants of the four-month siege of Same were 
enslaved by M. Fulvius Nobilior.301 Their enslavement was a punishment for 
revolting from Roman hegemony shortly after having submitted to it.  
Elsewhere, the town of Corbio, belonging to the Suessetani tribe in 
Spain, was besieged in 184 BCE, with the survivors sold by A. Terentius 
Varro.302 The action quelled the area in advance of winter. These actions 
were not new, as about a decade previously, in 195 BCE, seven fortified 
castella of the Spanish tribe of the Bergistani were enslaved in their entirety 
after Cato was compelled to conquer them for a second time in short order. 
Livy says that this was ‘to put an end to their frequent breaking of the peace’, 
and they were therefore destroyed to break a cycle of recidivist infidelity.303 
Doubtlessly, Cato’s consummate self-promotion framed the record of this 
episode, making his actions seem both noble under Roman morality and 
strategically necessary. The episode may stand as a doublet with Livy’s 
more detailed account of Cato’s assault on the castrum Bergium, 
presumably the tribe’s capital, later in the same book, or the Bergistani might 
have revolted three times.304 In this latter account, all the inhabitants except 
those of a pro-Roman party were enslaved following the capture of the city.  
The 170s BCE seem to have brought an increase in predatory 
enslavement. In Sardinia, Tiberius Gracchus boasted on a tablet that he had 
set up in the temple of Mater Matuta about the 80,000 Sardinians that had 
been enslaved or slain under his auspices.305 While such self-display would 
be ripe for exaggeration, the quantity of Sardinian captives on the market led 
to the phrase ‘Sardinians for sale!’ (sardi venales) becoming proverbial for 
cheapness. The 170s BCE brought a shift in the way in which Roman 
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commanders were using enslavement to destroy communities. Previously, 
as we have seen, enslavements had resulted from the sack of a settlement 
when it was captured through force. Therefore, enslavement had been a 
complement to a prior phase of killing as the settlement was conquered.  
There are suggestions that the Romans were willing to inflict 
enslavement as a punishment on some wider, rural populations, as we have 
seen in the rounding up of Sardinians and Corsicans. The non-free status 
inflicted by the Romans on the Bruttians after Hannibal’s departure from Italy 
likewise restricted the liberty of an entire region, although probably stopping 
short of actual enslavement. However, those that surrendered or voluntarily 
submitted to Roman fides were perforce expected to be safe from collective 
reduction to slavery. These protections were eroded with M. Popilius Laenas’ 
enslavement in 173 BCE of the Ligurian town of Carystus.306 They were 
previously friends and allies of Rome, and therefore within the mutual sphere 
of obligations of protection that this entailed. They resubmitted to Rome, 
entrusting themselves to the clementia that they knew to expect as prior 
supplicants to Roman commanders. However, Laenas enslaved all the 
people within the town. As it seems that it was the metropolitan settlement to 
which a bulk of that tribe had fled upon the Romans’ unexpected invasion of 
their territory, this likely meant the symbolic extirpation of a bulk of their 
people. It certainly numbered in the tens of thousands, as there were a little 
under 10,000 men of fighting age present, having already lost the same 
number on the battlefield, if Livy is to be believed. As the city had 
surrendered voluntarily, enslavement was for the first time in the present 
study the sole and wholescale method of destroying the community.  
Wholescale, monomodal mass enslavement is therefore an outlier in 
the historical record, and enslaving in this fashion could be considered 
aberrant by contemporary ancient Romans. M. Popilius Laenas’ 
enslavement of the town of Carystus in 173 BCE, for example prompted an 
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angry and incensed reaction from the Senate in Rome.307 Carystus was the 
metropolis for the Statelite tribe of Ligurians, to which numerous of its people 
had fled when Laenas unexpectedly invaded their territory and at which a 
grand army of the tribe was convened to defend themselves. He was 
deemed by his peers to have been in breach of the spirit of mutual 
obligations attendant on the submission of a people to Roman fides.308 The 
implications of this reaction are discussed further in chapter six of this study. 
The Senatorial opprobrium marked the event out as unusual and resulted 
from the use of a method of destruction without the legitimating context of a 
siege. The allied status of the Statelites, further compounded the illegitimacy 
of the consul’s actions in enslaving them.  
Third Macedonian War, 171-168 BCE 
The onset of the Third Macedonian War brought with it a renewal of mass 
enslavement, and the abandonment of Flamininus’ openly Hellenophilic 
policy from the previous war with Macedon. Nonetheless, the enslavements 
at Abdera and Coronea in 171 BCE were contemporarily considered to have 
been achieved in contradiction of norms of war, international relations, and 
moral expectations at Rome. The wholescale enslavements had been 
carried out after the cities had peacefully surrendered, thereby delegitimating 
their destruction.309 Because of the inherent infidelity of the mode of 
wholescale enslavement employed in these cases they were rejected at 
Rome. The Roman elite were not averse to treating their enemies with 
severity when they considered the occasion demanded, but they had their 
limits. Roman state actors who made use of wholescale destruction could 
leave themselves open to charges of wanton and immoral destruction 
contrary to Roman sociocultural norms and to the interests of the state. 
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The most significant mass enslavement of the Third Macedonian War, 
however, came with the so-called sack of Epirus, which was a direct 
consequence to it, despite Scheidel and others’ treating it as separate.  
Sack of Epirus, 167 BCE 
As Figure 1 shows, the sack of Epirus is an outlier in the available data. 
While its total of genocidal enslavement, at 150,000 people, is nearly equal 
to the previous two periods combined, it was only one incident. Furthermore, 
the chart shows that the mass enslavement was entirely directed against 
communities and not resulting from pitched battle. Despite similarities to the 
predatory, wholesale enslavements of Abdera and Coronea, there was little 
censure of this incident. It represents the clearest example of a genocidal 
use of enslavement in the Middle Republic.  
It was enacted by the consul Aemilius Paullus, who was returning to 
Rome from the victory at Pydna at the culmination of the Third Macedonian 
War after his subsequent tour and settlement of the Hellenic states. Our 
sources are at least as interested in the logistical precision shown by Paullus 
than in the fact or scope of the enslavement itself: 
Not far from here [viz, Passaron] was the camp of [praetor] 
Anicius. Paullus sent him despatches, so that there should 
be no disturbance over what was about to take place, saying 
that the senate had granted to Paullus’ army the booty from 
those cities of Epirus which had deserted to Perseus. The 
consul sent centurions to the several cities, who were to say 
that they had come to remove the garrisons so that the 
people of Epirus might be free like the Macedonians; ten 
leading men from each city were summoned to the consul. 
These men were instructed to have the gold and silver 
collected at the civic centre. Then cohorts were sent to all 
the cities, those bound for the more distant leaving before 
those for the nearer, so that they would arrive at all the 
towns on the same day. The tribunes and centurions had 
been instructed as to their mission. Early in the day all the 
gold and silver was collected; at the fourth hour the soldiers 
were given the signal to plunder the towns. So great was the 
booty that a distribution was made of four hundred denarii 
apiece to the cavalry, and two hundred apiece to the 
infantry, and one hundred and fifty thousand persons were 
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removed. The walls of the plundered cities were destroyed; 
the number of communities was about seventy. All the booty 
was sold, and from the proceeds the amounts given above 
were paid to the army.310 
Livy’s account here likely derives from Polybius’ description, which is now 
lost but to which Strabo attests.311 The scale and the meticulous, thorough 
planning and execution are chilling, and reminiscent of the systematic 
genocides of the twentieth century. It is also bears similarities to the 
massacre of Lusitanians carried out by Paullus’ political enemy Ser. 
Sulpicius Galba when praetor in 150 BCE, but lacks the universally negative 
judgement that he garnered from the sources.312 As Galba would, Paullus 
cannily divided his victims after their submission to Rome, encouraged them 
to think that they were safe, and then carried out the act of destruction. He 
thereby maximised the destructive effect while minimising the risk to his own 
troops.  
If Polybius’ statement that Scipio the Elder assigned one Roman 
superintendent (ἐπιμελητής) per thirty slaves upon the capture of Carthago 
Nova is indicative, then Paullus would have required about 5,000 troops in 
total to achieve the Molossian operation. The mean number of persons per 
settlement, there being 70 settlements, would be roughly 2,143, so requiring 
about 71 soldiers per settlement. The number of people per settlement 
would in reality be uneven, with several larger cities containing many people 
and many smaller komai containing far fewer.313 This would seem to suggest 
that Paullus used one legion, which in the second century before the so-
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called Marian reforms numbered about 5,000, and organised the 
enslavements around detachments of centuries, numbering roughly 60 
soldiers a piece.314 The scale of Paullus’ enslavement of the Molossians, as 
well as the logistics behind it, are therefore plausible. 
The characteristically meticulously planned execution of the 
enslavement is probably as much the reason for the textual survival of this 
episode than the scale of enslavement itself, though the latter has been of 
greater interest to modern commentators. Paullus probably became 
eulogised as a moral exemplar in his own time, the friendship of Polybius no 
doubt playing its role, and his virtuousness is a recurrent theme of discourse 
on him, both ancient and modern.315 Among his plaudits, stories circulated: 
He used to say to those who wondered at his attention to 
details that the same spirit was required both in marshalling 
a line of battle and in presiding at a banquet well, the object 
being, in the one case, to cause most terror in the enemy, in 
the other, to give most pleasure to the company.316 
The way the enslavement was carried out was a large part of the mythos 
that surrounded it, and Paullus, in antiquity, emphasising the extraordinary 
attention to detail shown by the consul. The apparent dissonance between 
the scope and the enslavement went largely unnoticed, except for some 
slight anxiety that it seemed ‘so contrary to his mild and generous nature’.317 
Another, important, similarity between Paullus’ enslavement and 
Galba’s massacre is that in both incidents the result was to functionally 
destroy an entire tribe or ethnic group within a wider ethnic identity. Galba 
did not massacre all the Lusitanians, but rather one of their tribes. So too, 
Paullus targeted, for the most part, just one of the tribes of Epirus, the 
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Molossians. While the 150,000 persons sent sub corona in one stroke was 
unprecedented in scale, it would be of less interest to the question of 
genocide if thought of in terms of the whole koinon of Epirus.318 However, 
when the seventy cities—many of which were probably in reality komai 
(villages), proto-urban sites or large defensive enclosures319—were 
depopulated, the specific and intentional destruction of the Molossian tribe 
was the outcome. Unfamiliarity of commentators with the political and ethnic 
constitution of Epirus has likely obscured this point in ancient times as well 
as in modern. Some ancient authors mistake Epirus for a part of Macedonia, 
no doubt because of deep intercultural ties between the states and formal 
political links from at least the time of Philip II, or even as being Illyrian. 320 It 
is common for the modern literature to refer to the event as being inflicted on 
the Epirotes, and therefore the genocidal effect on the Molossians has 
previously been missed. 
The collective ethnic identifier of Epirotai or Apirotai is attested from the 
fifth century BCE, and was substantially consolidated by the Molossian 
Aeacid kings such as Pyrrhus I.321 As with neighbouring Illyria, it was an 
identity largely constructed by outsiders, meaning ‘Mainland’ as opposed to 
Hellas proper.322 The Molossian identity was older and more entrenched 
than that of the Epirote, and was still a key societal organising structure 
within the superstructure of the Epirote koinon. Although the state and 
society of Epirus was partially centralised, the regional ethnicities within it 
were substantially decentralised. The geomorphic conditions of Epirus, 
comprised of distinct valleys separated by steep mountain ranges, facilitate 
linear communication but circumscribe movements in other directions.323 As 
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such the history of Epirus was one of the increasing Hellenization and 
constitutional consolidation in the context of distinct ethnic or tribal groups. 
Strabo, quoting Theopompus, says that the Chaonians and Molossians were 
the most prominent, with the Molossians coming into the greatest power.324 
Under the Epirote Republic these two ethnic blocs were in a potentially 
uneasy power-sharing agreement. As they were a distinct entity, eliminating 
the Molossians by means of enslavement was to extirpate an entire group.  
It was logical for Paullus to concentrate his enslavement for the most 
part to the Molossians. It was they who had in 170 BCE, headed by their 
leaders Antinous and Theodotus, rejected Roman hegemony and re-joined 
their erstwhile allies Macedonia during the war. The subsequent attempted 
abduction of the consul Aulus Hostilius Mancinus at Phanote and the capture 
of most of the territory of the Molossians and Thesprotians by the 
Macedonians made this rupture irrevocable.325 This had led to internecine 
strife between the ethnic blocs that made up the Epirote Republic.326 The 
Chaonian tribe, led by Charops the Younger, championed the Roman cause. 
They had long been rivals with the historically more dominant Molossians for 
the leadership of Epirus. It would have made little sense for Rome to target 
their staunch allies for destruction, and nor did they. Instead they restricted 
themselves to rebellious Molossia and adjoining regions. Epirote sites 
outside Molossia do evidence damage from this time, including the 
significant sites of Cassopia and the Necromanteion-on-the-Acheron. 
Possibly they were judged by Paullus to have colluded with the Macedonians 
too.327 Otherwise, perhaps they were selected to demonstrate Roman power 
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or fulfil their avarice, or both. It is unknown if these sites should be included 
among those subjected to the enslavement however. 
Indeed, Paullus’ actions were very much tied up with economic 
considerations. Several of the sources indicate that the right to pillage the 
Molossians came from the Senate, while Appian makes the affair a 
consequence of ‘secret orders’ from them.328 Appian seems somewhat 
confused about the order and disposition of events, however, thinking that 
the Epirote towns despoiled had belonged to Gentius of Illyria and that 
Paullus went back to them after having already returned to Rome. The more 
credible of the accounts that mention the Senate’s role, those of Plutarch 
and Livy, are more restrained, and merely suggest that the senators had 
granted to Paullus’ triumphant veterans the privilege to the plunder of those 
Epirote cities that had sided with Perseus. No source explicitly states that the 
Senate were seeking slaves and had ordered Paullus to extract them writ 
large. Although taking the population might be considered part of the typical 
elements of plundering, these were people that had been quickly subdued 
and had had their submission to Roman fides accepted, and so this outcome 
might not have been a foregone conclusion. Indeed, Livy provides clear 
evidence that the Senate had made a general outline of policy and had sent 
it along with a commission to advise Paullus but that he was given broad 
discretion in how to implement it.329 Any economic calculus to enact the 
mass enslavement would therefore seem to have been Paullus’. He was 
probably keen to placate his troops prior to their return to Rome, Epirus 
being the last leg of the journey before Oricum, the port of departure across 
the Strait of Otranto. He intended to use the spectacular royal treasury of 
Macedonia as part of his triumph and deposit it in the Aerarium, and had 
therefore not distributed it to his men. The bonus payment seems to have 
been insufficient reward for them however. Although Livy had recorded a 
grand stipend of 400 denarii per cavalryman and 200 per infantry soldier, 
Plutarch recorded a paltry eleven drachmae for each of Paullus’ soldiers. In 
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any event, the amount yielded from the plunder of the valuables and 
enslavement of the urban population of Molossia was not enough to quell 
dissent, which nearly disrupted the rubber stamping of his right to a 
triumph.330 
An economic rationale behind the plundering of Epirus has been 
stressed by Ziółkowski.331 He takes the Senate’s role in the incident as 
crucial, identifying the importance of this centralised decision making and the 
fact that Epirus was the last location in the consul’s itinerary before Italy, 
making it the ideal place to source slaves for the peninsula. His argument 
that the slaves were required due to an increase in demand resulting from 
plague is well made, but contingent on too many factors. If he is correct in 
seeing a demand-side economic rationale in the enslavement of the 
Molossians as a slave hunt to supply a demand, then this would seem to 
have been a novelty that would not be soon repeated. It would require the 
Molossian enslavement to have been an exceptional departure in the Roman 
acquisition of slaves through warfare from an almost incidental model to one 
of demand-based slave hunting, and the seeking of exceptional models to 
explain the sheer scope of the 150,000 people enslaved. Erich Gruen made 
this incident the exception in his observation that ‘the facts plainly militate 
against any Roman policy of slave hunting in the East to stock the farms of 
Italy’, although he did balance it alongside further rationales.332 Ziółkowski’s 
argument posits a centralising economic strategy, led by pull factors. 
However, as an argument it rests on too many contingent factors producing 
a special outcome nonconformant with Roman interstate behaviour at any 
other time, whereas simpler solutions are available that do not test the limits 
of the law of parsimony nor disregard the issue as being simply an 
exceptional case. As stated above, Paullus probably had a wide latitude to 
interpret the overall senatorial policy for Greece and Macedonia, and any 
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economic considerations were likely to have been short-termist rather than 
an attempt at centrally-planned economic management. 
Irrespective of the various rationales provided for the enslavement, the 
connection between the targeting of an entire ethnic group, the Molossian 
tribe, for destruction through enslavement betrays a clear intention to commit 
genocide. The ethnic consideration is probably most strongly felt when it 
comes to Paullus’ enslavement of the Molossians. The liminality of the 
Epirote identity—Hellenised but of contested Greekness—existing in the 
border regions among Illyrians and Macedonians, possibly made their 
enslavement more palatable. The Romans could still claim to have been 
defending the freedom of the Greeks, providing the Greekness of the 
Epirotes was downplayed. The fracturing of partisanship in the state of 
Epirus along ethnic and geographic lines was relatively unusual in those who 
would become Rome’s victims. Savage reprisals were meted out to the anti-
Roman factions in other Greek states following Pydna, and Roman factional 
elements given free reign, and tacit support, to purge their opponents. 
These, however, were characteristically internal elements to each polis. No 
other league or state in Greece ended up in the same position of having a 
strongly demarcated pro-Roman/anti-Roman geographically-defined ethnic 
split. The Roman plundering was thereby confined to one ethnicity within the 
larger identity of the Epirotes, with Molossia destroyed in a like manner to 
the anti-Roman partisans in other states and according to similar principles. 
The state capture effected by the Chaonian leader Charops the 
Younger, who was much loathed by the statesmanlike Polybius,333 was in 
part a reflection of and a cause for the split of the Epirote republic along 
ethnic lines. It is, however, not necessary to see him as the orchestrator of 
events conspiring with a Plebeian coalition in power at Rome, as H.H. 
Scullard proposed.334 His explanation of events blames the affair on the 
machinations of Charops in conspiracy with an implausible plebeian clique 
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that Scullard conceived of as being in control of the Senate at the time. This 
reconstruction relied on a high degree of central senatorial authority in 
deciding policy, and as we have seen Paullus likely had some broad initiative 
in the enslavement and acquisition of Epirote booty. Scullard was also overly 
swayed by the ancient presentation of Paullus as an ideal type, who could 
not have carried out the deplorable enslavement unless he had been forced 
by the policy of a higher power.335 That Paullus’ acceptance of the 
consulship to pursue the war against Perseus of Macedon was famously 
predicated on the Senate and People of Rome allowing him complete 
autonomy in doing so militates against this interpretation. Instead, Charops’ 
continued elevation, and freedom to autocratic, corrupt rule even despite the 
disaffection of prominent Romans themselves, were symptomatic not 
causative. As venial as Charops may have been, it was not him that carried 
out the destruction of Molossia, but he was part of the fracturing along ethnic 
lines that led to it being thus destroyed.  
Cultural memories of Pyrrhus I of Molossia’s campaign into Italy may 
not have hindered Roman willingness to destroy them, and may have helped 
them to draw a distinction between Molossians and those of the other 
ethnicities of Epirus. However, there is little evidence that there was any 
specific ethnic hatred of the Molossians by the Romans as opposed to any 
other group in the region. Most likely, the liminal status of Epirote identities 
informed a permissiveness towards the enslavement of one of them.  
Achaean and Third Punic Wars, 158-146 BCE 
Taking the account of mass enslavement into the final years of our period of 
study, after the resettlement of Greece and dismemberment of Macedonia 
following the Third Macedonian War, both the incidence and the scale of 
mass enslavements lessened again, until the contemporaneous events of 
the Fourth Macedonian or Achaean and Third Punic Wars led to another 
spike that interrupted that trend. After the former of these, an unknown 
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number of the inhabitants of Corinth were enslaved. The majority of those 
still in the city were killed in the sack, but the women and children were sold, 
as were those former slaves who had been previously freed during the 
crisis.336 Those Corinthians that L. Mummius could locate in nearby towns he 
also ordered to be enslaved.337 The extension of this policy beyond the 
immediate confines of the sack shows an intention to complete the 
destruction of the Corinthians by means of enslavement. The fall of Carthage 
was not accompanied by the seeking out of Carthaginian or Punic people 
elsewhere to enslave. It may however have furnished 50-55,000 slaves from 
the survivors of the city’s population. The sources on this matter are 
ambiguous or contradictory, and hinge on whether the 50-55,000 suppliants 
who were allowed safe passage under guard out of the carnage were 
enslaved or allowed to go free as a performance of clementia. 338 If the 
former, then it would be among the largest numbers of people taken in a 
single mass enslavement in this period. While they may indeed have been 
reduced to slavery, the first source for this titbit is Orosius, and therefore 
quite late as evidence. This is perhaps not surprising, as the sack of 
Carthage is remarkably poorly evidenced and little contemporary evidence 
survives considering its major cultural and political impact and legacy. His 
sources recording the fact of the enslavement have been lost to us, but 
equally he could have been working on a plausible assumption of how the 
Roman Republican army would have acted. It is therefore difficult to say 
whether they were released or sent sub corona. Their appearance as 
suppliants— ‘bearing the sacred garlands of Aesculapius’ and ‘olive 
branches from the temple’—could have prompted a reciprocal clemency 
from Scipio Aemilianus.339 
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Appian’s account has them beseeching Scipio Aemilianus ‘that he 
would spare merely the lives of all who were willing to depart on this 
condition from Byrsa’, so that ‘forthwith there came out 50,000 men and 
women together, a narrow gate in the wall being opened, and a guard 
furnished for them’.340 Zonaras recorded that ‘the majority of the men 
captured were thrown into prison and there perished, and some few […] 
were sold’.341 However, his epitomisation, although working with elements 
familiar from other sources, seems in several ways to follow a different 
chronological structure. This makes it difficult to identify to whom Zonaras is 
referring, not specifying that these captives are the same as the 50-55,000 
suppliants, as well as casting doubt on the causation and victims that he 
presents. That most of Zonaras’ group ended up mouldering in prisons, and 
that he in the very next sentence tells of the fate of Hasdrubal, Bithias and 
the other ‘very foremost’ of the captives imprisoned in Italy, suggests that 
perhaps he might be talking about military captives rather than those of the 
general population. It is difficult to believe that the Romans would have 
imprisoned, rather than enslaved, 50-55,000 people for any length of time, 
unless it was the case that they were briefly held under guard before being 
deliberately extirpated, although this would have been an exceptional and 
unusual act for the Romans. It might just be that our earlier surviving 
narratives are either lacunose or overly circumspect and euphemistic, and 
Scipio could have reasonably claimed the survivors as legitimate booty taken 
from a city under storm;342 it is unlikely that any would have opposed him, 
and simply preserving their lives might have been demonstration enough of 
his clementia if he had.343 The putative enslavement of 50-55,000 
Carthaginians in 146 BCE is therefore not well substantiated. Most of the 
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sources mentioning the suppliants do not suggest that they were enslaved, 
although it cannot be ruled out. 
Types of Roman genocidal mass enslavement  
Complementary mass enslavement 
Most of the incidents of mass enslavement discussed above occurred 
following the partial destruction of the group by other means. Typically, those 
reduced to the pitiable status of slaves were those who had survived the 
indiscriminate or selective mass killing that ensued when the Romans 
stormed a city.344 Therefore, the social death of a large part of the group 
complemented the actual killing of another part, destroying the group. 
Because such mass killing was often selective of male adults, as we have 
seen, there was a de facto selection of women and children to be enslaved. 
The prevalence of complementary mass enslavement was due to the stigma 
attached to the enslavement of those who had submitted to Rome. If 
relations were conversely hostile, it was normal for Roman troops to kill a 
portion of the population when capturing and securing a settlement. This 
meant that under normal circumstances it would not be possible to enslave a 
people without first attacking them and causing bloodshed. The moral 
regime that regulated this praxis is discussed in more detail in chapter six.  
Wholescale enslavement 
As we have seen, however, there were indeed times where populations were 
enslaved in their entirety without first being killed en masse. This was 
relatively uncommon. The mos maiorum militated against the acceptability of 
destroying a community unless it was captured legitimately in war,345 and so 
the enslavement of a community was normally carried out as part of 
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warfare.346 Thus, some instances of wholescale enslavement discussed 
above led to opprobrium from the Senate. The most prominent example, the 
total enslavement of the Molossians by Paullus, are therefore marked out as 
exceptional, in that the wholescale enslavement of the population was 
enacted despite that population having resubmitted to Roman fides. A range 
of factors probably legitimated their treatment to the Romans. Most important 
among these was the previous infidelity shown by the Molossians, making 
their future adherence to their submission to Roman suzerainty 
questionable. Undoubtedly, pecuniary concerns informed the opinions of 
both Senate and consul, assuaging any qualms they might have about 
bloodlessly enslaving wholescale this liminal ethnic group. 
Conclusions 
Enslaving groups, wholly or in part, served to fatally sever the social bonds 
that tie communities together, consigning those communities to social death. 
In many cases, enslavement was supplementary or complementary to the 
killing of urban populations, often taking the form of the killing of adult males 
of military age and the enslavement of those who remained. At other times, 
enslavement was not accompanied by any bloodletting, but was itself the 
sole, wholescale method of annihilating that given community. Both the 
complementary and the wholescale modes of mass enslavement were used 
with the intention to destroy groups.  
The taking of slaves served several ends. As a method of destruction, 
enslavement destroyed potential threats to Roman suzerainty and thereby 
compelled neighbouring states or peoples to acquiesce. Polybius thought 
that the tipping point in the Roman lust to conquer the Mediterranean was 
the capture of Agrigentum in 241 BCE.347 It may well have been, once the 
Romans understood the domino effect that its enslavement had on bringing 
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the other inland Siciliote cities over to Rome. Mass enslavement was meted 
out in revenge for lack of loyalty, in addition to its embeddedness in the 
annual sequence of warfare of the militarised society of Rome.348 It was 
therefore terroristic. The literary topoi that permeate the possibility of the 
enslavement of oneself and one’s family reveal the anxiety and fear that the 
threat of enslavement posed. This perhaps, informed the practice of self-
annihilation, the patriarchies of threatened cities preferring to kill their own 
families than risk their violation upon capture.349 The normativity of the 
practice of mass killing of the adult males and enslavement of the women 
and children among ancient peoples meant that this threat was very real 
under the ius bellum and ius gentium.350 
Roman commanders had good incentives to their self-interest to ‘save’ 
the inhabitants of plundered settlements rather than putting them to the 
sword. Slaves were useful to members of the Roman elite in furthering their 
own position within the competitive social and political culture of Rome, 
although this should not be taken to indicate a straightforward model of 
avaricious imperialism.351 They had more economic value alive than dead. 
Economic considerations were inevitably part of the calculus of those 
deciding to enact mass enslavement, because slavery is inherently the 
process of reducing humans to their economic function as property, or to the 
role of ‘fixed capital labour’, bereft of worth as autonomous people.352 
Enslavement could help to provide the booty that the Roman soldiers 
expected their commanders to provide.353  
Purchasing goodwill in this way was an essential step in having a 
request for a triumph accepted, and commanders perceived as stingy risked 
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losing their moment for glory.354 Selling slaves could produce more money to 
donate to the treasury on returning to Rome, another ploy to secure a 
triumph and a positive reception among one’s peers.355 It was supposed to 
have been the marker of a morally good general to have not made himself 
wealthy at the expense of the towns that he sacked. Those who deposited 
the wealth that they had captured, including that derived from the sale of 
human beings, in the state Aerarium were especially well regarded.356 The 
display of captives in the triumph itself was a powerful way of increasing the 
social standing of a commander. The alterity of those enslaved by Rome 
was part of the spectacular power of the procession.357 It was a performance 
of imperialism over other, vanquished peoples, a spectacle akin to the 
display of exotic animals, lustrous valuables, or even trees.358 This triumphal 
dramatization aggrandised the imperator, but did so predominantly through 
the conference of a symbolic status. It made (some) slaves worth more than 
just their market value and provided a powerful incentive to take slaves 
during or after the capture of foreign settlements to use them as adornments 
of imperial prestige. 
The social and economic benefits of enslavement encouraged some to 
overstep the bounds of what was morally permissible. Those who otherwise 
carried out morally objectionable enslavements could be attacked for being 
motivated by economic considerations. Pursuing his programme of 
demonstrating negative exemplars, Livy criticized those ‘who waged war 
harshly and greedily in Greece’ on this basis.359 The competitive need to 
make use of the opportunities of imperialism probably motivated Popilius 
Laenas and others to attack and enslave wholesale populations already 
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under fides. This precept could lead to some apparent dissonance when 
morally exemplary Roman figures enacted enslavements that appeared like 
the cruel and avaricious actions of their antitheses. Sallust felt the need to 
assert that when Marius carried out the complementary enslavement of the 
survivors of Numidian Capsa, he did so ‘contrary to the rules of war’ not from 
‘avarice nor his cruelty’ but due to strategic necessities, reinforced by a 
healthy dose of victim-blaming the inhabitants for their untrustworthiness.360 
Other authors would show some small discomfort in trying to reconcile 
Paullus with his actions in Molossia, which were self-evidently ‘so contrary to 
his mild and generous nature’.361 
The Roman economy of slave trading and holding was inseparable 
from their imperial expansion. As has been shown in this chapter, slave 
hauls resulting from warfare could be extensive. Delos was renowned 
because it ‘could both admit and send away ten thousand slaves on the 
same day’ and was proverbial for its facilities and capacities.362 The high 
volume of human traffic was, Strabo suggests, due to the Romans’ 
possession of many slaves following their destruction of Corinth and 
Carthage. Imperial expansion and the slave trade were commensurate. 
Furthermore, the opening of the port of Delos seems to have been a 
concerted, and successful, policy attempt to use economic means to 
undermine the position of Rhodes, showing the Roman capability for some 
level of economic strategy.363  
The longstanding behaviour of enslavement was dynamic and 
contingent. Its use increased as the Roman hegemony expanded along with 
Rome’s capacity for and engagement in military activities across wider 
                                            
360 Sall., Iug., 91.7: Id facinus contra ius belli non avaritia neque scelere consulis admissum, 
sed quia locus Iugurthae opportunus, nobis aditu difficilis, genus hominum mobile, infidum, 
ante neque beneficio neque metu coercitum. 
361 Plut., Aem., 30.1: ‘Αἰμίλιος μὲν οὖν τοῦτο πράξας μάλιστα παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιεικῆ 
καὶ χρηστὴν οὖσαν εἰς Ὠρικὸν κατέβη’. 
362 Strabo, 14.5.2: ἡ Δῆλος, δυναμένη μυριάδας ἀνδραπόδων αὐθημερὸν καὶ δέξασθαι καὶ 
ἀποπέμψαι. 
363 Rosenstein 2012, 222–23. 
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territorial spans.364 The quantity of human booty acquired through 
complementary enslavement grew. The Romans did not need to commit 
themselves to dedicated slave hunting expeditions to feed their intrusive 
model of slavery, as they had ample and opportune sources from which to 
acquire such captives.365 More than this, however, as Roman imperialism 
developed, so too did their use of enslavement as a genocidal method of 
destroying other communities.  
 
 
Table 4. Incidents of Roman mass enslavement of groups, 343-146 BCE 
BCE Victim Quantity Sources 
308 Allifae 7000 Liv., 9.42.7-8; Diod. Sic., 20.35.2 
305 Silvium 5000 Diod. Sic., 20.80  
293 Velia, 
Palumbinum & 
Herculaneum 
>5000 Liv., 10.45.11 
293 Saepinum <3000 Liv., 10.45.14  
284 Senones Women & 
children 
App., Sam., 13; App., Gallica, 9; Liv., Per., 12; 
Oros., Hist., 3.22.12-15; Polyb., 2.19.11  
261 Agrigentum 25000? Diod. Sic., 23.9.1; Oros., 4.7.6; Polyb., 
1.19.5; Zonar., 8.1  
260 Mazara All Diod. Sic., 23.9.4 
259 Corsica and 
Sardinia 
Several 
thousand 
Eutr., 2.20; CIL, VI 1287; Flor., 1.18.16; 
Front., Strat., 3.9.4, 10.2; Oros., 4.7.11; 
Zonar., 8.11; Liv., Per., 17.4; Sil., 6.670-72 
258 Myttistratum All Diod. Sic., 23. 9. 4; Zonar., 8.11; Polyb., 
9.10.11 
258 Camarina 
 
Diod. Sic., 23.9.5; Polyb., 1.24.12; Val. Max., 
6.5.1; Zonar., 8.12  
256 Countryside 
around 
Aspis/Clupea 
23500 Eutr., 2.21; Oros., 4.8.9; Polyb., 1.29.7  
254 Panormus c. 13000 Diod. Sic., 23.18.5; Polyb., 1.38.9-10; Zonar., 
8.14; Flor., 1.18.12; [Aur. Vict.], De vir. ill., 
39.2; Sen., Ep., 114.17; Cic., Rep., 1.1 
218 Malta 2000 Liv., 21.51.2  
215 Vercellium, 
Vescellium and 
Sicilinum, 
> 5000 Liv., 23.37.13 
215 Sardinia 1500 Eutr., 3.13; Flor., 1.22.35; Liv., 23.41.7  
213 Antinum >7000 Liv., 24.47 
212 Turdetani All Liv., 24.42.11, 28.39.5-8; Zonar., 9.3 
212 Syracuse 
 
Diod. Sic., 26.20.1-2; Liv., 25.28.1-31.15, 
26.31-32, 31.31; Cic., Ver., 2.4.120; Val. 
Max., 5.1.4, 8.7; Plin., Nat., 7.125; Sil., 
                                            
364 K. Bradley 2011, 246. 
365 Gruen 1986, 298–99; O. Patterson 1985, 38ff. 
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14.627-683; Flor., 1.22.33-34; Plut., Mor., 
19.7-12, 21.1-7; Zonar., 9.5; Cass. Dio, 15.5 
212 Telesia, 
Compsa, 
Fugifulae, 
Orbitanium, 
Blandae, Aecae 
25000 killed or 
captured 
Liv., 24.20 
211 Antikyra All Polyb., 9.39.2; Liv., 26.26.3 
211 Capua 
 
App., Hann., 43; Liv., 26.14.1-4, 16.6, 34.1-
13; Oros., 4.17.12; Zonar., 15.6  
210 Agrigentum All Eutr., 3. 14; Liv., 26.40.13; Oros., 4.18.2; 
Zonar., 9.7  
210 Aegina 
 
Polyb., 22.8.10; OGI, 281 
209 Carthago Nova ~2000 of 
artisan class 
App., Hisp., 23; Cass. Dio, 16.57.42; Diod. 
Sic., 26.21.1; Eutr., 3.15; Flor., 1.22.37-40; 
Liv., 26.49f; Polyb., 10.17.6; 19.8; Oros., 
4.18.1; Zonar., 9.8 
209 Tarentum 25-30000 App., Hann., 49; Brut. 72; Diod. Sic., 26.21.1; 
Eutr., 3.16; Liv., 27.16.7; Oros., 4.18.5-6; 
Plut., Fabius, 22.4; Plut. Mor., 195f; 
Polyaenus, Strat., 8.14.3; Zonar., 9.8 
209 Manduria 3000 (4000?) Liv., 27.15.3 
204 North Africa 5-8000 Liv., 29.29.3; Oros., 4.18.19; Zonar., 19.12 
203 Bruttians All App., Hann., 61  
199 Dyme 
 
Liv., 32.22.10  
193 5 Bergistani 
towns 
All Liv., 34.16.10  
188 Same All Liv., 38.29.11  
184 Corbio All Liv., 39.42.1  
177 Histrian towns: 
Nesactium, 
Mutila, Faveria 
5632 Liv., 41.11.8 
177 Sardinia 80000 [Aur. Vict.], De vir. ill., 57; Liv., 41.28.7-10; 
Festus, Breviarium, 322 
173 Statelite 
Carystus 
All Liv., 42.7.8-9; Cic., Off., 1.36; Liv., 42.7.1-9.6, 
10.9, 21.6-7, 45.15.10 
171 Haliartus 2500 Liv., 42.63.11; Strabo, 9.411 
170 Abdera All Liv., 43.4.10; Diod. Sic., 30.6  
170 A few Greek 
cities held by 
Philip 
 
Liv., Per., 43; Zonar., 9. 22  
167 Epirus 150000 App., Ill., 29.4; Liv., 45.34.5; Polyb., 30.15; 
Strabo, 7.7.3 
155 Delminium 
 
Zonar., 9.25  
154 Aegina All Polyb., 33.10.3  
150 Lusitanians ? App., Hisp., 59 
148 Macedonians 
 
Ampelius, Liber Memorialis, 16.5; Flor., 
1.30.5  
146 Corinth Women & 
children 
Oros., Hist., 5.3.5; Zonar., 9.31; Paus., 
5.10.5, 7.16.7-8; Flor., 1.32.5; Oros., Hist., 
5.3.5; Festus, Breviarium, 7.2 
146 Carthage 50-55000? App., Pun., 127-133; Oros., Hist., 4.23.2-6; 
Zonar., 9.30-31; Flor., 1.31; Polyb., 39.8.6; 
Cic., Leg. agr., 2.51; Diod. Sic., 32.4; Liv., 
Per., 51; Liv., Epit. Oxyrh., 51.137-39; Vell. 
Pat., 1.12.5; Val. Max., 1.1.18; Dig., 7.4.21; 
Jer., Ab Abr., 18.71 
 
  
Chapter Four 
— 
Urban annihilation 
Introduction 
The first two chapters have dealt with destructive and genocidal force 
against population groups at large. We have seen that much of this violence 
was aimed at those located within urban settlements. While rural dwellers 
were no doubt vulnerable to the predations of Roman armies, it was the 
populations of urban settlements that withstood the worst of Roman military 
communal violence. There will have been several reasons for this: 
populations often seek refuge in fortified locations when threatened with 
invasion; cities and nucleated settlement types concentrate a larger number 
of the victim group into densely populated nodes; the frequently-bloody 
nature of the Roman method of sacking cities; and, the strategic importance 
of such settlements, especially for states or state-like organisations with a 
single metropolis, meant that they were a focus of military action. As 
centralised sites of ‘militarized power and control’ cities were both ‘primary 
agents, as well as the main targets, of war’.366 The mass killing or 
enslavement of urban populations was probably also easier for the authors 
of our sources to identify, and to make compelling, than any atrocities that 
were levelled against the general, rural population or smaller order 
settlements of which none of their audience would have heard. There is 
therefore probably a selective bias to the inclusion of destructive violence 
aimed at urban populations. 
When the Romans destroyed, they did not just destroy members of the 
group, but the settlements in which they lived could likewise be annihilated. 
This posed an existential threat to the inhabitant group, particularly because 
                                            
366 Graham 2014, 10. 
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of the localism of ethnocultural groups in this period. The category of urban 
settlements and places should be considered broadly, and should be thought 
of as including bona fide cities, be they Greek poleis or other indigenous 
forms, but also towns, proto-urban places, and what the Romans called 
oppida. These heterogenous forms share certain commonalities of urbanism. 
Each feature some or all of the defining features of urban settlements: 
‘centralized authority and state or public cult [and] a defensive system of 
town walls’.367 These features conditioned the patterns and ways of life of 
the groups inhabiting urban places. Therefore, the destruction of these 
features, and of entire urban sites, contributed to the destruction of the 
groups that built their communities within them. 
The 146 BCE annihilation of the city of Carthage has for many centuries 
played the role as a sort of foundational myth of Western European 
civilisation. In the ancient world, it was joined in significance with the 
destruction of Corinth in the same year and Numantia in 133 BCE. They 
belonged to a long line of urban annihilation that stretched back through 
Roman history and into mythology, a tradition through which their destruction 
would later be parsed.368 The Romans linked their mythological and 
(quasi-)historical origins and development to past acts of destruction. The 
Romans developed the mythology of the Iliad to include the foundational 
figure of Aeneas fleeing as a refugee of the destruction of Troy, and the 
Roman destruction of Alba by Tullius Hostilius was perceived as a key 
development in the state formation of Rome.369 The destruction of Veii as it 
reached our sources bears features that suggest that elements of the Trojan 
war had been assimilated with it, such as the ten year siege and the 
infiltration that led to its capture.370 The destruction of cities, therefore, had 
deep links into the Roman’s sense of ethnocultural identity, at least as far as 
a core defining feature of ethnicity is a conception of shared descent.371 
                                            
367 W. V. Harris 1989, 379–80; as paraphrased by Rasmussen 2005, 79. 
368 East 1971; Harrison 1984; Farron 1980; Frangoulidis et al. 2016, 403; Reckford 1961; 
Bell 2008; Morwood 1991; Estevez 1978. 
369 Alba Longa: Liv., 1.28-29; Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom., 3.31. 
370 The parallel is marked at Liv., 5.4.11. Cf. Ogilvie 1965, 628. 
371 Fenton 2010, 19–23. 
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However, these myth-historical episodes do not seem to have acted as role 
models for real world behaviours in our period of interest. Neither Roman 
commanders nor the Senate sought to destroy cities merely because of 
mythological precedents. They were aware of the parallels, however. 
Polybius reputedly recorded the lament of Scipio Aemilianus as he looked 
down on the ongoing sack of Carthage: 
Scipio, when he looked upon the city […] as it was utterly 
perishing and in the last throes of its complete destruction, is 
said to have shed tears and wept openly for his enemies. 
After being wrapped in thought for long, and realizing that all 
cities, nations, and authorities must, like men, meet their 
doom; that this happened to Ilium, once a prosperous city, to 
the empires of Assyria, Media, and Persia, the greatest of 
their time, and to Macedonia itself, the brilliance of which 
was so recent, either deliberately or the verses escaping 
him, he said: 
A day will come when sacred Troy shall perish, 
And Priam and his people shall be slain. 
And when Polybius speaking with freedom to him, for he 
was his teacher, asked him what he meant by the words, 
they say that without any attempt at concealment he named 
his own country, for which he feared when he reflected on 
the fate of all things human. Polybius actually heard him and 
recalls it in his history.372 
Quoting from the Iliad, Scipio hinted at the connections made by Roman 
actors between their destruction of other cities and the destructions that lay 
in their past, as well as the cyclical possiblilities for their own future. While 
suggesting empathy for the destroyed and fear for the possible annihilation 
                                            
372 App., Pun., 132, trans. Olson: Ὁ δὲ Σκιπίων πόλιν ὁρῶν […] τότε ἄρδην τελευτῶσαν ἐς 
πανωλεθρίαν ἐσχάτην, λέγεται μὲν δακρῦσαι καὶ φανερὸς γενέσθαι κλαίων ὑπὲρ πολεμίων· 
ἐπὶ πολὺ δ᾿ ἔννους ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ γενόμενός τε καὶ συνιδὼν ὅτι καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη καὶ ἀρχὰς 
ἁπάσας δεῖ μεταβαλεῖν ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπους δαίμονα, καὶ τοῦτ᾿ ἔπαθε μὲν Ἴλιον, εὐτυχής 
ποτε πόλις, ἔπαθε δὲ ἡ Ἀσσυρίων καὶ Μήδων καὶ Περσῶν ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνοις ἀρχὴ μεγίστη 
γενομένη καὶ ἡ μάλιστα ἔναγχος ἐκλάμψασα ἡ Μακεδόνων, εἴτε ἑκών, εἴτε προφυγόντος 
αὑτὸν τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους <εἰπεῖν>, “ἔσσεται ἦμαρ ὅταν ποτ᾿ ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρὴ καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ 
λαὸς ἐϋμμελίω Πριάμοιο.” Πολυβίου δ᾿ αὐτοῦ ἐρομένου σὺν παρρησίᾳ (καὶ γὰρ ἦν αὐτοῦ καὶ 
διδάσκαλος) ὅ τι βούλοιτο ὁ λόγος, φασὶν οὐ φυλαξάμενον ὀνομάσαι τὴν πατρίδα σαφῶς, 
ὑπὲρ ἧς ἄρα, ἐς τἀνθρώπεια ἀφορῶν, ἐδεδίει. Cf. Diod. Sic., 32.24. The relevant section of 
Polyb., Fr., 38.21, is lacunose and the quotation of Hom., Il., 6.448-9 attested in both App. 
and Diod. Sic. is absent. 
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of his own city, it does not posit the mythological as a justification nor 
motivation for urban destruction. 
Urbicide 
While the term ‘urban annihilation’ is employed here, ancillary to the field of 
Genocide Studies is the useful concept of ‘urbicide’. This word denotes the 
targeted destruction of the built environment, literally indicating the killing of 
cities. It specifically refers ‘both to the destruction of the built environment 
that comprises the fabric of the urban as well as to the destruction of the way 
of life specific to such material conditions’.373 As Cicero put it, the close 
bonds of belonging to the same gens, natio, and lingua is exceeded by that 
of fellow citizens who have the ‘forum, temples, porticoes, roads, laws, 
lawcourts, suffrage’ in common.374 The Romans had some sort of conception 
not completely dissimilar from that of urbicide. Florus, for example, 
comments that the Third Punic War was ‘fought not so much against an 
army in the field as against the city itself’.375 However, like ‘genocide’, there 
is no specific Roman conception nor terminology that maps precisely to 
‘urbicide’.  
It is a term that rose to prominence simultaneously from the works of 
Marshall Berman in the United States and of a group of Bosnian architects 
responding to the targeted destruction of the built environment as part of the 
ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian War.376 Urbicide can entail the 
destruction of cultural landmarks, being objects that enable the continued 
reproduction of ethnic, religious, social, and cultural identity. In the examples 
                                            
373 Coward 2009, 38. 
374 Cic., Off., 1.17.53: gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa infinita 
discedatur, propior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines 
coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se 
communia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura, iudicia, suffragia. 
375 Flor., 1.31.15.1, trans Forster: non enim tam cum viris quam cum ipsa urbe pugnatum 
est. 
376 Berman 1987; Šego et al. 1992; See, Coward 2009, 35; Easterling 2014, 75 n.2; Berman 
1996. 
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of Roman destruction, this would primarily mean public buildings and 
temples. As shall be seen, the Roman approaches to such edifices varied 
from case to case. The deliberate destruction of cultural landmarks is 
consistent with a strain of Genocide Studies as a form of cultural genocide 
as envisaged by Raphael Lemkin.377 However, scholarship on urbicide since 
the early 1990s has increasingly incorporated the analysis of the destruction 
of more mundane aspects of urban settlements, on the understanding that 
these equally constitute the physical environment in which people live their 
lives and create their communities.378 
Genocidal agrarianism 
Benjamin Kiernan’s interpretation of the destruction of Carthage—which he 
has referred to as ‘the first genocide’379—is essentially one of urbicide taken 
to its ultimate extension of an anti-urbanism stemming from a fundamental 
agrarianist ideology.380 While agrarian ideology undoubtedly informed 
Roman conceptions of ethnicity and morality, particularly when it came to 
other (non-elite) classes or other peoples, this kind of pathological anti-
urbanism cannot account for Carthage’s destruction. It is true that the 
Carthaginians, as a Phoenician offshoot, were identified by the Romans, as 
did the Greeks before them, as a seafaring, mercantile people in 
fundamental opposition to the morally rectitudinous in-landers.381 However, 
the evidence of the crisis that led to the war in which Carthage was 
destroyed can be interpreted in ways other than in fulfilment of an agrarian 
ideology. 
During the diplomatic overtures between Carthage and Rome at the 
start of what we know as the Third Punic War, the former had offered their 
surrender to the latter. Several demands were made of them by the consuls. 
                                            
377 A. Jones 2010, 9. 
378 Coward 2007, 26–28. 
379 Kiernan 2004. 
380 Kiernan 2009, 49–58. 
381 Isaac 2004, 324–35; cp. Gruen 2012, 115–40. 
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The final one was consul L. Marcius Censorinus’ ultimatum instructing the 
Carthaginians to remove themselves inland by 80 stades.382 It was an order 
that could be couched, as least as presented by Appian, as a gesture of 
moral improvement for the Carthaginians, the Romans taking the opportunity 
to do the Carthaginians a favour: 
The sea reminds you of the dominion and power you once 
acquired by means of it. It prompts you to wrongdoing and 
brings you thus into disaster. […] Believe me, Carthaginians, 
life inland, with the joys of agriculture and quiet, is much 
more equable. Although the gains of agriculture are, 
perhaps, smaller than those of mercantile life, they are surer 
and a great deal safer.383  
It is perhaps no coincidence that 80 stades was chosen. It was the minimum 
distance that Plato considered possible for a moral and uncorrupted city to 
be located from the sea.384 While the length of a stade varied widely from 
about 162-210 metres depending on the standard adopted, the 
correspondence of about 8 stades to a Roman mile means that Appian was 
probably converting from a Roman distance of 10 miles.385 Therefore, by 
modern measures, the Carthaginians were directed to move about 15 
kilometres, or about 9.3 miles. This would have been a trauma for a 
Phoenician group whose identity and prosperity were predicated on the 
ocean. It seems likely that Plato’s influence, perhaps indirectly, informed the 
ultimatum to the Carthaginians, as it undoubtedly informed Cicero’s later 
thoughts on the negative effects of proximity to the sea.386 Indeed, many of 
the same criticisms levied against Carthage by the Romans could be said to 
have also been aimed at the Corinthians, Cicero described their destruction 
together as ‘those two ornaments of the coast of the sea’.387 Hellenism was 
                                            
382 Diod. Sic., 32.6.3; App., Pun., 12.81; Cass. Dio, 21.9.26. 
383 App., Pun., 12.86-87, trans. H. White: ἡ θάλασσα ὑμᾶς ἥδε, μεμνημένους τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ 
ποτὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως, ἀδικεῖν ἐπαίρει, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἐς συμφορὰς περιφέρει. […] 
εὐσταθέστερος γάρ, ὦ Καρχηδόνιοι, ὁ ἐν ἠπείρῳ βίος, γεωργίᾳ καὶ ἠρεμίᾳ προσπονῶν· καὶ 
σμικρότερα μὲν ἴσως τὰ κέρδη, βεβαιότερα δὲ καὶ ἀκινδυνότερα καθάπαξ τὰ τῆς γεωργίας 
τῶν ἐμπόρων. 
384 Pl., Leg., 4.704a-705b.  
385 For the stadion as a measure, Schulzki and Decker [2006] 2011. 
386 Cic., Rep., 2.5-9, 2.7-9. See commentary in Zetzel 1995, 162–63. 
387 Cic., Nat. D., 3.91: duo illos oculos orae maritumae. 
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still highly contested in Rome even at the end of what we might call the 
Middle Republic, and for every Hellenophile T. Quinctius Flamininus there 
was a Cato the Elder to decry the corrupting influence of Eastern, Hellenic 
culture and mores.  
However, as much as ideas of moralising, thalassophobic 
environmental determinism may have informed the ultimatum that tipped the 
Carthaginians into retracting their deditio and pursuing war, it is a step too 
far to claim that Carthage, or Corinth for that matter, was destroyed in 
pursuance of some agrarian ideology. The Middle Republican Roman state 
was itself highly urban in nature. Even if most of its citizens and subjects 
were rural inhabitants, and if agricultural sources of wealth were considered 
more legitimate than negotium, the civic functions of the Roman state were 
deeply embedded in the urban topography of the city of Rome, and Roman 
control of various colonies and allied cities was instrumental to their 
empire.388 While much Roman military action was against urban or proto-
urban settlements, the Romans did not seek the destruction of urban 
precincts as a matter of an urbicidal ideological imperative. Indeed, the 
unnecessary destruction of cities was considered immoral and unnatural. 
Polybius has Alexander Isius accuse Philip of Macedon of being deviant, and 
with breaking with his royal forebears, by destroying cities, and in doing so 
destroying the prize and therefore spiting himself.389 Destroying cities without 
needing to was perceived as irrational, a mark of hubris and tyrannical 
behaviour. One might compare the tradition of the descent into decadence, 
hubris, and tyranny of Alexander the Great, manifest by his destruction of 
Tyre and, more egregiously, Persepolis.390 Indeed, it seems that the actual 
annihilation of cities by the Romans was comparatively rare considering the 
amount of military action taken against metropolitan peoples. The Middle 
                                            
388 Of the numerous works that take as essential the notion of Roman urbanism, see Purcell 
2010; Finley 1977; Rich and Wallace-Hadrill 1992; Cornell and Lomas 1996; Parkins [1997] 
2005. 
389 Polyb., 18.3. 
390 Tyre: Curt., 4.4.12-18; Diod. Sic., 17.46.4; Arr., An., 2.24; Persepolis: Curt., 5.7.1-7; Diod. 
Sic., 17.71.1-3, 72.1-6; Arr., An., 3.18.10-12; Plut., Alex., 38.1-8. 
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Republic was not inherently urbicidal, and ideological explanations of urban 
destruction are not sufficiently supported by the evidence. 
Physical destruction of cities 
Destroying settlements is difficult. Monumentalised defensive architecture 
necessitated the development of siege weaponry and tactics just to enable 
their circumvention.391 Jonathan Schell wrote about the lengths to which he 
witnessed the United States Army going in 1967 to destroy the Vietnamese 
village of Ben Suc, which had a population of about 3,500 people.  
G.I.s moved down the narrow lanes and into the sunny, 
quiet yards of the empty village, pouring gasoline on the 
grass roofs of the houses and setting them afire with 
torches. [...] Before the flames had died out in the spindly 
black frames of the houses, bulldozers came rolling through 
the copses of palms, uprooting the trees as they proceeded 
and lowering their scoops to scrape the packed-mud 
foundations bare. [...] Air Force jets sent their bombs down 
on the deserted ruins, scorching again the burned 
foundations of the houses and pulverizing for a second time 
the heaps of rubble, in the hope of collapsing tunnels too 
deep and well hidden for the bulldozers to crush.392 
The Romans had recourse to neither bulldozers nor high explosive munitions 
to drop from the air, and the task of obliterating a settlement completely 
would have been manifestly more laborious. We may justifiably doubt 
whether the complete destruction of settlements, in the manner of the US 
Army ‘bent on annihilating every possible indication that the village of Ben 
Suc had ever existed’, was achievable. 
The archaeological excavation of sites that can be securely identified 
as destruction layers is uncommon and requires a set of indicators to 
diagnose a cause of destruction due to purposeful human violence.  
                                            
391 Vitr., 10.13. 
392 Schell 1967. 
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Talking about annihilation 
Once again, the nature of the evidence, and its parlous state, is problematic. 
It is difficult to say how much of the language describing urban annihilation is 
accurate, unexaggerated, and terminologically precise. Ancient authors were 
themselves aware of the different effects that lexical choices could make on 
the presentation of urban annihilation. Attempts to reconcile the apparent 
exaggerations of their sources by our sources are not infrequent, as with this 
from Strabo: 
Polybius narrates that Tiberius Gracchus destroyed 300 
cities of the Celtiberians. This Posidonius ridicules, and 
asserts that to flatter Gracchus, Polybius described as cities 
the towers such as are exhibited in the triumphal 
processions. This is not incredible; for both generals and 
historians easily fall into this species of deception, by 
exaggerating their doings.393 
While the Latin terminology for urban annihilation is imprecise, some words 
do more to suggest either the outcome or method than others. Thus, ruina, 
ruo (and its derivative diruo) suggests the visible outcome of collapsed 
buildings.394 Likewise, ex(s)cindo might suggest the demolition through 
ripping apart or ripping down, as might excido and diripio.395 Adaequo and 
complano suggest the demolishing of the settlement so that it is level with 
the ground and, while undoubtedly exaggerative, it suggests an attempt at 
complete effacement. Other words are more metaphorical and tell us little 
about the actual destructive method: deleo (and its derivative noun deletio), 
stinguo, perdo, everto, and consumo fall into this category.396 Vasto 
suggested the creation of a featureless wasteland where the settlement once 
stood, but likely is figurative or symbolic rather than literal in meaning. 
                                            
393 Strabo, 3.4.13, trans. Hamilton and Falconer: Πολυβίου δ᾽ εἰπόντος τριακοσίας αὐτῶν 
καταλῦσαι πόλεις Τιβέριον Γράκχον, κωμῳδῶν φησι τοῦτο τῷ Γράκχῳ χαρίσασθαι τὸν 
ἄνδρα, τοὺς πύργους καλοῦντα πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θριαμβικαῖς πομπαῖς. καὶ ἴσως οὐκ 
ἄπιστον τοῦτο λέγει: καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ συγγραφεῖς ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τοῦτο φέρονται τὸ 
ψεῦσμα καλλωπίζοντες τὰς πράξεις. 
394 For examples, see relevant entries in the Oxford Latin Dictionary (Glare 1982). 
395 For discussion of diripio, see Ziółkowski 1993. 
396 Consumo is sometimes associated with fire as an agent of destruction, e.g. Caes., 
BGall., 2.14.2 and Liv., 25.7.6, but not necessarily, e.g. Lucr., 1.226. 
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Likewise are the range of words that take their meaning from reduction to 
nothing, among which are adnullo, adnililo, adnihilo, and annullo. Of course, 
much of the Latin usage dates to the Late Republic, Principate and even 
later, due to the vagaries of the survival of works from the earlier periods. As 
such, the complete range of terms and concepts through which the Romans 
of the Middle Republic thought about their annihilatory behaviours is 
uncertain. This ambiguity applies, for the most part, also to the words used 
by the Greek sources for Roman urban annihilation; among the more 
common are ἀπόλλυμι, διαφθείρω, διόλλυμι, φθείρω.397 Some of the Greek 
vocabulary is more suggestive of the methods of destruction, especially 
those such as καθαιρέω, Κατασκαφή/κατασκάπτω, καταλύω whose prefix 
suggest the demolishing of structures, which we will return to in due course.  
Burning 
For smaller settlements, burning likely served to achieve their effective 
destruction. Wooden structures would be easily dealt with, and even many 
stone structures would have had wooden elements—beams, supports, and 
so forth—liable to catch fire.398 Literary evidence suggests that villages could 
be burnt when the land was harried.399 It seems that burning was the primary 
method of destruction at Corinth, the fire being so intense that it gave rise to 
the later misconception of having created the Corinthian bronze alloy.400 
Other large scale settlements were subjected to burning as a method of 
destruction.401 Large parts of Syracuse were burned when M. Claudius 
Marcellus captured some of its neighbourhoods.402 The razing through fire of 
a settlement if captured was considered normal: Livy had the pro-Hannibalic 
                                            
397 For examples, see relevant entries in Liddell, Scott, and Jones 1940. 
398 Adam [1994] 2005, 236–42. See comments by Vitr., 2.9.14-16, on the naturally fire-proof 
nature of larch wood for concern over flammability of materials. 
399 Liv., 10.4; Cass. Dio, 4.34.4. 
400 ‘Corinthian bronze’: Plin., Nat., 34.3.6-7; Flor., 1.32.16.6-7; Oros., Hist., 5.3.7. See: 
Mattusch 2003; Jacobson and Weitzman 1995; Jacobson and Weitzman 1992; Emanuele 
1989. 
401 Antipatrea: Liv., 31.27. 
402 Liv., 26.32.4. 
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leaders of Capua imagine the burning of their city if the Romans were to 
capture it.403  
The destructive effects of fire on densely-packed, combustible urban 
environments were genuinely feared. At Rome itself, the problem of periodic, 
accidental fires was only systematically addressed under Augustus, and, 
even then, were only partly successful at ameliorating their effects.404 Arson 
was perceived as the weapon of choice for insurrectionists and conspirators 
in Rome, both alien and domestic.405 Among the crisis reactions to the 
Bacchanalian Affair was the organisation of vigiles to ensure that adherents 
of the cult did not burn Rome down.406 The Roman legate Q. Pleminius, in 
one tradition, was executed after bribing men to set fires in Rome to coincide 
with Scipio the Elder’s ludi so that he could escape from confinement.407 The 
trope of the arsonist conspirator would reappear with Catiline’s infamous plot 
in 63 BCE.408 Indeed, Cicero frequently levelled the accusation of attempted 
arson to destroy the city of Rome at those for whom he alleged criminal and 
treasonous activities.409 Looking backwards to Livy’s account of the Gallic 
sack of Rome, arson features prominently as the main method of 
destruction.410 The greatest existential threat to Rome was imagined, 
probably rightfully, to be through fire because it was an effective way to 
destroy urban places and formed part of the practices of Roman attempts to 
destroy other cities.  
Demolition 
Along with incendiary techniques, the Romans could use physical demolition 
to annihilate urban settlements. In some cases, this could be with the 
                                            
403 Liv., 26.13.15. 
404 Southern 2007, 119–20. 
405 E.g. Capuan conspirators in Liv., 26.27.12-14. 
406 Golden 2013, 166 f. 
407 Liv., 29.22.9-10. 
408 Pagán 2013, 31–35, 41. 
409 Cic., Sull., 6.19. 
410 Liv., 5.41.10-43.4; cp. Diod. Sic., 14.116.8; Plut., Cam., 22.6. 
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apparent intention to destroy utterly, as far as that was practical, the urban 
fabric of the city. Some sites, such as that of Numantia, provide 
archaeological evidence for both burning and demolition.411 Iliturgi in Spain 
was subjected to this kind of attack. They had killed those remnants of the 
Roman army of the Scipio brothers, and the Romans took their revenge, 
killing many of the inhabitants and then razing the place: 
Threw firebrands into the houses and demolished what 
could not be consumed by the flames. So delighted were 
they to destroy even the traces of the city and to blot out the 
memory of their enemies' abode.412 
Demolition was therefore probably in many cases carried out after the 
structure of buildings had been compromised by firing. For his description of 
this attack, Appian uses a term derived from κατασκάπτω to describe the 
demolition of this town, which he calls Ilurgia.413 Zonaras’ description of the 
Romans having burnt it to ashes (κατέπρησαν) may not be a 
contradiction;414 the demolition of the remains and foundations of destroyed 
towns as represented in many of the Greek sources with this verb (and the 
associated noun κατασκαφή) seem to have occurred following the torching 
of the buildings, although some of the less reliable sources seem to also use 
the word more generically.415 The two phase destruction is well expressed by 
                                            
411 Dobson 2007, 98, 140. 
412 Liv., 28.20.7, trans. Gardener Moore: ignem deinde tectis iniciunt ac diruunt quae 
incendio absumi nequeunt; adeo vestigia quoque urbis exstinguere ac delere memoriam 
hostium sedis cordi est. Cf. Zonar., 9.10; App., Hisp., 32-33; Val. Max., 9.11.ext.1; Eutr., 
3.16.2. The Iliturgi here may be the Ilorci of Plin., Nat., 3.9. See comm. in Gardner Moore 
1949, 8:28.19.1 n.1; and Yardley 2006, 26.36 n., 28.19 n. 
413 App., Hisp., 6.32: μέχρι καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς ἐπικατέσκαψαν.  
414 Zonar., 9.10: τὴν δὲ πόλιν κατέπρησαν ἅπασαν. 
415 Connor 1985, 85. Carthage and Corinth: Strabo, 14.5.2; Carthage: App., Pun., 12.83, 
20.136; Carthage and Numantia: Plut., Aem., 22.4; Numantia: App., Hisp., 15.98; Pharos: 
Polyb., 3.19.12; Cannae (town): Polyb., 3.107; Cameria: Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom., 5.51.1; 
Judea: Joseph., AJ, 15.357, 18.8; Syracuse: Plut., Marc., 19.2; examples of the Romans 
avoidance of include: Latin War: Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom., 3.34.8, 51.1, 6.75.3; Sabines: Dion. 
Hal., Ant. Rom., 3.66.2; Fidenae: Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom., 5.43.1; Plut., Rom., 23.6; cp. non-
Roman examples, including Sybaris: Diod. Sic., 11.90.3; Lyttus: Polyb., 4.54.2; Dium: 
Polyb., 4.62.2; walls of Paeanium: Polyb., 4.65.4; Dodona: Polyb., 4.67; Thermus: Polyb., 
5.9.3; Athenian designs on Syracuse: Diod. Sic., 13.29.4; Thebes: Diod. Sic., 15.88.4; 
Polyb., 5.10.6; Metape: Polyb., 5.13.8; risk to Rome: Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom., 8.50.1, 9.53.5, 
11.18.2. 
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Plutarch’s ‘κατεπίμπρασαν καὶ κατέσκαπτον’ (‘they burned them down and 
levelled them with the ground’).416 The importance of these lexical choices 
linked them to a ritual domain, the symbolic consequences of which will be 
discussed a little further on.  
The Romans could selectively apply their demolitions. They could, for 
example, destroy certain suburbs only to achieve strategic aims through the 
partial destruction of the urban environment. Thus, at Nola in 313 BCE, the 
dictator Gaius Poetelius supposedly ordered all the extramural 
neighbourhoods to be demolished to facilitate the approach to the town, and 
thus the Roman assault on it.417 Indeed, much damage to the urban fabric 
could be made during the siege and the attack on a settlement.418 In Epirus, 
the Molossian cities at Megalo Gardiki and Kastritsa show signs of damage 
from the Romans in the Third Macedonian War. Damage to the walls at 
Megalo Gardiki may be attributed to the Roman campaign of the praetor L. 
Anicius, who quelled the region prior to the sojourn of Paullus, whereas the 
site of Kastritsa shows evidence of the assault in the form of iron arrowheads 
from ballista projectiles and stone projectiles excavated in the destruction 
layer surrounding the southern tower that guarded the main entrance to the 
city which must have been deposited at the time of the attack.419 M.V. 
Sakellariou and N.G.L. Hammond identify these places as Passaron and 
Eurymenai respectively.420 If this is the case, then our literary sources would 
be wrong, as Livy is clear that of the Molossian settlements it was only 
Passaron, Tecmon, Phylace, and Horreum that did not immediately 
surrender out.421 Therefore, Sotirios Dakaris and Pierre Cabanes may 
instead have been correct in identifying Kastritsa as Tecmon instead.422 
Kastritsa, like other sites in the region, has not yet produced any epigraphic 
evidence for its ancient name and so we cannot be certain. In any case 
                                            
416 Plut., Cam., 22.6. 
417 Liv., 9.28.5. 
418 E.g. see the evidence for the siege works and assault on Numantia: Schulten, Barthel, 
and Groller 1927; Dobson 2007. 
419 Yiouni, Kappa, and Faklari 2015, 41–45; Pliakou 2007. 
420 Sakellariou 1997, 30; Hammond 1967, 176, 181–82, 527, 576–77; Cabanes 1976, 302. 
421 Liv., 45.26. 
422 Dakaris 1956, 54–57; Cabanes 1976, 302. 
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these sites attest to damage occurring not just after the Roman conquest, 
but during the invasion itself. 
Indeed, the site at Kastritsa may therefore represent an example of 
archaeological evidence for destruction that lacks literary attestation. There 
are others about which nothing is known about the site nor its destruction 
beyond the archaeological data, and indeed we must remain conscious of 
the partialness of the literary evidence for urban annihilation. The large 
Etruscan city at modern Doganella in the lower Albegna Valley, for example, 
is seemingly absent from the literary history of Rome’s expansion into 
Etruria. However, the archaeological remains, as far as they can provide 
diagnostic data, seem to suggest the termination and rapid decline of the 
settlement, with evidence for its having been set fire to, sometime after the 
first half of the third century BCE. Philip Perkins and Lucy Walker plausibly 
suggested its destruction belonged to the period between 212 and 200 BCE, 
if indeed it had not already been destroyed by the time of the fall of Vulci in 
225 BCE.423 Whatever city once existed at the Doganella site, it was 
impressive and large. Its literary absence suggests a larger set of unknown 
destruction sites, especially those that were lower order settlements and left 
fewer archaeological remains. Other examples of such sites include those in 
the Iberian Peninsula, where literarily unattested towns such as those at 
Castellet de Banyoles and at Cerro de la Cruz show evidence of having 
been violently destroyed.424  
Carthage’s urban fabric was severely damaged during the Romans’ 
assault. The successive series of walls were likely partially destroyed during 
the fighting.425 Appian’s account on the storming, as the Romans broke out 
from the military harbour known as Cothon and attacked the Byrsa reads: 
There were three streets ascending from the Forum to this 
fortress, along which, on either side, were houses built 
closely together and six storeys high, from which the 
Romans were assailed with missiles. But they captured the 
                                            
423 Perkins and Walker 1990, 77. 
424 Noguera et al. 2014; Moralejo Ordax, Quesada Sanz, and Kavanagh de Prado 2010. 
425 Flor., 31.15.11. 
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first few houses, and from them attacked the occupants of 
the next. When they had become masters of these, they put 
timbers across over the narrow passage-ways, and crossed 
as on bridges. […] No one dared to set fire to the houses on 
account of those who were still on the roofs, until Scipio 
reached Byrsa. Then he set fire to the three streets all 
together, and gave orders to keep the passage-ways clear 
of burning material so that the charging detachments of the 
army might move back and forth freely. […] The fire spread 
and carried everything down, and the soldiers did not wait to 
destroy the buildings little by little, but pulled them all down 
together.426 
The buildings comprising the urban fabric of Carthage were targeted for 
methodical destruction. This work of demolition-under-arms lasted, he says, 
six days and nights. At least fragments of this part of Appian’s work were 
derived from Polybius, and that the latter’s influence is likely to have been 
quite extensive.427 It is therefore the closest to an eyewitness record that 
survives.  
Yet, despite the carnage of the storming, and the subsequent 
deliberate burning and demolitions, archaeological evidence of destruction is 
slight relative to the magnitude of the descriptions.428 Certainly it would have 
been foolhardy to have attempted to flatten Carthage in its entirety: Strabo 
estimated that the walls alone ‘comprise[d] a circuit of three hundred and 
sixty stadia’, of which sixty, where they went across the neck of the isthmus, 
were tripled.429 In all probability the smoking ruins of the city of Carthage 
would have been expansive. At Corinth too, the damage to the city seems to 
have not been absolute. The effect on the urban centre has been described 
                                            
426 App., Pun., 128-129, trans. H. White: τριῶν δ᾿ οὐσῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀνόδων ἐς αὐτήν, 
οἰκίαι πυκναὶ καὶ ἑξώροφοι πανταχόθεν ἦσαν, ὅθεν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι βαλλόμενοι τὰς πρώτας τῶν 
οἰκιῶν κατέλαβον, καὶ ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ἠμύνοντο τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πλησίον. ὅτε δ᾿ αὐτῶν κρατήσειαν, 
ξύλα καὶ σανίδας τοῖς διαστήμασι τῶν στενωπῶν ἐπιτιθέντες διέβαινον ὡς ἐπὶ γεφυρῶν. […] 
ἐνεπίμπρη δ᾿ οὐδὲν οὐδείς πω διὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν τεγῶν, ἕως ἐπὶ τὴν Βύρσαν ἧκεν ὁ Σκιπίων· 
καὶ τότε τοὺς τρεῖς ὁμοῦ στενωποὺς ἐνεπίμπρη, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ πιμπράμενον ἑτέροις ὁδοποιεῖν 
ἐκέλευεν, ἵν᾿ εὐμαρῶς ὁ στρατὸς ἀλλασσόμενος διαθέοι. […] τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς ἐπιφλέγοντος 
πάντα καὶ καταφέροντος, τῶν δε ἀνδρῶν τὰ οἰκοδομηματα οὐ διαιρούντων ἐς ὀλίγον. The 
briefer treatment in Zonar., 9.31 bears many similarities.  
427 Rich 2015. 
428 Ridley 1986, 141–43; Miles 2010, 447 n.1. 
429 Strabo, 17.14. 
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as ‘selective destruction’.430 While most of the monuments in the civic area of 
Corinth seem to have survived the sack unscathed, the Romans targeted, in 
addition to inscriptions, the Columned Hall, North Stoa and Theatre. These 
likely played the role of tax office, armoury, and civic or military council 
meeting place, respectively. The destruction of these would have effectively 
destroyed the ability of the state to organise itself, not least because the 
burning of the tax office would have destroyed the land registry. It is possible 
that the lexis of devastation refers to this functional destruction rather the 
physical reduction or desolation of the site.431 
Public buildings were looted rather than razed to the ground, and it 
seems that most of the edifices of the city would have remained standing.432 
It is also likely that some habitation occurred in the interim period between 
Corinth’s fall and re-establishment. Probably there were so-called ‘miserable 
huts’ built in levelled areas, possibly housing the Corinthioi spoken of by 
Cicero.433 Evidence suggests that there were some limited building works 
carried out during this period as well as use and maintenance of some of the 
roads.434 Small finds of pottery and coinage also attest to the continued use 
of the site of Corinth after its fall. Estimates for the size of the population of 
these dwellers range from about 500-1,000 to 2,500-4,000.435 These 
dwellers may have been those Corinthians who had escaped L. Mummius’ 
predations. However, lacking the organisational level of the former polis and 
living on a subsistence basis, it would scarcely be tenable to claim that the 
Corinthians escaped as a functional social group.436 
The destruction of the core, administrative buildings of Corinth—and 
the valuable records of landholdings, laws, and citizen rolls that they 
                                            
430 S. A. James 2014, 25. 
431 Gebhard and Dickie 2003, 212–64. 
432 S. A. James 2014, 23. 
433 S. A. James 2014, 26–27; Millis 2006. 
434 Gebhard and Dickie 2003, 270f. 
435 Given by S. A. James 2014, 29; Sanders 2014, 116 respectively. Sanders’s measure 
includes the area of one hour’s walk from the polis. 
436 Gebhard and Dickie 2003, 262–64. 
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contained—seem to have sufficed to prevent its further functioning of the 
material conditions that could produce a way of life. Cities, even in the 
ancient world, are comprised of complex, specialised mechanisms and 
processes that enable high order functioning, but simultaneously introduce 
vulnerabilities.437 These require a high degree of maintenance to continue in 
an operational and effective state. The disruption of established equilibrium 
through even partial destruction can cause the urban system, reliant on 
many interconnecting infrastructures, to collapse to a state of higher entropy, 
that is to say one characterised by greater disorder. Thus, even partial 
destruction of cities, or of the networks in which they were embedded, may 
have induced an inevitable decline of the settlement, unless a high degree of 
social or economic capital was available to rebuild. Much of the settlement 
pattern disruption detected through surveys such as the Tiber Valley project 
may represent the result of the disruption caused by Roman conquest to the 
socioeconomic systems in which such settlements were embedded.438 
Whether these therefore represent a deliberate attempt to destroy the group 
is debateable. On the other hand, the direct violence and damage levelled by 
Roman forces against urban sites may have led to their inexorable decline, 
such that they died out despite not being obliterated in their entirety.  
Conversely, some settlements that had supposedly been annihilated 
pop up again later in the historical record. This suggests that the destruction 
of these settlements was less than intimated, that external populations re-
inhabited the site and put substantial efforts into rebuilding, or that a 
sufficient proportion of the native inhabitants survived and rebuilt. It seems 
that some populations fled their urban centres when a Roman attack was 
imminent. In 232/1 BCE Marcus Pomponius, assailing the Sardinians, found 
that much of the population had slipped away to hide in caves in the forests, 
and he had to resort to tracking them with dogs called across from Italy.439 
Similarly, the Ligurian Friniates tribe fled across the Apennines in 187 BCE, 
seemingly in consequence to their reluctance to comply with consul C. 
                                            
437 Graham 2014, 263. 
438 H. Patterson and Millett 1998; H. Patterson 2004. 
439 Zonar., 8.18. Degrassi 1954, 101. 
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Flaminius’ demand that they disarm made following their deditio. Flaminius 
had to pursue them with his legions to compel their compliance. His 
colleague, M. Aemilius Lepidus likewise had to chase those lowland Ligurian 
populations who had fled to the mountains to evade him.440 The inhabitants 
at Thebes and Corinth also both abandoned their cities for refuge elsewhere 
when the Romans marched against them.441 The Corinthians were for a time 
sought out, and their city remained destroyed until its Julian colonial re-
foundation, but the Thebans expressly were not, and their city was re-
established well enough for Sulla to capture it in 86 BCE.442 
Temples, religious sanctuaries, and sacred sites 
It would seem likely that a crucial element of the Roman annihilation of urban 
settlements would be the targeted destruction of temples, religious 
sanctuaries, and sacred sites due to the central cultural heritage role that 
such places played in shaping communities’ way of life. Indeed, some urban 
sites may have been dominated by, or originated from, religious sanctuaries. 
The Umbrian town of Fanum Fortunae is a good example of such a town; 
while the origins are unstated by our sources and the eponymous temple 
has not been found, it is clear that the town took its name from a temple to 
Fortuna.443 Cities that the Romans subjected to destruction events that 
possessed regionally or supra-regionally prominent religious sites include 
Carthage, Corinth, Falerii, Volsinii, and Agrigentum.  
Alba, having undergone its synoecism with Rome, was said to have 
had its urban fabric destroyed but its temples spared.444 Indeed, the Alban 
mount remained an important site for the Latins, including the Romans, for 
                                            
440 Liv., 39.2; Strabo, 5.217; Cass. Dio, fr. 65.2. 
441 Thebes: Paus., 7.15.9-10; Polyb., 38.16.10, Liv., Per., 52; Corinth: Paus., 5.10.5, 7.16.7-
9; Zonar., 9.31. 
442 Paus., 9.7.5-6, 30.1; Plut., Sull., 19.12. 
443 Caes., BGall., 1.11.4; Plin., Nat., 3.113.3; Strabo, 5.2.10. Uggeri 2006; E. Richardson 
1976a. 
444 Liv., 1.29. 
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centuries following the dissolution and destruction of any urban settlement 
there. Volsinii’s extra-urban Fanum Voltumnae, the federal sanctuary of the 
Etruscans, continued in use until Late Antiquity, despite the destruction of 
the original city.445 Likewise, the extra-urban sanctuary of Juno at modern 
Celle in Civita Castellana, associated with the ancient Falerii veteres, 
continued in use after the Roman destruction of that city. Both Falerii and 
Volsinii are discussed further in the next chapter. In Umbria, while the 
Roman conquest seems to have produced a general decline in the 
frequentation of rural sanctuaries, especially in those more closely 
associated with urban centres, they do not seem to have been specifically 
targeted as part of Roman military actions.446  
The site at Mesopotamon in Epirus, near to the polis of Ephyra, was 
argued by Dakaris to have been the famous Necromanteion and may 
represent a significant religious site targeted by the Romans in this period.447 
Recent decades have introduced increasing scepticism as to this 
identification, reinterpreting it as a Hellenistic fortified farmhouse, the 
hypogaeum a storeroom rather than the crypt of the oracle.448 The final 
decision is uncertain, and it is likely that the actual oracular site may have 
been nearby. If this is so, then the fortified site, the destruction of which in 
168 BCE is still the consensus, may indicate the destruction of a nearby, 
monumentalised oracular site. This shows the methodological complexities 
in interpreting the effects on religious sites of Roman destruction.  
Steven Rutledge has argued that Romans did not necessarily regard 
foreign cult sites as sacer, and that they were therefore open to destruction 
with legal impunity especially during war where such sites were de facto 
targets for destruction.449 He does however note that there was an unwritten 
social dynamic that meant that respect to sacred sites, and thus whether a 
sacred site was destroyed, was contingent on a range of factors including 
                                            
445 Stopponi 2011. 
446 G. J. Bradley 1997. 
447 Dakaris 1993, 13–31. 
448 Ogden 2001, 19–21. 
449 Rutledge 2007. 
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antiquity and reverence. This variability of behaviours is bore out in the 
examples in the present study. The presence of sacred sites, even 
prominent ones among those recognised and respected by the Romans, 
were not immune to the destruction wrought on cities. They were especially 
prone to mutilation during looting, and widespread burning and demolition 
likely would have caused damage or destruction. However, the Romans of 
this period did not seem to have specifically sought out the destruction of 
urban religious sites to destroy the social order of victim communities. The 
deliberate preservation of some temple sites belonging to annihilated urban 
settlements, especially those connected to but not within them and therefore 
less likely to constitute collateral damage, demonstrates that this was not an 
objective of Roman genocide.  
Symbolic capital of destruction  
Destroying a city was a performative act that communicated messages of 
terror and power. A both symbolic and practical, permutations in the scope, 
meaning, and method of urban destruction were possible. The destruction of 
cities could be successfully used to induce other cities to surrender without 
resistance to the Romans.450 In other cases, the destruction of cities through 
treacherous means could lead to other cities strengthening their resolve 
against Rome as they could not trust in surrender as a safeguard.451 In such 
cases, the terroristic message of the urban annihilation produced an 
opposite effect within the interstate system to that intended.  
Ruin lust 
As has been argued above, the destruction of urban sites could involve 
substantial effort, and in many cases will not have been absolute. However, 
                                            
450 Codrion surrenders after Apustius was destroyed: Liv., 31.27.5. 
451 Intercatia in Spain refused surrender after Lucullus destroyed Cauca, until a young Scipio 
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even the partiality of the physical destruction of sites could itself have its own 
value for the destroyers. The ruinous remains of cities were in themselves a 
powerful signifier of their own erasure, and were expressive of having been 
put ‘under erasure’.452 This might be considered an ancient form of ‘ruin lust’ 
or ‘ruinenlust’ in German, which could be described as ‘the various kinds of 
pleasure given to various people at various epochs by the spectacle of 
ruined buildings’.453 In the first century BCE, a Servius Sulpicius recalled in a 
letter to Cicero his reflections on mortality prompted by the views of Corinth 
and adjacent destroyed settlements: 
As I was on my way back from Asia, sailing from Aegina 
towards Megara, I began to gaze at the landscape around 
me. There behind me was Aegina, in front of me Megara, to 
the right Piraeus, to the left Corinth; once flourishing towns, 
now lying low in ruins before one’s eyes. I began to think to 
myself: ‘Ah! How can we manikins wax indignant if one of us 
dies or is killed, ephemeral creatures as we are, when the 
corpses of so many towns lie abandoned in a single spot?454 
Corinth, whose cultural renown was widespread both long before and after 
its destruction, formed a poignant ruin.455 Diodorus Siculus wrote 
passionately about the ruins of Corinth: 
Nor was it only at the time of her downfall that Corinth 
evoked great compassion from those that saw her; even in 
later times, when they saw the city levelled to the ground, all 
who looked upon her were moved to pity. No traveller 
passing by but wept, though he beheld but a few scant relics 
of her past prosperity and glory.456 
                                            
452 I employ here the sense used by Derrida 1997; developing Heidegger 1956, 81 f. 
453 Macaulay and Beny [1954] 1966, 26; see Dillon 2014. 
454 Cic., Fam., 4.5.4, trans. Bailey: ex Asia rediens cum ab Aegina Megaram versus 
navigarem, coepi regiones circumcirca prospicere. post me erat Aegina, ante me Megara, 
dextra Piraeus, sinistra Corinthus, quae oppida quodam tempore florentissima fuerunt, nunc 
prostrata et diruta ante oculos iacent. coepi egomet mecum sic cogitare: ‘hem! nos 
homunculi indignamur si quis nostrum interiit aut occisus est, quorum vita brevior esse 
debet, cum uno loco tot oppidum cadavera proiecta iacent? 
455 Graverini 2002, 61–65. 
456 Diod. Sic., 32.27.1. 
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The same sort of incorporation of the landscape into the culturally-ordained 
spatial construct is seen in the commemoration of the scars, or vestigia, that 
battle sites and campaign camps left, or on a smaller scale the incorporation 
of the remains of the past into the cityscape of Rome itself.457  
An echo of this cultural-embeddedness of the ruined city is shown in, 
for example, Pliny’s frequent recitation of towns that formerly existed in the 
various locales of which he writes but that had expired by his time of writing. 
The wide variety of cultural significances that could attach themselves to 
destroyed places can also be seen in Strabo’s elicitation of, for example, the 
destroyed ruins of Laurentum, Lavinium, and Ardea, where: 
Although only traces of cities are left, those traces have 
become famous because of the sojourn which Aeneas made 
there and because of those sacred rites which, it is said, 
have been handed down from those times.458  
The perished site of Parra similarly functioned as a form of vestige.459 The 
ruins left behind at destroyed sites such as these communicated their 
erasure and could be a powerful signifier for both the imperial might of 
Rome, but also for the societies that formerly inhabited them. The symbolic 
element can be seen in Cicero’s description of the destruction of his house 
by Catiline, an act which he compares to the destruction of cities in the 
manner that it was cruelly executed, and like an attack on his own person.460 
Magical and ritual annihilation 
It has been conclusively shown that Scipio Aemilianus did not have 
Carthage’s soil salted as a ritualistic performance of its destruction, this 
being a modern invention.461 However there were ritual measures available 
                                            
457 Clark 2014, 30 ff.; Rutledge 2012. 
458 Strabo, 5.3.5: καὶ λείπεται μὲν ἴχνη πόλεων, ἔνδοξα δὲ διὰ τὴν Αἰνείου γέγονεν ἐπιδημίαν 
καὶ τὰς ἱεροποιίας ἃς ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν χρόνων παραδεδόσθαι φασί. 
459 Plin., Nat., 3.125. 
460 Cic., Dom., 23-24. 
461 Ridley 1986. 
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by which to secure the annihilation of urban centres in dimensions beyond 
the physical destruction of arson and demolition. Belief in curses and evil 
spells (carmina mala) was a persistent feature among the Romans, as with 
most premodern societies; there is copious enough later evidence in the 
form of curse scrolls, and the Twelve Tables provide early testimony for the 
credence in them.462 The ritual and magical destruction of the cities of 
enemies could be performed through the appropriate use of spells: evocatio 
to coax away the tutelary god; and devotio, to commit the city to the chthonic 
deities. Macrobius, citing his now lost sources, is very clear on the distinction 
between the appropriate spells for evocatio and for devotio, which he 
provides at length along with the appropriate gestures to be made.463 Livy 
has Camillus besieging Veii offer two distinct, though shorter, prayers that 
follow this divide between devotio and evocatio.464  
Pliny, who cites in turn the credible sources of Verrius Flaccus, says 
that the use of evocatio was customary and was still then in use: 
In sieges, before everything it was customary for the Roman 
priests to call out the deity in whose protection that town was 
and promise them the same or greater worship among the 
Romans. 465 
However, despite the assertions of Macrobius and Pliny that the evocatio 
was regularly performed, it is infrequently attested. It is likely to have been 
performed during the destruction of Veii in 396 BCE, in which Camillus ritually 
drew out Juno Regina.466 Her temple on the Aventine subsequently housed 
                                            
462 Warmington 1979, 3:Table 8.1a-b, 8a-b; For evidence of magic, witchcraft, curses, and 
spells, see Gager 1999; and, Ogden 2002; for the Twelve Tables, Rives 2002. 
463 Macr., Sat., 3.9.6-12. 
464 Liv., 5.21.2-3. 
465 Plin., Nat., 28.18: Verrius Flaccus auctores ponit quibus credatur in obpugnationibus ante 
omnia solitum a Romanis sacerdotibus evocari deum cuius in tutela id oppidum esset 
promittique illi eundem aut ampliorem apud Romanos cultum. et durat in pontificum 
disciplina id sacrum.  
466 Liv., 5.21.1-4, 5.22.3-8; Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom., 13.31.1; cf. Val. Max., 1.8.3, who identifies 
the deity as Juno Moneta, presumably in confusion with Camillus’ son’s dedication of a 
temple to the latter around 344 Bce, see Ov., Fast., 6.183-186; Liv., 7.28.4-6. One 
inscription, CIL, VI 362, identifies a Juno Moneta Regina, so it may be that a later merged 
cult aided his confusion, see Miano 2012, 92–93; Meadows and Williams 2001. 
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her wooden cult statue brought from Veii.467 The attention given by Livy, 
Valerius Maximus, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus suggest that the ritual 
there was exceptional and not common practice.468 It may be inferred from 
Pliny that the rite was not a matter of course because only ‘certain gods’ 
(θεούς τινας) had been coaxed to Rome.469 
Other than Veii, the identification of evocationes is much more 
insecure. There are several potentials. Giorgio Ferri argues that it is likely 
that Juno Curite was led off from Falerii.470 The Etruscan god Vortumnus 
may also have been led off from Volsinii. Carthage is suggested by 
Macrobius as having undergone an evocatio, and there has been suggestion 
that Juno Caelestis (Phoenician Tanit) was led away from Carthage, 
although the factuality of this rite has been questioned.471 Tertullian does hint 
at the evocatio of tutelary Tanit, when he questions Juno’s willingness to 
allow the destruction of Carthage by the Romans.472 C. Gracchus’ ill-fated 
Roman colonisation of Carthage under the name Colonia Iunonia in 123/2 
BCE,473 may represent an attempt to reintroduce the tutelary Tanit back to her 
city. Falerii and Volsinii were, however, not destroyed as civic entities; their 
urban centres were destroyed and their cities relocated (see the next 
chapter). If these led to the evocatio of their tutelary gods, this suggests 
either that their destruction was initially intended or that their transfer was in 
service of other ends than the complete ritual destruction of the community. 
Macrobius suggests that the existence of the spell with which the Romans 
would coax out the tutelary gods was kept secret.474 This may account for 
the dearth of historical records, but seems unlikely given the transparent 
                                            
467 E. Richardson 1976a, 215–17; Ziółkowski 1992, 238–40. 
468 Rutledge 2007, 180. 
469 Plut., Quaest. Rom., 61. Serv., Aen., 9.446. 
470 Ferri 2011, 149–50. 
471 Blomart 1997. 
472 Tert., Apol., 25.8-9; Tert., De Pallio, 1.2. 
473 Plut., C. Gracch., 10.2 CIL, I 585. 
474 Macr., Sat., 3.9.2, trans. R.A. Kaster: moremque Romanorum arcanum […] certo 
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signs of an evocatio in the building of a new temple to the deity at Rome and 
the processional transference of their cult image to it. 
The devotio, by which the chthonic gods were called on to ensure the 
destruction of a city by receiving it as a sacrifice,475 is similarly uncertain in 
usage. Only dictators and the generals, those possessing imperium, could 
use this spell according to Macrobius. As he does with the evocatio, he 
provides the spell for devotio, using Carthage as the exemplar victim. 
Macrobius furthermore identifies the following victims: Fregellae (destroyed 
125 BCE); Stonios, which is unattested but may be a manuscript corruption 
for Thurii (colonised in 193 BCE); Gabii, whose destruction is unrecorded; 
Veii (396 BCE); Fidenae (498 BCE); Carthage and Corinth (146 BCE);476 and 
also, the vague ‘many armies and towns of our enemies the Gauls, the 
Spaniards, the Africans, the Mauri, and other nations that the ancient annals 
mention’, which go unrecorded.477 Beyond the mere fact of their destruction 
or capture by Rome, we have no corroboration of devotio in most cases, 
excepting Veii and Carthage.478 Gabii and Fidenae were, however, bywords 
for desolation by the Principate, and a tradition of destruction may have 
grown attached to them.479 For Carthage, the lex agraria of 111 BCE seems 
to reconfirm the exclusion zone for the land where the city of Carthage 
stood, as well as attesting the Lex Rubria by which the Colonia Iunonia was 
decreed, and special attention seems to have been given to the auguries 
surrounding the establishment of the failed Gracchan colony and later 
                                            
475 Versnel 1976. 
476 Listed in Macrobius’ ordering. Destructions: Fregellae 125 BCE: Liv., Per., 60; Amm. 
Marc., 25.9.10; Vell. Pat., 2.6.4; Val. Max., 2.8.4; Rhet. Her., 4.13, 22, 37; Cic., Planc., 70; 
Thurii: Liv., 34.53.1-2; Strabo, 6.263; Veii: Liv., 5.21.1-4, 5.22.3-8; Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom., 
13.31.1; Val. Max., 1.8.3; Fidenae: Flor., 1.12.4. 
477 Macr., Sat., 3.9.13, adapted from trans. R.A. Kaster: in antiquitatibus autem haec oppida 
inveni devota: Stonios, Fregellas, Gabios, Veios, Fidenas; haec intra Italiam, praeterea 
Carthaginem et Corinthum, sed et multos exercitus oppidaque hostium Gallorum 
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478 Liv., Per., 52; App., Pun., 20.136. See bibliography in Miles 2010, 447 n.3; Versnel 1976, 
408 argues that devotio was ‘an ancient rite and was frequently practised’. 
479 Hor., Ep., 1.11.7-8. 
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Caesarean one.480 Sarah James’s use of the Carthaginian example to argue 
that no devotio occurred at Corinth, on the grounds that the existence of a 
subsistence, interim community at the latter would have been precluded had 
the land been cursed, overly privileges Roman religious behaviours and 
views.481 These might not have determined the informal settlement patterns 
of the community that established itself in the ruins, and the lack of any 
organised, official community until it gained its own Caesarean colony in 44 
BCE at the same time as Carthage indicates that the site remained formally 
dead. The site of destroyed Corinth was, therefore, possibly cursed, 
although the evidence is inconclusive.  
The use of the evocatio and, more significantly, the devotio to extend 
the obliteration of cities beyond the mundane destruction of their fabrics and 
into a symbolic dimension, robbed their settlements of their tutelary deities 
and their sites a future. Although the evidence is scant, these practices were 
probably more widespread than recorded. It is evident that there were 
ritualistic understandings of destruction stretching back into the Archaic 
period among Italian peoples.482 Parallels may be found in the Greek 
concept of κατασκαφή, which has been demonstrated above to have been 
among the lexis of Roman urban annihilation. Cassius Dio uses this word to 
describe the ritualistic confiscation and destruction of the house of M. 
Manlius Capitolinus in 354 BCE.483 Generally meaning the utter destruction of 
structure, originally the house of the condemned and later by extension of 
entire cities, it also had a symbolic component. Edith Hall described it as: 
The overthrow, the physical razing to the ground of the 
house […], which was symbolically charged as the concrete 
manifestation of the whole kinship line through time […] the 
denial of burial, destruction of family altars and tombs, 
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removal of ancestors' bones, confiscation of property, exile, 
and a curse applying even to offspring and descendants.484 
The destruction of cities achieved the same thing, obliterating the cultural 
and ritual fabric of the community, and severing its link to its continued ethnic 
and civic lineages. Florence Gaignerot-Driessen has argued that in some 
contexts, κατασκαφή was used to ritually kill poleis.485 In all likelihood, the 
very act of demolition involved with it ritual practices to effect the magical 
and religious annihilation of the settlement as the Romans understood it. 
Slighting 
Other places were certainly subjected to the physical destruction of stone 
works. Evidence suggests the partial destruction of walls at some of the 
larger settlements of Molossia, which have been associated with the 
deportation of its tribespeople by Paullus. This evidence is not conclusive but 
plausible nonetheless. Crucially it confirms the related practice of the 
demolition of walls of enemy cities that had tendered their deditio in fidem 
populi Romani. An example of this would be the cities that Cato compelled to 
defortify in this way.486 The destruction of fortified towers in Spain, 
mistakenly claimed to be full cities, is similar. Not only did this destruction of 
defensive capabilities have a real-world utility of reducing the defensive 
capabilities of the settlement, and therefore the capability to withstand Rome 
should hostilities be renewed, but it was demonstrative of Roman majesty 
and imperium over them. Other towns which had their walls demolished by 
the Romans in this period include Velitrae in 338 BCE,487 Privernum in 329 
BCE,488 unnamed Ligurian cities in 182 BCE and unnamed Greek cities in 146 
BCE. 
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Walls were a status feature, serving to indicate that an urban centre 
had reached a level of confidence, prestige, and cohesion. It also served to 
delimitate the areas within and without the official confines of the city proper, 
therefore acting as a ‘manifestation of the symbolic and ideological unity of a 
city and its political community’.489 One might look to the Romans’ ascription 
of cultural meaning to the establishment of the pomerium of a city, and the 
religious and cultic importance of its maintenance. However, walls can also 
be a reaction to increased peril. Etruscan cities, for example, seem to have 
added monumental walls to their already naturally formidable cities at the 
same time as the Roman state began to aggressively assert itself beyond 
Latium. Similarly, Roman interventions in Samnium led to an increased 
density in defensive hillfort settlements there.  
While the pomerium and walls of a city did not necessarily overlap, they 
often did, and the Romans might have assumed that they did when it came 
to foreign cities.490 The deep linkage in the Roman mentality between the city 
as an incorporated entity and its pomerium is suggestive.491 The Romans 
clearly had the sense that foreign states possessed ritually-constituted 
pomeria, as indicated by the famous tale of Dido’s cunning ploy to enlarge 
the pomerium of Carthage upon its foundation.492 While he might not have 
salted the soil of Carthage, Scipio Aemilianus may indeed have had the 
boundary of the city ritually disrupted by the plough, which in Roman ritual 
was also the means by which it was instituted.493 Demolishing the walls in 
part, and ploughing a furrow across its path ritually and symbolically killed 
the city. As far as the Roman conception of the pomerium prohibited the 
presence of ‘hostile authority, forces, persons, and even gods’ within it,494 
breaking it may have thereby ritually and symbolically permitted the 
penetration of the former city by such inimical forces.  
                                            
489 Fulminante 2014, 104. 
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These symbolic practices should perhaps be seen as cognate to the 
concept of the ‘slighting’ of castles in the English Civil War, the ‘intentional 
damage or destruction of a castle or fortified place to render it useless’, 
which was done both during and immediately after the conflict. Even partial 
demolition of civic defences could cause serious status harm and the 
demotion of power and prestige of that settlement. Lila Rakoczy has 
furthermore argued that these processes of slighting were not just predicated 
on a binary divide between the military and civilian, but ‘consisted of specific 
and complex actions’ within social and economic contexts.495 Unfortunately, 
these contexts and the complexity of interactions between Roman and 
indigenous groups in the partial destruction of their own fortifications are 
largely irrecoverable. Nonetheless, we should expect that in many cases the 
demolition of fortifications, and the slighting of the settlement, would have 
engaged the locals, some of whom may indeed have profited from the 
process. Indeed, slighting may have represented an alternative to utter 
destruction, typically prompted by the submission of the former enemy to 
Roman fides.  
The disincorporation of Capua  
The ultimate extension of the symbolic potential of destruction can be found 
in the disincorporation of Capua. This was the punishment of the city for 
having sided with Hannibal in the Second Punic War, the most significant to 
Rome of their allies to have disaffected.496 The Capuans had held out during 
a long siege, which had seen Hannibal attempt to lift the assault, and then 
try to draw the Romans off by advancing on Rome itself. Throughout, the 
Romans had maintained a fierce focus on defeating Capua, the Senate 
ordering two consuls and a praetor to commit their armies to the task. 
However, the resulting punishment was mild in comparison to the 
alternatives. The anti-Roman ringleaders were scourged and beheaded, 
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inhabitants of the city enslaved, and the city stripped of its corporate 
existence.497 Cicero, who compares the act to the destructions of Corinth and 
Carthage, writes about the decision-making process behind its 
disincorporation: 
For a long time, the lot of Capua was the subject of earnest 
discussion; public records and several decrees of the senate 
are to be seen, O Romans. Our ancestors wisely decided 
that, if they deprived the Campanians of their territory, 
removed the magistrates, senate, and public council from 
that city and left no semblance of a republic, there would be 
no reason why we should be afraid of Capua. Accordingly, 
you will find it written in ancient records that a city might 
exist to supply the means for the cultivation of Campanian 
territory, a place where the crops could be collected and 
stored, and in order that the labourers, fatigued by work in 
the fields, might make use of the houses in the city; that that 
was the reason why the needful buildings were not 
destroyed.498 
Similarly, Livy says the Senate’s decision was that Capua henceforth, ‘as a 
nominal city, should merely be a dwelling-place and a centre of population, 
but should have no political body nor senate nor council of the plebs nor 
magistrates’,499 and elsewhere says that they ‘destroyed, not the walls alone, 
but the city’.500 The Romans were aware of the difference between the type 
of destruction that they meted out to Capua and to those that they burned 
and demolished. Yet henceforth the city of Capua symbolically functioned in 
the landscape in the same manner as the physical ruins of destroyed cities, 
                                            
497 Liv., 26.12-16, 33.4-13, 31.31.14, 39.37.10-12; Val. Max., 2.3.3, 3.2 ext.1, 8.1, 5.2.1; 
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498 Cic., Leg. agr., 2.32.88, trans. J.H. Freese: de Capua multum est et diu consultum; 
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visible as the ‘sepulchre and monument of the Campanian people’.501 The 
disincorporation of Capua represented the furthest abstraction of the 
symbolic capital that accompanied and lay underneath the performance of 
destruction. 
Authority to destroy 
With whom the authority and agency to destroy lay is important in describing 
and explaining the Roman annihilation of urban places. As with our 
discussion of mass enslavement, the destruction of cities was seldom 
accidental, due to the physical energy that had to be employed in setting 
fires and demolishing in such a way as to generate general rather than 
localised destruction. While sacking and looting of urban spaces probably 
produced much damage to public and private buildings during the general 
chaos,502 evidence is lacking that it resulted in urban annihilation. As the 
Romans did not routinely annihilate urban places when they captured them, 
there must have been a decision making or exigent process that led to that 
outcome. In searching for who among the Romans had the authority to 
determine the annihilation of a city, let us look first to the outbreak of the 
Third Punic War. 
Cato the génocidaire and the annihilation of Carthage 
The process that resulted in the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE is among 
the best evidenced and most discussed of the incidents of urban annihilation 
in this period, as well as being one of the most important for the 
development of Roman Mediterranean hegemony. The path to the 
destruction of Carthage is also prone to reductive analysis. There is a 
tendency, in both modern and ancient literature, to consider its annihilation 
to have either been the inevitable clash of two antithetical empires or 
civilisations, or to have been the result of the relentless genocidal agitation of 
                                            
501 Liv., 31.29.11: Capua quidem sepulcrum ac monumentum Campani populi. 
502 For the chaos as a real event, see Ziółkowski 1993; for depictions of sacking as literary 
motif, see Paul 1982. 
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Cato the Elder. He is often credited with the utter destruction of the 
Carthaginians; in this regard, he has been labelled a greater ‘threat to 
Carthage’ than Carthage was to Rome.503 This is not only a modern view but 
is one gleaned from the ancient texts. For example. Plutarch says that: 
The last of his public services is supposed to have been the 
destruction of Carthage. It was Scipio the Younger who 
actually brought the task to completion, but it was largely in 
consequence of the advice and counsel of Cato that the 
Romans undertook the war.504 
Cato is repeatedly noted by the ancient sources for his role in agitating for 
the destruction of Carthage.505 This is most famously expressed in his 
supposed maxim that ‘Carthage must be destroyed’, usually rendered as 
either ‘Carthago delenda est’, or ‘ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse 
delendam’, or a similar phrase. The Latin formulation is modern, appearing 
in English, French, and German starting in the early eighteenth century.506 
The Greek historians Appian, Plutarch, and Diodorus Siculus all attribute the 
exhortation ‘Καρχηδόνα μὴ εἶναι’ to Cato, while the later writers Orosius, 
Aurelius Victor, and Florus give Latin phrases somewhat similar to the 
modern version.507 While it is impossible to know what it was that Cato might 
have said, the sources are unanimous in stressing his intransigence on this 
matter; the Greek sources in particular, say that to foment war with Carthage 
he added the call to destroy Carthage to the end of any speech of his in the 
Roman Senate, no matter the subject.  
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Fragments of Cato’s own writing confirm that he was an agitator for 
renewed hostilities with Carthage. A fragment from his De bello 
Carthaginiensis survives, and may be a section from a speech of his: 
The Carthaginians are already our enemies; for he who 
prepares everything against me, so that he can make war at 
whatever time he wishes, he is already my enemy even 
though he is not yet using weapons.508 
Furthermore, fragments of his Origines, likely composed in the late 150s 
BCE, show him arguing that the Carthaginians had committed treaty-
breaches six times.509 Undoubtedly, this was part of an argument for the 
untrustworthiness of Carthage at a time in which Cato was attempting to 
convince others of the danger that it posed to Rome. His stunt of, 
supposedly accidentally, dropping fresh figs on the floor of the curia, which 
he claimed were picked two days previously in Carthaginian territory, was 
intended likewise to impress a sense of urgency to the threat.510 Indeed, 
Pliny directly linked the stunt with the figs to Carthage’s annihilation, saying 
that ‘they promptly embarked on the Third Punic War, in which Carthage was 
destroyed’.511 
It is entirely plausible then, that Cato was an agitator for not just war but 
for the utter annihilation of Carthage as a city and as a corporate entity. Cato 
would seem to fit the model of the génocidaire. However, such arguments 
are substantially hampered by the fact that Cato did not live to see the 
outcome of the Third Punic War, dying in 149 BCE, shortly after the war had 
started.512 To put it in legal terms, while he might have possessed a 
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1.13.1. 
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genocidal mens rea, the state of mind, in respect to the Carthaginians, he 
did not carry out the actus reus, the prohibited act.513 Cato’s influence, 
although it might have been great, is very unlikely to have continued to have 
directed the course of action. The political constitution of the Roman state of 
this time was generally unsuited to long-term thinking, and to suppose that 
Cato could continue to cause the annihilation of Carthage after his death is 
questionable. His influence over the Senate should not be overestimated, 
and is likely to have been magnified in the tradition as time passed. A.E. 
Astin noted that although Cato stands out as an energetic and vigorous 
orator and politician, there is little evidence for him having a decisive role in 
other big issues of foreign affairs and that, rather, he was reflective of the 
general leanings of large sections of the Senate.514 The continual opposition 
of Scipio Nasica, who replied that Carthage should be preserved, shows that 
substantial voices among the elite dissented from Cato’s opinion.515 Both of 
these men likely disguise and represent a varied and mixed set of attitudes 
towards the possibility of Carthage’s extirpation. That Cato seems to have 
started his agitations in 157 BCE, following his trip to Carthage as an 
ambassador,516 shows limits to his influence in this matter.  
Therefore, Cato can only be considered as one part of the process that 
resulted in Carthage’s destruction. However, approaches that directly draw a 
line between Cato and Carthage’s annihilation tend to afford a large degree 
of political instrumentality to Roman state operations. It is worth looking in 
greater detail at the events that led to the outbreak of hostilities known as the 
Third Punic War.517 In 151 BCE the Carthaginians, tiring of Rome’s continual 
toleration of Masinissa’s aggressive acquisition of their territory, fought 
                                            
513 Bazyler 2017, 41–44. 
514 Astin 1978, 288, 291. 
515 Polyb., 36.1.1-2.4; Liv., Per., 49; Plut., Cat. mai., 27.2-5; Flor., 1.31.4-5; Diod. Sic., 
34.33.3-5; Cic., Off., 1.79; Cic., Tusc., 3.51; Cic., Leg. agr., 2.87; [Aur. Vict.], De vir. ill., 47.8; 
August., De civ. D., 1.30, 2.18; Oros., Hist., 4.23.8-10; Zonar., 9.30. 
516 Liv., Per., 48; Plut., Cat. mai., 26.1-3; App., Pun., 68-69.  
517 Polyb., 36-37 being fragmentary and Liv., 49 lost, App., Pun., 74-93 is the fullest 
remaining account for the following events but problematic. 
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against the Numidians and lost. Envoys were immediately dispatched to 
Rome, to explain their position and apologise for having taken up arms, in 
contravention of the treaty made at the end of the Second Punic War. Three 
years later, in 149 BCE the Roman Senate voted for war with Carthage, 
shortly before Cato’s death.518 In Polybian terms, given the cause (αἰτία) for 
the war was provided in the form of Cato’s agitation, the reason for the delay 
between the pretext (πρόφασις) and commencement (ἀρχή) is unclear.519 
Perhaps the delay was to accommodate further intelligence gathering.520 
The Carthaginians sent a delegation with plenipotentiary powers to Rome, 
and, finding that the consuls had already left in preparation of the war, they 
committed themselves to the fides Romanus.521 Their submission was 
accepted, and they were ordered to deliver 300 hostages, sons of the elite, 
to the consuls at Lilybaeum, and to follow any further instructions that they 
issued.522 With the consular army landing near Utica, the Carthaginians 
again sent envoys, who were instructed to surrender all of the arms 
belonging to Carthage, which they promptly did.523 Then came the final 
order, sometimes known as the Censorinus ultimatum, that the 
Carthaginians abandon their city and relocate to a new site 80 stades 
inland.524 
There has been a tendency to view this ratcheting up of demands as a 
way to compel the Carthaginians to reject their deditio in fidem and thus 
enable the Romans to justify their annihilation. This is certainly the view of 
Appian, and subsequently of Cassius Dio, who refer to secret orders of the 
                                            
518 App., Pun., 75, 86; Polyb., 3.5.5; Liv., Per., 49; Liv., 49.88-89; Strabo, 17.833; Flor., 
1.31.3-6; Ampelius, Liber Memorialis, 46.7; Eutr., 4.10.1; Oros., Hist., 4.22.1; Zonar., 9.26; 
Vell. Pat., , 1.12.2. 
519 Baronowski 2011, 16ff., 73-77. Polybius explains this tripartitism himself at 3.6.3ff. 
520 Austin and Rankov 1995, 92–93; Cp. Hoyos 2010, 214. Liv., Per., 48; Zonar., 9.26. 
521 Polyb., 36.3.9-4.7, 9.12-13; Diod. Sic., 32.6.1; Liv., Per.49; Liv., 49.90-91; App., Pun., 76, 
80; Zonar., 9.26. 
522 Polyb., 36.4.8-5.9, 11.3; Diod. Sic., 32.6.2; Liv., Per., 49; App., Pun., 77-81; Zonar., 9.26. 
See J. Allen 2010, 63–66. 
523 Polyb., 36.6.1-7; Diod. Sic., 32.6.2; Liv., Per., 49; Strabo, 17.833; Flor., 1.31.7; App., 
Pun., 78-80; Oros., Hist., 4.22.1-2; Zonar., 9.26. 
524 Polyb., 36.7.1-5; Diod. Sic., 32.6.2-4; Liv., Per., 49; Liv., 49.91-93; Flor., 1.31.8-9; App., 
Pun., 80-93; Oros., Hist., 4.22.3; Zonar., 9.26; Suda, B 320. 
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Senate who had already decided on the course of action.525 However, there 
are significant problems with this interpretation. The Romans did not require 
a pretext to go to war with the Carthaginians nor to destroy their city; pretext 
had been provided in 151 BCE, and the Romans only had to not accept the 
Carthaginian deditio if they wished to remain in a state of war. The 
acceptance of hostages would have been utterly pointless if a peaceful, 
albeit unequal, solution was not being sought. What is more, the war 
conspiracy interpretation is undermined by the fragmentary evidence of 
Polybius and Livy, the latter in the form of the epitome of Florus. Polybius 
says that ‘the Romans turned their hands against Carthage, having resolved 
in the first place on changing its site and subsequently on its utter 
destruction’.526 Florus says that, when Cato and Scipio Nasica had 
trenchantly presented their opposing views as to whether Carthage should 
be destroyed or preserved in the Senate, the ‘Senate decided upon the 
middle course, namely, that the city should merely be removed to another 
site’.527 The necessity to find compromise among the many diverse and 
competing needs and strategies of the members of the Senate may have 
obliged the use of delaying tactics with the Carthaginian envoys. What 
Appian and Cassius Dio see as a cunning stratagem to force the 
Carthaginians to give up their arms, all the while planning the ultimatum, 
may in fact be a result of the senate not being able to reach consensus. This 
may also explain the Roman desire to move the Carthaginian envoys 
between Rome, Sicily, and Utica, as a delaying tactic while they made up 
their collective mind. 
It therefore seems more plausible that an intractable set of views were 
voiced in the Roman Senate. At some point in 149 BCE the body decided for 
war, but there was no unanimity as to how it should be pursued and whether 
Carthage’s annihilation should be its goal. The consuls were briefed on the 
                                            
525 App., Pun., 10. 67-68, 72, 11. 74, 77; Cass. Dio, 32.1.1, 32.3.1. 
526 Polyb., 3.5.5, trans. adapted from Paton: οἱ δ᾿ αὐτοὶ μετ᾿ οὐ πολὺ Καρχηδονίοις 
ἐπέβαλον τὰς χεῖρας, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μεταναστῆσαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἄρδην αὐτοὺς 
ἐξαναστῆσαι προθέμενοι διὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθησομένας αἰτίας. 
527 Flor., 1.31.5, trans. E.S. Forster: medium senatus elegit, ut urbs tantum loco moveretur. 
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wishes of those in the Senate, with plenipotentiary authority to secure the 
best outcome as the situation determined. That the Senate and the consuls 
might have thought that they could have seriously demanded that Carthage 
relocate is not as ludicrous as often believed; the Romans had previously set 
successful precedents for forced urban relocation of other peoples, most 
notably the Italian cities of Volsinii and Falerii. These are discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter. While Carthage was a much larger, and more 
important, city than any other that they had hitherto forced to relocate under 
their fides, Rome was at that time at an unprecedented height of its 
revisionist power, and previously unthinkable ideas had become possible. 
The reaction of the Carthaginians seems not to have been predicted by the 
Romans, who lost their opportunity to deal easily with their erstwhile bipolar 
competitor for the hegemony of the Western Mediterranean.528 It was 
therefore a failure of ‘compellence diplomacy’, but the Romans were 
prepared to carry through the alternative by force.529  
Cato’s influence might have been significant, but it is overly teleological 
simply to connect his genocidal agitations to the outcome; the diverse and 
plural interaction of various agents, including competing elements among the 
Roman Senatorial elite, their plenipotentiary representatives, as well as the 
representatives of the Carthaginians, and their senate. Once the siege got 
underway, authority passed to the consular agents in command of the 
Roman military forces. Undoubtedly the protracted siege, marked by 
repeated setbacks until Scipio Aemilianus took command, and the difficulty 
of its capture once its storming got underway, made more likely the violence 
that ultimately befell the place. 
                                            
528 Or ‘militarized dyadic rivalries’, W. R. Thompson 1999, 3–6. 
529 Eckstein 2006, 60–61. 
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Imperium  
Cato’s role in the convoluted process that led to the destruction of Carthage 
is illustrative of the wider issue of where the loci of authority to annihilate 
cities resided, the instrumentality of Roman state agents, and the conditions 
under which they could annihilate settlements. The Romans did not routinely 
annihilate urban places when they captured them,530 so there must have 
been a decision making or exigent process that led to that outcome. The 
literary evidence seems to suggest that in many cases the imperium of 
commanders in the field—consuls, praetors, and their prorogued 
colleagues—legitimated their application of force, including urban 
annihilation, and it was their right to use as they deemed fit.531 Their right to 
lead and command armies, and to use their force was practically unrestricted 
once they were in the field. As with our previous analysis of mass killing, it is 
likely that the imperium provided religious authority to command destruction, 
and that this was an inheritable trait to the classes of citizens under their 
authority and bonded to them by the army oath. However, this apparent 
legitimatisation of the use of violence did not in reality equate to carte 
blanche to annihilate urban settlements. Carrying out inappropriate or 
unauthorised urban annihilation could be perceived as impinging on the 
auctoritas of the Senate and the potestas of the People.532 This was another 
area of unwritten rules and expectations. Legitimacy to destroy a settlement 
was contingent on the charismatic ability of the general to do so without 
censure, on the nature of how the destruction came to happen, and on 
Roman perceptions towards the settlement annihilated. Thus, for example, 
Appian recalls that Scipio Aemilianus destroyed Carthage by Senatorial 
authority but Numantia by his own, both earning him triumphs and 
agnomens.533 
                                            
530 Polyb., 18.37. 
531 Eckstein 2010; Lintott 1999; Lintott 1981; Giovannini 1983; Morstein-Marx 1995. 
532 Cic., Leg., 3.28. 
533 App., Hisp., 15.98. 
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The transitory nature of imperium—which was held only so long as the 
magistracy was held, which is to say usually one year unless prorogued—
meant that the opportunities that it afforded were fleeting. The chance to 
acquire fame and fortune might not arise again. It might be the only 
opportunity to lead a triumph, and to add a triumphal cognomen. This meant 
that commanders were sometimes eager to bring about urban annihilation 
when they had the prospect. In the Achaean or Fourth Macedonian War, the 
praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus had defeated both the pretender Andriscus in 
Macedonia and the armies of the Achaeans, but was prempted by the arrival 
of the consul Mummius, to whom went the spoils of sacking Corinth and the 
subsequent triumph and fame back at Rome.534 Indeed, Mummius’ triumph 
was renowned in part due to the artworks he brought back. He capitalised on 
this with their public display and by setting up inscriptions, incorporating the 
sacking of Corinth into his public presentation of self as a triumphator.535 
Even Scipio Aemilianus was warned, by Masinissa’s son Gulussa, that he 
should press to complete the siege of Carthage because the ‘appointment of 
the new consuls was close at hand and he should take this into 
consideration, lest when he was overtaken by winter another commander 
should succeed him and without any trouble credit himself with the result of 
all his pains’.536 
The fame and wealth that a commander could accrue through 
destroying other cities likely encouraged a hastiness or even rashness in the 
behaviour of some, as they sought to maximise the rewards of gaining the 
curule magistracies and the imperium that was attached to them. This time 
pressure may lie behind those urban annihilations which the Romans 
themselves considered problematic. Some of these, such as the destruction 
of the Ligurian town of Carystus, were clear breaches of the customary 
expectations of fides in attacking allied towns. This posed both a moral 
                                            
534 Paus., 7.15.1. 
535 CIL, I2 626. 
536 Polyb., 38.8.2, trans. W.R. Paton: χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν 
ὑπάτων ἤδη συνεγγίζειν, ἧς δεῖν ἔφη στοχάζεσθαι, μὴ τοῦ χειμῶνος προκαταλαβόντος 
ἐπελθὼν ἕτερος ἀκο νιτὶ λάβῃ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ἐκείνου πόνων. 
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hazard as well as potentially harmful consequences to the status of the 
Romans among others. Those who strayed outside their allotted provincia to 
attack and destroy towns were similarly apt for backlash, as this risked 
upsetting both international and domestic balances. Yet, even Scipio 
Aemilianus came in for comment for carrying out the destruction of 
Numantia, a hostile city within his province that, one would presume, he had 
a prima facia right to destroy due to his imperium.537 Imperium, as far as it 
informed the use of urban annihilation, was not unlimited.  
Senate and assemblies 
The authority of imperium was circumscribed in important ways by the 
Roman Senate. It was to the Senate that the survivors of foreign peoples 
who had been treated severely or unfairly by Roman curule magistrates went 
to seek redress, because they were the locus of power and the best check 
on the powers of the Roman state’s magistrates.  
It was usual for the Senate, and for the People, to react positively to 
news that enemies had been defeated and their city destroyed. It was a near 
sure-fire way of getting the acclamation necessary to be recognised with a 
triumph. Politics could intervene, as when M. Fulvius Flaccus was denied a 
triumph because he had regained a dominion of Rome and had not 
augmented it. Marcellus’ destruction of parts of Syracuse evoked sympathy 
from some quarters, but Livy maintains that the majority approved of his 
actions and that that ‘a decree was passed confirming Marcellus’ deeds both 
during the war and after his victory’ and incorporating the Syracusans into 
the protection of the Senate and People of Rome’s fides.538 The corollary is 
that Marcellus could have had his acts of urban annihilation deemed illegal, 
as M. Popilius Laenas found when he destroyed the Ligurian city of Carystus 
in 173 BCE.539 The Roman Senate and People could censure or annul 
unpopular measures, and the conditionality of their consent was by the 
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538 Liv., 26.32.4-5. 
539 Liv., 42.7.1-9.6, 10.9, 21.6-7, 45.15.10. 
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Middle Republic formally included in the diplomacy of generals in the field, 
their imperium notwithstanding. Shortly after our period of interest, the 139 
BCE treaty of Q. Pompeius with the Numantines was repudiated by the 
Senate, and a few years later still saw the retraction of the peace negotiated 
on unfavourable terms by C. Hostilius Mancinus and the bizarre, propitiative 
delivery of him to the Numantines, bound and naked.540  
Once victory was secured over an enemy, the Roman Senate often 
sent out boards of delegation to oversee the post-war settlement. At the 
withdrawal of Hannibal from Italy for Africa, for example, boards of 
commission decided the punishment of numerous seditious or insufficiently 
pro-Roman communities in Italy.541 Some Roman commanders, such as 
Aemilius Paullus seem, perhaps, to have pre-empted this Senatorial 
interference by ordering the destruction of several settlements prior to the 
arrival of the decemviral commission.542 Paullus supposedly accepted the 
consulship on the condition that he be given free-reign to conduct the Third 
Macedonian War without interference, so this might have been him 
exercising his freedom before he lost it. Although he did not destroy Capua 
itself, one might compare the actions of Fulvius. In pocketing a letter from 
the Senate ordering a stay of execution for the Capuan ringleaders, so that a 
Senatorial commission could investigate their supposed crimes and seditious 
overtures with Rome’s other allies, Fulvius could claim a plausible 
deniability.543 Cicero attests to the debates—he had seen the records—held 
over whether to destroy or preserve Capua once it had been captured.544 
Camillus’ speech after marching to destroy Pedium is probably a reflection of 
                                            
540 Refusal to ratify: Liv., Per., 54, 55; Liv., 46.fr.14; Cic., Off., 3.109; Cic., Rep., 3.28; Plut., 
Ti. Gracch., 7.1-6; Cass. Dio, fr.79.1-3, 83.2; App., Hisp., 83; Vell. Pat., 2.2.1; [Aur. Vict.], De 
vir. ill., 59.4, 64.2; Oros., Hist., 5.4.21, 5.3; Eutr., 4.71.1, 10.17.2. Pompeius: Liv. 46.fr.14; 
Cic., Fin., 2.54; ; Cic., Off., 3.109; Vell. Pat., 2.1.5; Val. Max., 8.5.1; App., Hisp., 79; 
Mancinus handed over: Liv., Per., 56; Cic., De or., 1.81, 2.137; Cic., Off., 3.109; App., Hisp., 
83; Dig., 50.7.18; Plin., Nat., 34.18; Oros., Hist., 5.4.21, 5.4, 6; [Aur. Vict.], De vir. ill., 59.4; 
Amm. Marc.. 14.11.32. Rosenstein 1986. 
541 Gel., 10.3.19. 
542 Liv., 45.16.1-18.8, 27.1-4. 
543 Liv., 26.15. 
544 Cic., Leg. agr., 2.88. 
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later debates found in such records as well as histories. He is made by Livy 
to outline the two options of annihilation, as a way of decisively and 
permanently ending intercommunal strife, or leniency.545 These options were 
weighed up for Luceria in the Senate. While there had been mass killing 
within the town already by the Roman troops, the Senate still needed to 
consider whether to destroy it or renew it. While many voted to utterly 
destroy the town, an argument to send a colony out to it prevailed.546 In a 
similar debate, Cato performed for Rhodes a role opposite that he had 
played for Carthage, persuading the Senate not to seek its annihilation.547 
The Senate could, rather than their magistrates, be the ones seeking 
the destruction of settlements. Their authority and intention, once 
Censorinus’ ultimatum failed and the siege got underway, to destroy 
Carthage cannot be denied, no matter whether there was an antebellum 
consensus on its annihilation. The Senate had a hand in the mass 
enslavement of the Molossians, during which many settlements were 
destroyed. Corinth was supposedly attacked by Mummius under orders of 
the Senate. The role of the assemblies seems to have been less than that of 
the Senate. Probably, their role was predominantly to assent to the 
settlements proposed by the Senate. Where their role was more prominent 
seems to have been in the few cases where assemblies dissented, typically 
demanding more destructive outcomes. Thus, after Falerii is selected for 
forced urban relocation rather than outright destruction, the People had to be 
persuaded by C. Papirius Maso, who had authored the Faliscan deditio, to 
persuade the voters to ratify the resolution rather than demand the city’s 
obliteration.548 For Capua, on account of the citizenship held through 
                                            
545 Liv., 13.11-18. 
546 Liv., 9.26.1: eoque ira processit ut Romae quoque, cum de colonis mittendis Luceriam 
consuleretur senatus, multi delendam urbem censerent. Praeter odium, quod exsecrabile in 
bis captos erat, longinquitas quoque abhorrere a relegandis tam procul ab domo civibus 
inter tam infestas gentes cogebat. Vicit tamen sententia ut mitterentur coloni. Duo milia et 
quingenti missi. 
547 Gel., 6.3.5-55; Liv., 45.25.3-4. Astin 1978, 123–24. 
548 Liv., 21.13.9. 
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coniubium by many of the Capuans, the Senate was judged not competent 
to deal with them without an order from the People.549 Therefore a plebiscite 
was proposed by a tribune and passed, although it authorised the Senate to 
do what it wanted with the Capuans rather than proposing an alternative 
Plebeian solution.  
Conclusions 
As we have seen, the evidence shows unequivocally that the Romans did 
destroy urban centres. The destruction of these places will frequently have 
led to the destruction of the groups that inhabited them, and whose identities 
were structured by them. The destruction of these places was likely achieved 
through fire, followed by the tearing down of the burned ruins. Often only part 
of the place would be targeted for deliberate physical destruction, and in 
many cases the undamaged remains of the city would have been quite 
extensive. In some cases, the destruction seems to have been transient, 
with the city later appearing again as operational agent. Therefore, the 
claims of our sources that places were utterly destroyed or wiped off the map 
are somewhat exaggerated. However, the effect on the communities that 
called these places home would have been similar. Alan Lloyd was correct in 
saying that the destruction of Carthage was ‘a stroke as final in effect as a 
nuclear strike’.550 The mass killing and enslavement of the populace that 
commonly preceded the annihilation of the urban form itself will have 
contributed to the death of these urban sites. Probably more places were 
destroyed than we know about, as Macrobius hinted at. Those later authors 
who chose to take an interest in such things—Strabo, Pliny the Elder, 
Ptolemy, Pausanias—noted repeatedly the disappearance of sites of which 
they were aware from older works. The causes of the death of these places 
will have been various. Some will have been deliberately destroyed, while 
some vanishing as a second order result of the disruption of local ways of life 
and patterns of habitation due to the coming of Rome. This probably does 
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550 Lloyd 1977, 182. 
 150 
not count as a form of genocide, as the effect was likely accidental or 
incidental rather than intentional on the part of the Romans. Their deliberate 
destruction of other towns, on the other hand, probably did contribute to the 
intentional destruction of the groups that lived there.  
The deliberate, intentional annihilation of an urban settlement went 
beyond the mere act of killing or enslaving its inhabitants. Burning and 
demolition was an arbitrary act, enacted by the decision of the Roman 
commander through his imperium or by Senatorial authority, and one that 
could take substantial resources if carried beyond the superficial slighting of 
a settlement. These acts of destruction were meaningful for those carrying 
them out, but were also intended to signal other communities, calculated to 
imbue existential terror of Rome. The deep semiology of the act of 
destruction was heightened by rituals that were carried out. Possibly this 
could have included an evocatio of the tutelary god, and the devotio of the 
site to the chthonic deities, although the attestation of these is insecure 
beyond a couple of examples. The ploughing of the soil, and severing of the 
sacred boundary of the pomerium featured in these activities as an inversion 
of the ritual of foundation. These symbolic acts possibly served the religious 
needs of the Romans involved, although it does not seem that they were too 
worried about preserving the sacrosanctity of foreign cult sites, but they also 
communicated a message about destruction to the rest of the world. The 
continued visibility of destroyed sites as ruined vestigia—erased but still 
present—made the existential threat of contesting Roman imperialism 
transparent. Destroying a city or urban settlement therefore not only 
removed a challenge to Roman hegemonic power, but was intended to 
compel other communities to comply. It was therefore an act of the urbicide 
of heterotopic spaces, although the Romans were not ideologically opposed 
to urbanism, and were content to leave othered spaces unchanged if their 
communities did not defy them. The genocidal destruction of urban 
settlements destroyed or contributed to the destruction of the groups who 
lived there, and were an audacious performance of Roman imperialism. 
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Table 5. Incidents of Roman urban annihilation, 343-146 BCE 
BCE  Victim Sources 
275 Caulonia Paus., 6.3.12 
264 Volsinii Flor., 16.1; Liv., Per., 16; Plin., Nat., 31.31; 
Zonar., 8.7  
258 Myttistratum Diod. Sic., 23. 9. 4; Zonar., 8.11; Polyb., 
9.10.11 
241 Falerii Eutr., 2.81; Liv., Per., 20; Polyb., 1.65.2; 
Zonar., 8.18  
238 Cities inc. Caralis  Flor., 1.22.35. Festus, Gloss. Lat., 430L; 
Polyb., 1.88.8-12; Liv, Per. ,20; Zonar., 8.18 
219 Pharos App., Ill., 8.2; Polyb., 3. 18. 12  
212 Turdetani Liv., 24. 42. 11, 28.39.5-8; Zonar., 9.3 
206 Iliturgi / Ilurgia Liv., 28.19.1-23.5; Val. Max., 9.11 ext.1; Sil., 
16.277-591; App., Hisp., 32-33; Eutr., 3.16.2; 
Jer., Ab Abr., 1813; Zonar., 9.10 
183 A town twelve miles from 
Aquileia 
Plin., Nat., 3.131 
177 Histrian towns: Nesactium, 
Mutila, Faveria 
Liv., 41.11.8 
173 Statelite Carystus Liv., 42.7.8-9; Cic., Off., 1.36; Liv., 42.7.1-9.6, 
10.9, 21.6-7, 45.15.10 
171 Haliartus Liv., 42.63.11; Strabo, 9.411 
170 A few Greek cities held by Philip Liv., Per., 43; Zonar., 9. 22  
167 Antissa Liv., 45.31.13-14; Plin., Nat., 5.39 
146 Corinth Oros., Hist., 5.3.5; Zonar., 9.31; Paus., 
5.10.5, 7.16.7-8; Flor., 1.32.5; Oros., Hist., 
5.3.5; Festus, Breviarium, 7.2 
146 Carthage App., Pun., 127-133; Oros., Hist., 4.23.2-6; 
Zonar., 9.30-31; Flor., 1.31; Polyb., 39.8.6; 
Cic., Leg. agr., 2.51; Diod. Sic., 32.4; Liv., 
Per., 51; Liv., Epit. Oxyrh., 51.137-39; Vell. 
Pat., 1.12.5; Val. Max., 1.1.18; Dig., 7.4.21; 
Jer., Ab Abr., 18.71 
146 Chalcis and Thebes Liv., Per., 52; Polyb., 40.11 
  
Chapter Five 
— 
Forced Urban Relocation 
Introduction 
The annihilation of a city did not always end that city’s existence. As has 
been suggested in the previous chapter, there were several occasions where 
the Romans re-established, on new sites, cities that they had destroyed. 
These are examples of what is termed here ‘forced urban relocation’, the 
formal transferral of urban places to a new site obligated by a stronger, 
imperial power. This differed from the voluntary removal of a city to a new 
site, as has been well documented for Greek poleis.551 As the process of 
forced relocation involved the destruction of the former urban form of the 
transferred place, this may be considered an extension of the destruction 
typified by urban annihilation. The destroyed settlements, however, survived 
their erasure, at least in name. How far the act of forced urban relocation, 
therefore, represented the destruction of the group that formerly inhabited 
the original site can be investigated. Forced urban relocations did not 
happen often and can be divided into two categories. The first type, 
translational urban relocations, was when one city was moved to a new site. 
We have already seen that the Romans attempted to command this sort of 
move for Carthage at the start of the Third Punic War. In addition, the cities 
of Volsinii and Falerii were successfully relocated in this manner. The 
second type were concentrative relocations. These were occasions where 
the inhabitants of multiple settlements were forcibly settled into one, new 
urban space. Again, this was not a common practice for the Romans of the 
                                            
551 Cp. the voluntary urban relocation of Greek poleis, Demand 1990. 
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Middle Republic to enact. The cities of Ligures Baebiani et Corneliani and 
Picentia were established in this manner.  
These settlements were built in an historical context where colonisation 
on the one hand, and the cultivation of the socii italici on the other, were the 
key elements of imperialism for the Romans; while the army could win 
battles, colonies and alliances enabled them to build up a large empire. 
Whereas colonies were, at least in the traditional model, for the benefit of 
settlers sent out from Rome or Latium with either Roman or Latin rights, 
these relocations involved foreign communities. If the relocated settlements 
were shown to be Roman colonial foundations, merely co-opting the names 
of local cities, then this would indicate a larger destructive effect on the 
groups belonging to the original sites. However, it appears that the relocated 
cities, although influenced by Roman colonisation, were not colonies 
themselves. Rather they represent an attempt to control and reshape foreign 
communities under the aegis of the Roman empire through the destruction of 
their previous modes of habitation and the creation of new ones. In this 
regard, forced urban relocation is urbicidal. A function of urbicide is to reduce 
the potentialities of heterotopic spaces, to eliminate urban forms that allow 
for sociocultural forms and expressions that challenge the dominant 
hierarchies of power.552 Forced urban relocation provided a method by which 
the political and military challenge posed by the lived-in spaces of alternative 
settlement forms could be annihilated, while the populations were transferred 
to newly constituted urban spaces that conformed to the spatial formalities of 
the Romans. In re-organising and restructuring the functional spaces of the 
city, the Romans sought to re-organise and restructure these groups. In 
doing so they aimed to create enduring relationships of loyalty and alliance. 
Translational urban relocation 
In 264 BCE, the Etruscan city of Volsinii was razed and relocated following a 
plea from its elite for Roman intervention. In 241 BCE, the rebellious Faliscan 
                                            
552 Coward 2009; Foucault and Miskowiec 1986. 
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city of Falerii was conquered by a double consular army. Following its 
submission, it too was relocated to a new city on a nearby site. In modern 
parlance, the old and new sites for these cities are indicated by the suffixes 
‘veteres’ or ‘novi’. In antiquity however, there was no such disambiguation 
between them. The shifting of these organically constituted urban centres 
from places of natural defensibility and domination to low-lying, freshly 
constructed new cities show discernible parallel traits. Both events can be 
understood as punctuated equilibria, ‘demonstrating extraordinary features 
that represent the end of an archaeological culture or historical phase and 
the beginning of a new one', as we have defined destruction in the 
introduction.553 
These Roman actions were explicit interventions in the autonomy, the 
power, and the relation to the landscape of these urban centres. This bears 
a close resemblance to elements of ethnic cleansing, such as the ‘forced 
removal of a group from a particular area’ and was a coercive remaking of 
the human landscape.554 Nonetheless, there remains an ambiguity of 
purpose, as there were also elements of continuity, not least in the persistent 
use of the original major cult sites and in the retention of the original names. 
Roman agency in choosing to relocate these cities allowed a third option to 
those of annihilation on the one hand, or doing nothing to prevent future 
recidivist violence on the other. Direct incorporation of territorial provinces 
was novel to the end of the First Punic War in 241 BCE and did not even then 
form a standard part of Roman policy options. Forcibly relocating Volsinii and 
Falerii allowed demonstration of both power (potestas) and clemency 
(clementia). This section proposes that complicity of the victim in placing 
itself under Roman fides through the voluntary act of the deditio in fidem 
populi Romani was crucial in creating the opportunity for this third way to be 
taken. Submission was instrumental in avoiding potentially greater 
bloodshed, or perhaps annihilation. Subsequently, these mongrel urban 
centres, exhibiting both endogenic and exogenous (i.e. Roman) traits, 
                                            
553 Driessen 2013, 6. 
554 Bloxham, Moses, and Benjamin Lieberman 2010, 44. 
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occupied modified places in the landscape and within networks of political 
power in central Italy. This contributed to the demise of the local ethnicities in 
both locations, though this element of group destruction was probably not an 
intended, long-term outcome. 
Before their forced relocations, Volsinii (Velzna in Etruscan) and Falerii 
both occupied substantial and leading roles in the territories in which they 
were situated. The first is located at modern day Orvieto, and the second at 
Civita Castellana. They showed substantial parallels in terms of their 
topography. They were situated on plateaux, high and prominent positions 
naturally occurring as part of the volcanic natural history distinctive of this 
area north of Rome. These sites offered not just command of their 
landscapes but also high levels of defensibility. Volsinii was the location of 
the Fanum Voltumnae, the chief sanctuary of the Etruscan league of twelve 
cities. It has now been securely identified with the site of the Campo della 
Fiera at Orvieto.555 The Fanum Voltumnae’s status as the sanctuary for the 
Etruscan cities is well established, although there has long been much 
debate about whether the Greco-Roman sources are correct in identifying a 
bona fide duodecimary league, and what role any such league would have 
had. The attested zilath mechl rasnal has been taken to be the head of this 
league, though that view is by no means secure.556 A religious function is 
definitely implied by Livy, who equates it with the office of sacerdos.557 
Regardless of whether this league is to be considered as a political or 
religious federation or merely symbolic in nature, its association with Volsinii 
indicates a key position of that city in the ethnic and civic identity of 
                                            
555 As with the longstanding controversy of identifying the location of Volsinii veteres with 
Orvieto, the identification of the Campo della Fiera at Orvieto with the ancient Fanum 
Voltumnae is increasingly secure: cf. Gleba 2008, 116 
556 Becker 2013, 355. 
557 Liv., 5.1.5. Cf. Liv., 4.23.5, 25.7, 61.2, 5.17.6, 6.2.2; CIL, XI 5265. Bruschetti 1999, 163 
overstates the case: ‘in essi si condivideva una volonta politica nazionale, che sfociava nelle 
elezione di un capo supremo politico-militare, identificabile nello zilath mechl rasnal, cui era 
affidata la guida delle azioni comunitarie su argomenti spesso essenziali per la 
sopravvivenza stessa della nazione’; Cp. Becker 2013, 355. 
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Etruria.558 Its reputation was clear to later historians and epitomists, Volsinii 
being referred to variously as the ‘head of Etruria’ (etruria caput), ‘oldest of 
the Tyrrhenians’ (ἀρχαιότατοι Τυρσηνῶν), ‘most opulent city of the 
Etruscans’ (oppidum Tuscorimi opulentissimum, and opulentissimi 
Etruscorum), ‘renowned city of Etruria’ (Etruriae nobile oppidum), and ‘the 
most prosperous of the Etruscans’ (Etruscorum florentissimi).559 Roman 
historical memory preserved the pre-eminence of Volsinii and its economic 
power, although it seems to have had fewer dealings in general with Rome 
than the smaller Falerii, and thus entered the surviving historical record at 
fewer points.560  
Falerii was the chief town, the most populous and wealthiest centre in 
the ager Faliscus.561 The presence of cuniculi, cisterns and roads, in addition 
to co-ordinated burial sites, suggest ‘a purposeful construction of place and a 
corresponding projecting of local identity’.562 There is some confusion over 
the names presented in the ancient sources about Falerii, and it appears to 
have been synonymous with the territory. The ager Faliscus was likely to 
have been either the direct territory of the city-state of Falerii, or alternatively 
a less centralised area containing a culturally and ethnically distinct people 
with Falerii at its heart.563 Although it is now well established that the 
Faliscans were a distinct ethnic identity, they were until recently conflated 
with the more dominant Etruscans.564 The Etruscans had substantial cultural, 
and economic links and dominance over the ager Faliscus, especially in the 
                                            
558 Cf. Torelli 2000, 18 for the suggestion that there was a second Etruscan league of twelve 
in the Po valley, with its own *Felsna (=Velzna). 
559 Respectively: Val. Max., 9.1 ext.2; Zonar., 8.7; Plin., Nat., 2.54.139; Flor., 1.21.16; [Aur. 
Vict.], De vir. ill., 36.1; Oros., Hist., 4.5.3. 
560 Respectively: Val. Max., 9.1; Zonar., 8.7; Plin., Nat., 2.139; Flor., 1.21; [Aur. Vict.], De vir. 
ill., 36.1; Oros., Hist., 4.5.3. 
561 de Lucia Brolli and Tabolli 2013, 260; Ceccarelli and Stoddart 2007, 133–34 for the 
historiography of the range of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies applied to 
the region. 
562 Ceccarelli and Stoddart 2007, 145; Cf. Moscati 1990; de Lucia Brolli and Tabolli 2013, 
265. 
563 Summary of discussion in Bakkum 2009, 20–21; Di Stefano Manzella 1977. 
564 E.g. L. R. Taylor 1923; and, Scullard 1967 incorrectly identify Falerii as Etruscan; 
whereas Banti [1968] 1971, 62–69 made some distinction, although she was unsure if 
perhaps Falerii was twinned with Capena. 
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years before Rome’s extirpation of Veii, but there are notable differences in 
material culture. Crucially, language marks the Faliscans as distinct from the 
Etruscans, G. Bakkum having convincingly argued it to have been a dialect 
of Latin.565 There has been a recent challenge to the ‘ethnocentric notion’ of 
the Faliscans ‘as an autonomous and autochthonous group’ instead 
proposing that their identity was a result of ‘a ductile ideology’ related to 
geopolitical changes of the eighth to fourth centuries BCE.566 Nonetheless, 
the modern consensus is that the Faliscan regional identity was distinct from, 
and constructed against, the surrounding Etruscan, Roman and Sabellian 
communities. The dynamism, viability and attractiveness of the Faliscan 
ethnic identity, and of its territory as a destination for artisanal immigration, is 
shown in the dramatic increase in Faliscan language inscriptions and 
production of black gloss and red-figure vases from the fourth century BCE.567 
As with Volsinii, Falerii veteres contained some of the major cult sites for the 
region (Figure 7), probably in conjunction with a federal or regional cult of 
Dis Soranus on Mount Soratte.568 The Vignale functioned as an acropolis, 
and housed two temple structures, one to Apollo, the other being as yet 
unattributed.569 The intramural site known as Scasato also held two temples, 
the more central of which being decorated with a distinctive and remarkably 
well crafted terracotta decoration of Apollo.570 Extramural complexes 
included that of Sassi Caduti, which also possessed fine, terracotta 
acroterion and pediment decorations (Figure 5), as well as the sanctuary of 
Celle. This last was the largest and most important, housing the cult to Juno 
Curitis, significant to the Faliscan territory. 
                                            
565 Bakkum 2009, 5; Faliscan’s status as a Latin dialect had been suspected since the 
discovery of the so-called Lapis Satricanus, Cornell 1995, 43. 
566 Cifani 2013. 
567 Ceccarelli and Stoddart 2007, 142. 
568 Plin., Nat., 7.2.19; Serv., 11.785, 787. 
569 Keay et al. 2004, 231f.; Carlucci et al. 2007. 
570 For the types and development of architectural terracottas at Falerii and elsewhere in the 
ager, see Carlucci 2013. 
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Both Volsinii and Falerii had had relationships with Rome that were 
characterised by intermittent periods of peace, guaranteed at times by formal 
treaties, punctuated by recidivist warfare. Livy records numerous conflicts 
with both Volsinii and Falerii.571 From these events, certain assertions can be 
made regarding the specifics of interstate treaties concluded between them. 
Less can be said on Volsinii, although W.V. Harris thought that it was 
possible to say that they had a formal foedus with Rome prior to the events 
of 264 BCE. 572 More can be said about Falerii regarding types of treaty 
relations. Discussing their defeat by Camillus in 394 BCE, Livy wrote of a 
deditio in fidem, however the mythohistorical nature of the encounter makes 
it difficult to discern its historicity.573 Possibly a relationship of amicitia did 
result from this engagement, or perhaps more likely one governed by an 
indutiae. Certainly this latter was the resultant settlement in 351 BCE of a joint 
enterprise with Tarquinia against Rome, specifying a forty year truce.574 This 
was superseded by a foedus, requested by Falerii following the Romans’ 
display of might in defeating the Samnites in 343 BCE.575 It has been 
speculated that they may have been present at the siege of Sutrium in 311 
BCE .576 Fifty years after their foedus with Rome, although they had ‘lived in 
friendship for many years’, they are attested preparing to side with the 
Etruscans against Rome in 293 BCE.577 The extremity of the situation 
supposedly prompted the Romans to first send fetials, then to declare war.578 
                                            
571 Volsinii: Liv., 5.31.32, 9.41.6, 10.37.1; Falerii: 4.17, 4.21.1-2, 4.32.3, 5.8.4-5, 5.10-24, 
5.26-27, 7.12-17, 10.46. 
572 W. V. Harris 1965, 291–92. 
573 Liv., 5.27: qui dederent Falerios and nec vos fidei nostrae nec nos imperii vestri 
paenitebit'. Camillo et ab hostibus et a civibus gratiae actae. Faliscis in stipendium militum 
eius anni, ut populus Romanus tributo vacaret, pecunia imperata. pace data exercitus 
Romam reductus. 
574 Liv., 7.20.9; Liv., 7.22.4-5: ad bellum ambo profecti, Faliscum Quinctius, Sulpicius 
Tarquiniense, nusquam acie congresso hoste cum agris magis quam cum hominibus 
urendo populandoque gesserunt bella; cuius lentae velut tabis senio victa utriusque 
pertinacia populi est, ut primum a consulibus, dein permissu eorum ab senatu indutias 
peterent. in quadraginta annos impetraverunt. 
575 Liv., 7.38.1: huius certaminis fortuna et Faliscos, cum in indutiis essent, foedus petere ab 
senatu coegit. 
576 Bakkum 2009, 40. 
577 Liv., 10.45.6: per multos annos in amicitia fuerant. 
578 Liv., 10.45.6-8; Liv., 10.26.15. 
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Again, the Faliscans seem to have sued for peace without coming to battle, 
on the basis of Carvilius’ predations on Etruria, and they were granted an 
indutiae for one year on condition of paying an indemnity.579 Presumably the 
earlier foedus was still considered to have been in effect, the extant sources 
being silent on the matter. This was the state of affairs preceding its final 
conflict with Rome. Certainly Polybius’ description of the war as a civil war 
(πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος) suggests that the Romans considered the matter to be 
domestic in nature, well within their own sphere of influence.580  
We should consider the longstanding normativity of both violent and 
amicable interstate relations in the region in the Middle Republican period as 
bearing a causal relationship to Rome’s actions in 264 and 241 BCE. What is 
more, any act of substantial modification to the cities of Volsinii and Falerii 
must necessarily have had wider impacts, both to lower order settlements 
and to the cultural and ethnic identities of their respective regions. This could 
reasonably be expected to be more pronounced in the case of Falerii, as the 
ductility of Faliscan identity meant it was somewhat more precarious than the 
dominating influences of the abutting Etruscan and Romano-Latin areas. It 
also lacked the reinforcement of other ethnically similar urban centres of 
alike size, being the primate settlement of the Faliscan ethnos—that is to say 
‘the largest city within a nation which dominates the country not solely in size 
[…] but also in terms of influence’581—unlike Volsinii which had the other 
Etruscan city-states. 
Roman interventionism 
Rome was called in at the behest of the Volsinian elite, due to the supposed 
usurpation of the ancestral rites of its elite by the lower echelons of Volsinian 
                                            
579 Liv., 10.46.12: et Faliscis pacem petentibus annuas indutias dedit, pactus centum milia 
grauis aeris et stipendium eius anni militibus. 
580 Polyb., 1.65.2. 
581 Mayhew 2009. 
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society.582 Moralising references to slaves and freedmen usurping power in 
the sources may correspond to a breakdown of the strict stratification typical 
of Etruscan society, and the rising social status of the lautni or lautnitha.583 
The willingness of the Volsinian aristocratic element to call on Roman 
hospitium, and its self interest in quelling plebeian revolutions, confirms the 
existence of mutually supportive networks among the elites of Italy at this 
time. It also potentially suggests the terms on which the then current 
agreement with Rome had been made, which may have been a formal 
foedus to which the Volsinian elite appealed.584 Rome repeatedly 
demonstrated a preparedness to intervene in the affairs of other states in the 
Middle Republican period in order to support, preserve or reinstate foreign 
elites.585 Rome similarly intervened at Arretium in 302 BCE and Lucania in 
296 BCE in favour of allied aristocratic interests.586 However the Volsinian 
affair quickly seems to have devolved into one of more conventional warfare 
against foreign polities. Perhaps bolstered by the seemingly impregnable 
situation of their ‘extremely strong citadel’, the defenders undertook to 
defend against a siege.587 Following the victory of the Roman forces under 
consul M. Fulvius Flaccus, the ringleaders of the usurping element were 
executed, and the surviving population deported to a new location, Volsinii 
novi next to modern Bolsena.588 The new site was on much flatter land 14 
km away, next to the Lago di Bolsena, and completely lacking the defensive 
advantage distinctive to Volsinii veteres. 
There is no indication however that any element of Falerian society 
invited the Roman campaign against them as in the case with the elites of 
Volsinii. Instead, it is more likely either that Falerii had taken the opportunity 
                                            
582 The key historical sources are Flor., 1.21; and Zonar., 8.7 = Cass. Dio, 10.7. Liv., Per., 
16 shows that Livy had an account, now lost. 
583 Haynes 2003, 328–29. 
584 W. V. Harris 1971. 
585 Cf. Liv.23.2.1-4 on the allies after Cannae, who were only prevented from immediate 
rebellion by ties of conubium to the Roman elite. Also Liv., 24.2.1-8. Gros 1981, 8–9; Cornell 
1995, 366–67. 
586 Liv., 10.3-5, 10.18.8. 
587 Zonar., 8.7. 
588 [Aur. Vict.], De vir. ill., 36.1 credits a Decius Mus (he does not say which one), but that 
this cannot be correct is shown by the evidence for Fulvius Flaccus’ triumph. 
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of the distraction of the First Punic War to secede from Roman hegemony, or 
that they had become exhausted by its duration. It is unclear whether they 
came into antagonism with Rome through conscious armed resistance or a 
refusal to supply troops under the conditions of the foedus with Rome. Either 
of these might provide a possible reason for Falerii entering a state of war 
with no other support when its relations with Rome had seemingly been 
peaceable for many years. Also unknown is at what juncture this might have 
occurred, it being possible that the rebellion, if that was what it was, may 
have started in the years prior to the conclusion of Rome’s war with 
Carthage. The sources are somewhat more comprehensive than those 
about the fall of Volsinii, although regrettably it is mostly only the later 
sources for this event that survive.589 The account that these sources give is 
one of a brief war of six days with the dual consular army, headed by 
Manlius Torquatus and Lutatius Cerco. The figure of 15,000 Faliscans killed, 
possibly in multiple battles, is likely exaggerated but provides a good 
indication of a massive loss of life. We need not put undue emphasis on the 
subsequent double triumphs as a way of calculating the minimum number 
slain, nor on arguments for the maximum based on the carrying capacity of 
the land. The first of these is over reliant on Valerius Maximus’ so-called 
triumphal laws, which are unattested in any source before him; 590 the 
second is over prone to assumptions and the results subject to too high a 
margin of error for such a small territory. The number of men killed would 
have been a genuine demographic trauma for an area such as the ager 
Faliscus. After the submission of Falerii, half their territory was confiscated to 
become Roman ager publicus. The actual removal of the population to a 
new urban environment—at modern Falleri/Santa Maria di Falleri—5 km 
                                            
589 The key sources are: Polyb., 1.65.1-2; Zonar., 8.18; Eutr., 2.28; Val. Max., 6.5.1; Oros., 
Hist., 4.11.10; Liv., Per., 20.1. 
590 Beard 2007, 209–12; Cf. Pittenger 2008, 81 for discussion on other examples where 
Roman commanders triumphed after joint consular campaigns. 
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away probably did not happen until between 240 BCE and 220 BCE, when the 
Via Amerina, which passes through Falerii novi, was extended from Nepi.591  
Voluntary surrender 
In both cases, the victim group underwent submission to Roman fides of 
their own volition. The agency of the surrendering party in the act of entering 
Roman fides was crucial.592 While some aspects of the rites of surrender to 
Rome are discussed here, the next chapter gives a fuller description. For 
Volsinii, this was achieved by representatives for the traditionalist oligarchs 
freely appealing to Rome for assistance. Indeed, Florus described Volsinii as 
‘the last of the Italians to come into fides’ (postremi Italicorum in fidem 
venere Volsinii), and that it was achieved following them imploring the 
Romans for help against their former serfs.593 For Falerii and the ager 
Faliscus, submission to Roman fides came about under the duress of 
Roman conquest. Yet, the emphasis of the texts is always on the dedicant 
as the actor in the process.594 Entering the authority of Rome could be either 
achieved ‘voluntarily in anticipation of Roman protection […] or under duress 
after military defeat’.595 This certainly was the view espoused by Cicero, and 
distinctions in the formulas used to discuss deditio, making reference to in 
fidem or in potestatem, by ancient authors have in the past led to a false 
legal distinction being identified.596 It was a flexible tool, used variously, with 
the end result of an establishment of permanent amicitia, to which category 
we should assign those states with societas in the Middle Republic.597 This 
amicitia did not, of course, entail equality of friendship but recognised the 
                                            
591 Bakkum 2009, 102; cf. Zonar., 8.18: ὕστερον δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία τόλις εἰς ὂπος ἐπθμνὸν 
οδρυμέμη κατεσκάφη, ἑτέρα δ’ ὠκοδομήφη εὐέφοδος. 
592 Cf. Burton 2011, 134f. on the 263 BCE deditio of minor Sicilian towns: ‘compulsion in the 
face of fear does not mean that these deditiones were any less voluntary’. 
593 Flor., 1.21. 
594 See Liv., Per., 20.1, Val. Max., 6.5.1. 
595 Burton 2011, 114; See also Dahlheim 1968, 54ff.; Rich 2008, 62. 
596 Cic., Off. 1.35; Val. Max., 6.5.1; Liv., 39.54.6-7. 
597 Gruen 1986, 54–55; Burton 2011, 114–15; Cp. Badian 1958, 55 who sees the functional 
result of deditio as being a formal relationship of clientship. On the relationship of amicitia 
and societas, see Cursi 2014. 
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mutual responsibilities of the relevant parties as being hierarchical and 
asymmetrical.598  
It could be said that the Faliscans had a choice, even if it does not 
seem like it was much of one: submit voluntarily or be taken, dead or alive, 
against their will. Nonetheless there was a choice, and no doubt the formula 
for accomplishing the process would have ritually stressed its voluntary 
nature. The distinction between the two options could be stark. Choosing to 
fight risked the systematic killing and enslavement that was, as we have 
seen, customary on the storming of a city.599 Yet volunteering for submission 
could risk violent outcomes nevertheless. Valerius Maximus makes this clear 
in his account of the decision-making process following their submission, 
occurring sometime soon after the six-day military campaign: 
The Roman people wished to take violent measures against 
them [the Faliscans], but were instructed by Papirius, by 
whose hand the words of the surrender were written at the 
consul’s order, that the Falisci had committed themselves 
not to Roman potestas but to Roman fides. Thus, the people 
became calm, putting all anger aside.600 
The ‘words of surrender’ (verba deditionis) no doubt refer to the ritualised 
formula for enacting or activating fides. Indeed, we have two glosses of the 
nature of this surrender, possibly reflecting the ritual formula itself, those of 
Polybius and Livy. They are discussed in the next chapter. Submitting to 
fides was fundamentally an act of undoing. It ritually destroyed and 
discorporated the civic existence of the community that was enacting it. The 
destructive ramifications of the loss of civic institutions can be demonstrated 
in responses to the 211 BCE treatment of Capua. Having shown infidelity by 
                                            
598 Hölkeskamp 2010, 33–34. 
599 Liv., 21.13.9. 
600 Val. Max., 6.5.1: Eadem civitas aliquotiens rebellando semperque adversis contusa 
proeliis tandem se Q. Lutatio consuli dedere coacta est. adversum quam saevire cupiens 
populus Romanus, postquam a Papirio, cuius manu iubente consule verba deditionis scripta 
erant, doctus est Faliscos non potestati, sed fidei se Romanorum conmisisse, omnem iram 
placida mente deposuit pariterque et viribus odii, non sane facile vinci adsuetis, et victoriae 
obsequio, quae promptissime licentiam subministrat, ne iustitiae suae deesset obstitit. 
 
 164 
siding with the Carthaginians during the Hannibalic War, the Roman 
government choose to dismantle in its entirety its organs of state. 601 As a 
result Capua was henceforth counted by the Romans alongside Numantia, 
Carthage and Corinth as a once great city now extirpated, ‘a tomb and 
monument’ because it was ‘without senate, without people, without 
magistrates, a monstrosity, more cruelly left habitable than if it had been 
destroyed’.602 The party placing themselves into the faith of a superior state, 
especially following violence, had to take the gamble that the Romans would 
reconstitute their community by authority of their imperium, and return their 
land and belongings to them.  
It was a strategy not without its risks. Cities under Roman so-called 
protection could fall prey to the vicissitudes of those governing. But crucially 
the relationship of amicitia governed by the act of deditio in fidem populi 
Romani could provide a valid mechanism through which restoration could be 
sought. Thus the positive and restorative resolutions issued by the Roman 
Senate in response to a Locrian diplomatic mission complaining about the 
predations of legate Q. Pleminius in 204 BCE.603 Much has been written of 
the failure and reversion of the deditio of the Aetolians.604 So too, consul M. 
Popilius Laenas in 173 BCE enslaved wholly the members of a Ligurian tribe 
situated in a town of Carystus (of unknown location) that had placed itself 
into Roman fides, demolishing their town and selling all of their property. Yet 
this example, as with C. Papirius Maso’s advocacy in favour of the 
Faliscans, also demonstrates the potent reciprocity that fides invoked. Their 
enslavement scandalised the Senate of Rome, members of which 
prosecuted Laenas and attempted to rectify the situation by restoring three 
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of the essential requirements for civil existence, their liberty, property, and 
weapons. Here, unlike Papirius, members of the Roman elite were only 
partially successful in their reciprocal protection of their amici, due to the 
complexities of the Roman legal system. Social custom among the upper 
orders of Rome seems to have been a bar to unrestricted and immoral 
violence. By committing themselves to fides, the Faliscans de-escalated the 
scenario. They demonstrated their submission and willingness to accept 
Roman authority on the one hand, and positioned themselves within an 
ideological construct that delegitimised Roman state actor’s ability to force 
violent action without moral risks on the other.605  
Deditio was a voluntary act, undertaken purposefully, and one that 
offered substantial benefits in the long term, even though it was an uncertain 
and potentially risky business. This is not to say that such states had much 
option in the matter, or rather their alternatives could have been far more 
deleterious. Asymmetries of power however, do not reduce the essential 
requirement that the state dedicating itself was the active agent in doing so 
and that this mitigated towards more favourable treatment. We should be 
under no doubt that the submissions of Volsinii and Falerii were considered 
victories over foreign peoples by the Romans. Substantial booty was 
appropriated, as well as significant tracts of land to add to the ager 
publicus.606 Archaeological remains attest to triumphal building by Flaccus to 
commemorate his victory, and Festus indicates that the triumph was also 
pictorially commemorated in a prominent position on the temple to 
Vertumnus that he had constructed on the Aventine.607 The fasti triumphales 
record the triumphs granted to M. Fulvius Flaccus over the Volsinians on the 
calends of November 264 BCE, and to Q. Lutatius Cerco and A. Manlius 
Torquatus over the Faliscans on the calends and fourth of March 241 BCE, 
                                            
605 Mann 2005, 6. 
606 FGrH, 184F12 = Plin., Nat., 34.34: deorum tantum putarem ea fuisse, ni Metrodorus 
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Flaccus, in altera T. Papirius Cursor triumphantes ita picti sunt. Cf. Rutledge 2012, 138–44. 
Wiseman 1994, 44; Skutsch and Cornell 1987, 515 with bibliography in n.4. 
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respectively.608 The state of Rome, and by extension its people, considered 
these to be victories worth celebration, twice in the case of the conquering of 
Falerii. This double triumph was possibly related to the need to re-stamp 
Roman authority on a recalcitrant state following the extra-peninsular 
preoccupations of the First Punic War, to serve as an exemplar to others. 
While the Romans celebrated their victories, the defeated positions of 
Volsinii and Falerii would have been clear to themselves, and made clearer 
by the dramatic act of relocation to which they were subjected. Nonetheless 
it not only prevented the triumphalist state apparatus of Rome from tending 
towards more violence, but acted as a bar against it. With the moral 
legitimacy of annihilation impaired, and the undesirability of preserving the 
status quo ante bellum, the Roman elite could continue their experimentation 
with urban forms in performing an act that was neither destruction nor 
preservation but both: the forced relocation of the cities of Volsinii and 
Falerii.  
Urbes novae: continuities and discontinuities 
The result of fides with Rome for these communities was one of a 
sociocultural rupture, and a punctuation in the equilibria of both territories. 
The surviving inhabitants of those towns were transported to new places. In 
both instances, the urban cores were moved from their lofty tableland – 
having been situated on small tuff outcrops in common with the general 
settlement pattern of Etruria and the ager Faliscus – to lowland situations at 
some remove from the original sites.609 The move away from their defensible 
situations is pronounced, and should be understood in light of increasing 
evidence that the Republican-era walls at both Volsinii and Falerii novi were 
not coterminous with their foundations, but came at a later point, and 
involved the modification of both settlements.610  
                                            
608 Degrassi 1954, 99, 101. 
609 Ceccarelli and Stoddart 2007, 137. 
610 Carlucci et al. 2007, 85; Massa-Pairault 2014, para. 14. 
Forced urban relocation 
167 
In the case of Falerii, the distance at c.5 km was not great, though the 
dramatic change in the topography is notable even at this shorter distance. 
The relocation of Volsinii to the shores of the modern Lago di Bolsena was a 
greater distance, though not insurmountable; walking the c.14 km along the 
current road network would take only about four hours, and it need not have 
taken much longer in antiquity. The old cities were essentially discorporated, 
the new ones taking their place in both name and function. Modest 
repopulation of the site of Volsinii veteres is evidenced following the events 
of 264 BCE.611 This was not uncommon following the supposed destruction of 
sites, and we can draw parallels with the small subsistence community 
evidenced at Corinth following its destruction in 146 BCE.612 Most urban 
sanctuaries at Volsinii veteres show decline from 264 BCE, coupled with a 
paucity of later Latin epigraphy. This is expected, but does confirm the 
depopulation of the old urbes and the cessation of its civic functions. Falerii 
veteres too is likely to have ceased to house a community, and if it did it 
would have been insignificant.613  
It is tempting to see a causal relationship between the defeat of Falerii 
and the rapid decline of the second order Faliscan settlements of Corchiano 
and even the second Faliscan town of Narce, in contrast to the flourishing, 
nearby Roman colony of Nepi. Vignanello seems to have disappeared in the 
following century. The disruption of the locus of authority, power, and 
economy in the ager Faliscus led to a general shift to the ruralisation of the 
area. It is possible that these effects were the result of devastations 
associated with the Roman conquest, but, if the sources are accurate, the 
conquest was rapid and there was unlikely time for the Romans to carry out 
such predations. It may represent an intentional policy of fragmentation and 
ruralisation. More likely, a combination of the shift in identity and status of 
Falerii coupled with the disruption of the functional role of the zone as a 
crossroads, made obsolete by the Roman hegemony by that time of the 
surrounding areas, was fatal to the Faliscan ethnic identity and to the ability 
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of smaller settlements to prosper under such conditions. Not all Faliscan 
settlements were equally vulnerable to this effect, Vignanello for example 
showing greater resilience in its expression of ethnic identity through late 
Faliscan inscriptions and traditional funerary practices, though it too 
evidenced the same pattern of decline.  
The relocated urban centres were significantly more influenced by 
Roman characteristics. Falerii novi’s layout (Figure 4) shows substantial 
influence of Roman colonial planning, and has often been taken as a prime 
model for Roman Republican town planning, particularly the road grid of so-
called decumani and cardines, with a ‘full suite of buildings playing a key 
structuring role’.614 A shallow ravine along its southern end, and likely the 
desire to conform to pre-existing roads, means that it deviates from the 
perfect playing card shape it might otherwise be. It is possible that the 
colony-like aspects of its plan were deliberate, as Falerii in many other ways 
fits the strategic concern of coloniae: 
Carefully constructed urban communities, equipped with all 
the necessary institutional apparatus and hierarchical social 
divisions to operate as selfgoverning city-states […] their 
primary purpose was to act as strategic outposts in newly 
conquered territory (propugnacula imperii as Cicero calls 
them). Naturally, they were all surrounded with defensive 
walls.615 
Even if it did not have the legal status of a colony, it was likely a municipium 
sine suffragio at this point, though it does later possess colony status, it may 
have been functionally intended to fulfil many of the same roles, or 
nonetheless to have been informed by the Romans’ by now extensive 
experience of planning regular colony plantations.616 This may have been 
connected to later viritane distribution however and not actually reflective of 
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the legal status of the town itself. Although most Roman and Latin colonies 
were, until the Gracchan programmes of 133-120 BCE, founded ab initio, they 
could be founded on pre-existing sites. This is linked to the use of citizenship 
grants en masse ‘to destroy autonomous existence’.617 However, unlike at 
Capua where autonomy was starkly deleted, we cannot be sure of the legal 
identity of Falerii. There is no definitive proof as to whether it was a 
municipium sine suffragio, a nominally independent state under fides, or an 
outright colony founded as a continuation of a previously autonomous 
settlement. Volsinii novi too is structured along principles of colony planning 
(Figure 3), although it is much larger and demonstrates a far lower level of 
dogmatic adherence to the model. Volsinii would see substantial 
restructuring over the coming centuries, bringing increasingly Roman urban 
civic forms. Not only this, the topographic shift from lofty and highly 
defendable vantage points to lowland positions would have stressed the 
change in agency and in modes of habitation. The world would have looked 
geographically and architecturally different for those inhabitants transported 
from the destroyed sites to their new homes.  
However, the rupture was not total. The populations of the refounded 
cities perhaps went unchanged. Alternatively, they may have been more 
mixed, especially in the example of Falerii, having a smaller and more 
precarious territorial ethnicity from which it could replenish its population 
following losses from the Roman campaign in 241 BCE. It is likely however 
that the population in Falerii still contained a substantial Faliscan contingent, 
as can be adduced from epigraphic evidence at Falerii novi. Indeed, there is 
textual evidence of population admixture elsewhere: Antium was refounded 
as a citizen colony in 338 BCE following the conclusion of the Latin War and 
after centuries of Volscian control, ‘on the condition that the people of Antium 
were allowed to enrol themselves as colonists if they wanted to’, a clear sign 
of the possibility of the admixture of inhabitants;618 and the people of Croton 
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agreed in 215 BCE to move to Locri rather than face a Bruttian siege.619 This 
last agreement was a contingency plan, the initial strategy being to use a 
Bruttian colony as a way of ‘restoring the level of population of the city, which 
was deserted and devastated by earlier wars’.620 There are therefore Italian 
examples of other settlements having their populations mixed to either 
preserve or restore the population of a place or for strategic rationale. 
Appian implies that, in the period following the Civil Wars, when the Romans 
defeated an enemy they ‘seized a portion of their lands and built cities there, 
or enrolled colonists of their own to occupy existing ones’.621 Indeed, both 
Volsinii and Falerii novi seem to have been founded on top of pre-existing 
local settlements.622 Although Falerii from 241 BCE occupied a new place in 
the landscape, it conformed to a pre-established spatial node, possessing a 
relationship to other settlements and cult sites within the landscape.623 
Excavations at Bolsena have found evidence of a minor settlement prior to 
the forced relocation of Volsinii, and no doubt within its sphere of influence 
prior to 264 BCE.624 The discovery of a 5 metre-wide road from the Hellenistic 
period, which connected Orvieto to Bolsena, suggests that connections 
between Fanum Voltumnae and the site to which Volsinii would be moved 
predate that removal.625 Indeed, the pre-established connectivity may have 
been taken into account among the factors for deciding on the Bolsena site. 
In both cases, although the Roman intervention dramatically changed the 
relationship of those societies with their landscapes, this was done within a 
pre-existing and developed network of communications and settlement. No 
doubt this would have aided the inhabitants of the ager Volsiniensis and the 
ager Faliscus to reconcile the changes with their pre-existing paradigms of 
place and space. Thus, when the Roman road network was developed 
across and through the Etruscan and Faliscan territories, to a large extent it 
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was an aggrandisement and refashioning of the pre-existing one to meet 
Roman needs.  
At Falerii the suburban temple of Juno Curitis continued in use, as did 
the Fanum Voltumnae at Volsinii. The continuities of the road linkages with 
their cults within the discontinuities of place are highly illustrative of the 
processes, intentions, and problems adherent to the Roman forced 
relocation of Volsinii and Falerii. Both remained intimately associated with 
their sanctuaries, which seem to have operated as ethnoreligious centres for 
broader, geographically bound peoples. The beginnings of the via sacra 
leading from the civic buildings of Falerii novi have been identified, along 
with epigraphic evidence of the priesthood of Juno Curitis at the city.626 
These new cities were furnished with temples as per the usual practice, yet 
regional cultic importance meant that the Fanum Voltumnae and the temple 
to Juno Curitis at Celle assumed a superordinate role. These sites would 
have represented easy prey to the Romans had they wanted to expunge the 
regional ethnoreligious identity of those societies.627 Analysis of the historical 
record shows numerous points at which sanctuaries or sacred sites were, or 
were likely to have been, intentionally destroyed because ‘for the Romans, 
the wholesale destruction of communities could include the demolition of 
sacred buildings’.628 The extramural sanctuary at Celle to Juno Curitis, 
contains the remains of a monumentalised temple edifice of the fourth 
century BCE (Figure 6). As with the fragments found for the Falerian temples 
of Sassi Caduti and Scasato, its terracottas were of a high quality.629 The 
earliest of these structures date back to the archaic early sixth century, but 
the most important belong to the monumental reconstruction programme of 
the beginning of the fourth century, which saw the reorganisation of civic life 
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in Falerii.630 Crucially, however, there is evidence that the religious precincts 
uncovered at and around Civita Castellana continued in use following the 
city’s demise and relocation. Continuity of cult practice is attested by 
deposited terracotta votives: Mid-Republican in a cistern near the temple of 
Juno Curitis; sixth century through to the Imperial period at the Ninfeo Rosa 
at the Fosso dei Cappuccini; and at the Vignale, the sanctuary of which 
shows use into the second century BCE.631 Votive deposits of textile 
implements have also been uncovered at Sassi Caduti and the Vignale, 
demonstrating a wide geographic continuity from the fifth to first centuries 
BCE.632 The temples of Falerii, and indeed those of its hinterland, seem to 
have all, or nearly all, survived the coming of Rome.633 Not only this, at least 
some of them seem to have flourished. Ovid described his participation in a 
festival to Juno at Falerii in emotive and celebratory terms, and multiple 
extant inscriptions boast of having performed the role of pontifex sacrarius 
Iunonis Quiritis.634 
Excavation at the Campo della Fiera near Orvieto, shows evidence of 
the continuation of use of the Fanum Voltumnae into the Augustan period, 
with replastering works dating to that time as well as the rebuilding of central 
monuments in the Late Republic, when point paving with red opus signinum 
with black and white tesserae was installed.635 Further finds show that cult 
activities continued there through into the Imperial period.636 It is extremely 
likely that this cult continued at least as far as the reign of Constantine, in 
whose name the famous Rescript of Hispellum was issued, excusing a small 
community (modern Spello) from the arduous journey to celebrate an annual 
joint festival, held at least every other year ‘at Tuscan Volsinii’ (aput Volsiniis 
Tusciae).637 The old role of zilath mechl rasna, which Livy had equated to 
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that of sacerdos, became assimilated into the Romanised magistracies of 
the praetor (Etruriae) XV populorum. Even if this position was primarily a 
civic and religious one, rather than a politico-military one, then it shows not 
only a lack of desire to eradicate the markers of ethnic identity but even a 
recognition of their utility. Moreover, Roman concern to not extirpate but 
instead to co-opt and engage with the significant symbol that the Fanum 
Voltumnae represented can be seen in the discovery of altars erected, at the 
time of the forced relocation of Volsinii, in front of temple structures in a 
manner and date concomitant with those erected in front of the temples of 
Mater Matuta and Fortuna in the Forum Boarium.638 These must have been 
at the instigation of Fulvius Flaccus, whose obvious willingness to associate 
himself with the Volsinian pantheon is indicated by his building of and close 
personal association with Vertumnus/Voltumna. Within the new city, 
continuance of the municipalia sacra of pre-Roman Volsinii is suggested by 
the continuation of civic cult rites related to Nortia.639 She was likely 
worshipped there, including in her identification with Minerva, Fortuna and 
Necessitas.640 Other members of the Etruscan pantheon were undoubtedly 
worshipped there too, Tinia is certainly archaeologically attested, and 
probably the Volsinian tutelary god Voltumna featured prominently.641 
Although the deities in question are still archaeologically uncertain, there is 
definite architectural evidence for cultic continuity between the urban temple 
sites of Volsinii novi and those of its predecessor. It seems certain that 
‘l’intime dialectique entre le fanum Voltumnae et les autres sanctuaires de la 
cité’ continued after its relocation.642 
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As we have already touched upon, both Volsinii and Falerii have been 
connected to the process of the evocatio over the years.643 The cults of Juno 
Curitis and Minerva Capta at Falerii have been cited as evidence of a 
probable evocatio following or during the rebellion.644 Janus Quadrifrons may 
have been imported from Falerii to Rome in some fashion.645 Inferences are 
sometimes made about Fulvius Flaccus’ establishment of a temple to the 
Volsinian tutelary god Vertumnus following his victory. However the only 
explicitly, historically attested evocatio occurred in relation to the 396 BCE 
destruction of Veii.646 Other ancient sources either discuss the process in the 
abstract or make reference to carrying statues of gods, with the implication 
of their blessing, to Rome.647 Evocatio seems inevitably to enter 
historiographical discussion whenever a major act of destruction is 
perpetrated by the Romans, sometimes in conjunction with further acts, such 
as the supposed cursing of the site of Carthage in 146 BCE.648 There is, 
however, good reason to discount evocatio as a normative act, as we have 
seen, because there is very little direct attestation in the sources with the 
above exception of Veii.649 Were the evocatio to be proven to have been 
associated with the destruction of Falerii or Volsinii veteres, it could be taken 
as part of an attempt to undermine the victim community on the most basic 
level. It would provide reason to explicitly attack their religious centres, and 
therefore the structures of ethnic and sociocultural cohesion, as the god or 
goddess would be no longer resident there. However, the evidence for 
Volsinii and Falerii suggest otherwise. The continued operation of the major 
cult sites of Juno Curitis and Voltumna, coupled with the evident patronage 
of members of the Roman elite, such as Fulvius Flaccus’ dedication of a 
temple to Vertumnus on the Aventine and his erection of altars in the Fanum 
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Voltumnae, are evidence that evocatio was not a tool used as part of an 
intentional campaign to destroy these communities.  
The cursus honorum at both locations seems to have continued, 
though perhaps modified to allow for Roman constitutional requirements. 
Falerii novi seems to have gained duumviri, a clear sign of a subordination of 
sovereignty to the needs of Rome.650 Indeed, other than aedilis and rex we 
lack evidence for emic, native Faliscan magistracies, the rest of the 
inscriptional evidence being Late Faliscan, Latino-Faliscan, or Latin, and 
relating to the refounded civic institutions at Falerii novi. Evidence that 
duumviri were installed at Volsinii is lacking. In contrast, there are clear 
indicators that the local Volsinian magistracies not just survived but were 
actively engaged in the formation of Volsinii novi.651 They are implicated by 
the presence of career markings, indicating the roles of ‘fle[re]’ and 
‘ca[zlanie]’, and a boundary-marking cippus, which was marked ‘methlumes’ 
and suggests the involvement of local magistrates in establishing the sacred 
pomerium according to their own rites. Their presence may also be 
detectable in the use of the Ptolemaic foot as the metric basis for the original 
construction of Volsinii novi, rather than the slightly smaller Roman foot.652 
The opus quadratum enclosing wall of the city seems to date to the early 
second century BCE, datable by certain Hellenistic techniques imported from 
Magna Graecia.653 This provided a point of continuity with Volsinii veteres, 
which was similarly built using opus quadratum. Many of the more 
monumentalised elements of Volsinii novi, such as the forum and temples, 
seem to have been reorganised and realigned in the same period as the 
wall, which also saw the extension of the via Clodia and the creation of 
Roman and Latin colonies in the area. The initial forum area does not seem 
to have been constructed on top of the pre-existing Etruscan settlement.654 It 
was only at a later stage, in conjunction to major Roman civic and road 
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building programmes, that the public areas of Volsinii novi were reoriented 
and rebuilt along Roman lines. There is evidence that the destruction of 
Volsinii led to the partial fragmentation and relocation of some members of 
the elite, whose onomastics show the Volsinian gentes crop up both in 
Volsinii novi and in Falerii veteres, prior to its own relocation. However, 
Rome had, whatever deeper motivation one ascribes to its designs on 
empire, undertaken this final war against Volsinii on the clear pretext of the 
restoration of the local elite. This was likely achieved. Indeed, the local elite 
would, as in the ager Faliscus, have provided a pre-established system of 
authority through which Roman hegemony could be enacted. Volsinii 
probably retained a nominal status as an independent state, possibly under 
a foedus and certainly with a transparent understanding of the asymmetrical 
nature of amicitia with Rome following its deditio in fidem and subsequent 
relocation. 655 Later inscriptional finds refer to it as a res publica and civitas 
volsiniensium.656 It is probable that significant portions of the elites of both 
towns continued to hold significant roles in the civic, religious, and social 
lives of the reconstituted and refounded states of Volsinii and Falerii. In the 
ager Faliscus, close links between Faliscan and Roman elites facilitated the 
transition to new realities of life in the area under permanent Roman 
hegemony, and these close links may even have begun a process of rural 
Romanisation prior to the events of 241 BCE.657 The areas surrounding 
Volsinii and Falerii would have continued to be governed from them, albeit 
increasingly in favour of the new reality of Roman dominion and patronage. 
This dominion would, however, have been intermediated by the self-
administration of the local elite.658  
The reorganisation of communication routes through Etruria and the 
ager Faliscus, into which Volsinii novi and Falerii novi were integrated, 
however, was probably the greatest facilitator of their eventual 
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‘Romanisation’. To a large extent this will have been due to the shifting 
paradigms of travel and space, which saw the relegation of the cities of 
central Italy as Roman attention shifted elsewhere.659 Both cities would come 
largely to be nodes on the Roman itinerary along a road network increasingly 
designed to facilitate rapid communications with spheres of interest in the 
ager Gallicus, Po Valley and Ligurian areas. For the Faliscan ethnic identity, 
this seems to have been more detrimental. Its construction of self as a 
ductile identity was in part related to its precarious geographic location as a 
buffer zone between major powers, and therefore to its ability to control the 
valuable crossroad of communication between East and West and North and 
South. As all roads increasingly led to Rome, the economic function of that 
crossroad ceased to bear significance, due to the constitutional shift of the 
central Italian states from relations of recidivist warfare to outright Roman 
hegemony, and so too did its cultural function.660 The close relationship 
between an increasingly irrelevant Faliscan tongue and the new Roman 
language of power probably facilitated its rapid absorption, and thence its 
swift disappearance within the next century.661  
The linguistic situation of Volsinii was rather different. The sociocultural 
reinforcement of the prestige of Etruscan on the one hand, and of its use, 
both vulgar and civic, in multiple major urban centres mean that this is 
unsurprising. Indeed, we know that the language survived until at least as 
long as the reign of Claudius, who was a speaker and scholar of Etruscan, 
though its use had been substantially replaced by Latin by then.662 
Epigraphy in the new Republican forum at Volsinii novi demonstrates the 
civic use of Latin there, but Etruscan retained its value as a language.663 The 
important point for this study is that in neither place is there any evidence of 
an attempt, concerted or otherwise, to eradicate the ethnicity through 
sociolinguistic suppression. The epigraphic increase in Latin at both 
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locations can be ascribed to an increased attractiveness of the utility of Latin 
as the language of the hegemonic state, as well as a rise in the settlement of 
Latin speakers following their permanent subordination to that hegemony. It 
seems that the Romans had not intended to destroy the groups of Volsinii 
and Falerii. 
Concentrative relocation 
The Romans also enacted forced relocations that did not translate an 
existing city from one site to another, but instead concentrated more diffuse 
populations into a single urban node. Elements of the Picentes and the 
Ligurian peoples were subjected to this displacement. Both these peoples 
possessed organised settlements, and that the Ligurians had cities is 
attested by various Greco-Roman sources. These relocations produced the 
cities of Ligures Baebiani and of Picentia, both of which were located at 
considerable distance to original homes and territories of their new 
inhabitants.  
The Picentes and Picentia 
The forced relocation of the Picentes evidently occurred in 268 BCE, following 
the victory of the consuls Sempronius Sophus and Claudius Russus over the 
Picentes.664 The Picentes are attested by various names in the extant Greek 
and Latin sources, and this may represent a diversity of self-identification, 
the inhabitants of Picenum, as the region was known to the Romans, being 
split into independent Picentine tribes, and home to at least two distinct 
linguistic groups.665 The Romans shifted their attentions towards Picenum at 
the turn of the third century BCE, and they were initially on friendly terms. In 
299 BCE, they allied against the common threat of the cisalpine Gauls under 
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a foedus, and the Picentes further demonstrated their loyalty to Rome by 
subsequently providing valuable intelligence on the Samnite preparations for 
war.666 However, following the shift in the balance of power after the Roman 
victory in 295 BCE over the Etruscans, Samnites, and Gauls at Sentinum,667 
the Picentes found Roman power in their sphere to have grown too great. 
With the conclusion of the Samnite Wars in 290 BCE, consul Marcus Curius 
Dentatus expelled the Gallic Senones tribespeople from the area around 
Picenum and subjugated the Praetutti, who had aligned themselves with 
Rome’s enemies. The Praetutti may have been a subset of the Picentes, and 
were often conflated with them. Their land was confiscated and allocated to 
the ager publicus or allotted to Roman colonists.668 The establishment in 290 
BCE of the Roman colonies of Hadria, Castrum Novum, and Sena Gallica 
surrounded the Picentes at key strategic points.669 The Picentes seem to 
have renounced their affiliation with Rome, because they were subjected to 
campaigns against them in 269 BCE and 268 BCE. Both ended in the 
celebration of triumphs for Roman generals, and the chief city in Picenum, 
Asculum, was captured. The defeat of the Picentes led to the establishment 
of a further Roman colony on the northern border of their territory, Ariminum, 
founded in 268 BCE although possibly decreed the year before.670 The 
Picentes were made to made to undergo a forced urban relocation. 
Picentia was established in the vicinity to the North of Paestum, on the 
Poseidonian Gulf. The new urban centre was given the trappings of a full 
city, being assigned a territory known as the ager Picentinus, within which 
were the Greek-founded Oscan city of Surrentum and, later, the Roman 
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colony of Salernum.671 The location of the city itself is uncertain, but probably 
to be identified with a site near the modern Pontecagno.672 Strabo is the only 
literary source for the relocation, as he describes ‘the tribe of the Picentini, a 
small offshoot of those Picentini who dwell on the Adriatic, which has been 
transplanted by the Romans to the Poseidonian Gulf’.673 His use of the 
diminutive, which he only uses here, along with language that implies a clear 
descent from the Picentes of Picenum, implies a shift in the signification of 
their ethnic marker. It is likely that at first the inhabitants were made cives 
sine suffragio, until they were made civitas optimo iure after 241 BCE.674  
If the relocation of those Picentes moved to the Tyrrhenian seaboard 
was supposed to secure their future loyalty, it was a failure. They went along 
with much of Campania, the Samnites, and the Bruttians in siding with 
Hannibal, and were seemingly punished by being displaced from their 
metropolis of Picentia, and the establishment of the Roman colony of 
Salernum to guard against further rebellion.675 Silius Italicus suggests the 
positive participation of the Picentes of Picentia in the Hannibalic War, 
although he is an untrustworthy narrator.676 Florus indicates that the city was 
destroyed in the Social War.677 Its relatively short time as the metropolitan 
city of the ager Picentinus may partially account for the past uncertainty over 
the location of Picentia. Nonetheless, the Picentine ethnic persisted in the 
area. The ager Picetinus kept its name, and the river that flows passed 
Pontecagno into the Tyrrhenian sea is still called the Picentino. Over time 
the presence of the Picentes as a distinct ethnic group in this region waned 
and the colony of Salernum took over as the chief city of the ager, but the 
authority of Strabo indicates that there was still an identifiable group of 
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people considered a branch of the Picentes proper. With the paucity of 
evidence, it is impossible to identify from which of the tribes of Picenum the 
deported Picentes originated; given the apparent role of Asculum in the 
sedition of 269/8 BCE, they might have been taken from its citizens, or they 
might have been the original inhabitants of the territory taken by the 
contemporary foundation of Ariminum.  
The Ligurian Apuani and the Ligures Baebiani et Corneliani 
The Ligurian tribe of the Apuani were forcibly relocated in 180 BCE. As 
among other peoples, the Ligurians were comprised of many subgroups, of 
whom the Apuani were one of the most prominent and the most easterly.678 
They therefore were open to Roman imperialism, as well as being the 
Ligurian tribe that posed the greatest perceived threat to the city of Rome 
and its territory. The Romans had found themselves in a crisis in Liguria at 
least twice in the 180s BCE. In 186 BCE, the army of the consul Q. Marcius 
Philippus was roundly defeated and put to flight by the Apuani, who made 
use of their superior local knowledge to lay an ambush in a forested defile.679 
Philippus disbanded his army to try to prevent the extent of the shame of the 
disaster getting out, but it became public knowledge anyway; the pass was 
henceforth nicknamed the ‘Saltus Marcius’ in the tradition of the Roman 
commemoration of sites of battlefield defeat. Then, in 181 BCE, the army of 
proconsul L. Aemilius Paullus was surrounded and faced almost certain 
defeat by the Ligurian Ingauni. The apparent declaration of a tumultus, the 
customary Roman crisis response, enabled the drawing up of emergency 
levies in anticipation of a disaster, and shows that at Rome there was a 
genuine fear of the Ligurians.680 The 180 BCE campaign against the Apuani, 
on the other hand, seems to have been entirely opportunistic. The 
proconsuls P. Cornelius Cethegus and M. Baebius Tamphilus, took 
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advantage of the delay in the appointment of their successors to rectify their 
lack of any notable achievements in their consular year.681 Despite the 
background of Roman aggression against themselves in 187 BCE, 186 BCE, 
and 185 BCE,682 and the decisive defeat meted out by Aemilius Paullus to the 
Ingauni in the previous year,683 the Apuani seem to have been caught 
entirely unprepared and so submitted to the Romans.684 This represents the 
first time that the Senate granted triumphs without a battle being fought.685  
The proconsuls then set about transporting 40,000 of the Apuani to a 
new site in Samnium, who were to be followed the succeeding year by 
another 7,000 moved by the consul Q. Fulvius Flaccus.686 They were 
assigned to settle what was subsequently called the Ligures Baebiani et 
Corneliani.687 Where this was once thought to have meant two cities, one 
under the patronage of each of the founding proconsuls, it is now generally 
thought that one urban centre was given the name of both consuls.688 It was 
located on the public land taken from the Samnite city of Taurasia. The 
existence of a town in this locale in the time of Trajan has been 
epigraphically confirmed by the discovery of a bronze tabula that identifies 
itself as such.689 It is likely that by this time the prolix original name had been 
shortened. The late attestation shows that the community succeeded, and 
that it maintained its Ligurian ethnic marker. The number of people 
transported, at 47,000 in total, was significant, and likely contributed to the 
continuation of a sense of group identity. The transplanted community 
seems to have left little trace in the genetic record, but that means only that 
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the community was small relative to the genetic pool into which it was 
placed, and into which it was presumably subsumed over time.690 The 
differentiation of the Apuani of the territory of Ligures Baebiani likely 
lessened over time also, probably in accord with the general process by 
which the whole region became increasingly dominated by Roman culture. 
The Romans seem to have taken steps however to maintain the 
cohesion of the transported Apuani as a group when they were relocated. 
Adults of both sexes and their children were included, and they could take 
their property with them. A large amount of money was offered at state 
expense for the Apuani to procure necessities in their new home, totalling 
150,000 silver sesterces.691 According to Livy, the Senate were consulted, 
but the agency was clearly the proconsuls’, and they were put in charge of 
dispersal of the money and lands. The Apuani’s appeals to the Senate were 
ignored and they could do nothing but acquiesce. The subsequent 
deportation of 7,000 more Apuani by Flaccus, which we are told he moved 
by sea, emplaced them with those who had already been transported.692 If 
the Romans had wished to completely disrupt and destroy the ethnic 
cohesion of the Apuani they could have done so. Instead, they determined to 
reorganise the relationship of the Apuani to the geography of Italy, and 
therefore with themselves. Further steps were taken to pacify those left 
behind. In addition to the military base of operations at Pisa, colonies were 
established at the Etrusco-Ligurian settlements of Luca and Luna. The first 
of these was the last Latin colony, sent out in 180 BCE to land offered by the 
Pisans.693 The second was founded in 177 BCE.694 They aimed to bulwark 
the region against further restlessness. Despite this, and the transportation 
of a significant portion of the natives, this was not enough to quell completely 
the Ligurians nor the remaining Apuani. Sporadic warfare with the Ligurians 
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continued for decades, and M. Claudius Marcellus triumphed over the 
Apuani in 155 BCE.695  
Relocation and colonisation 
Neither Volsinii novi, Falerii novi, Picentia, nor Ligures Baebiani et Corneliani 
were colonies of the Romans. However, their existence must be understood 
in the context of Roman colonisation and infrastructural expansion. Colonial 
mentalities intimately informed the geospatial understanding of the networks 
of Italy: 
If the Roman Senators did not have a precise perception of 
the political situation of the whole of Italy, this kind of project 
would never have taken place: Rome was starting to deal 
with the concept of Italy as a Roman state, and ultimately 
each part had to work in 'harmony' with the others, the whole 
a perfect machine. 696 
While this may overstate the case, and there was likely a greater element of 
ad hoc adaptation than it makes prima facie allowance for, the use of long- 
and short-distance urban transfers required a holistic mentality to the parts of 
Italy. A key element of the development of this encompassing view of Italy, 
which provided the framework for the conceptualisation and implementation 
of forced relocation, was the Roman use of colonisation. 
The new cities retained, in the case of the translational examples, their 
old names—semiotically minimising the break between the old and new 
incarnations, and the punctuation of the equilibrium of their existence. The 
names of the concentrative relocations were neologisms, yet retained and 
signified the ethnic identities of those who were relocated. The Roman 
actors wanted to encode or re-ascribe the prior group identities of these 
people that would otherwise have been destroyed. This habit of naming 
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bears similarities to colonial practices, which often saw the retention of the 
original names of settlements, or were named after their location.697 The 
alternative, the generation of a new name for the colony, served to obliterate 
the prior identity of the site, as at the Roman maritime colony of Cosa.698 
This practice, informed by colonial habits, served to continue the existence 
of the group identities of the relocated groups, even if in a form modified to fit 
Roman caprices. 
As we have seen, the translational relocations of Volsinii and Falerii 
saw the foundation of settlements that bore substantial influences from 
Roman colonial planning as well as, especially in the case of Volsinii novi, 
elements of indigenous architecture. The landscape surrounding the 
relocations evidence a process of centuriation, the land either being 
allocated to natives or settlers with Latin or Roman status. Doubtlessly, 
Roman expertise in surveyance was brought to bear and their agrimensores 
employed in parcelling the land.699 The building of the settlements 
themselves probably provided employment for the labour force, aiding the 
productivity of Rome and its allies. In the case of Ligures Baebiani, at least, 
there was an apparent role played by a quinqueviral board of commission in 
administering the foundation of the city and the settling of inhabitants 
there.700 Under the traditional model, Republican Roman colonisation was 
seen as an enterprise of the state, initiated by the Senate, the resulting 
proposed lex assented to by the People, and a board of commission 
appointed.701 These boards were typically triumviral, but could vary in 
number.702 However, the tenet that the Senate necessarily initiated colonial 
foundations or appointed their boards of commission has been challenged in 
recent years.703 The institution of colonisation was likely more ad hoc and 
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complex than the record at first glance suggests, and it is likely that the 
process of forced relocation drew on these heterogenous procedures. 
Colonialisation was one, albeit very important, tool within the 
heterogeneity of means of expansion, for the state as well as for the private 
individuals within the Roman elite. They were actively expanding their private 
bases wherever possible through the building of roads, fora, mansiones, as 
well as by receiving groups into the fides Romana.704 It seems certain that 
none of these relocated settlements bore the formal designation of colonia at 
that time, although some would later so do. This has caused confusion over 
the nature of the relocated settlements in the past. Thus, Papirius appeared 
in a patronal role regarding Falerii, and the patronage of Baebius and 
Cornelius is evident from the eponymy of the Apuani settlement. These 
settlements were more securely tied to the Roman state. Although it cannot 
be confirmed for all the cases here, it seems likely that they had the status of 
municipia, nominally independent but subordinate to Rome, governed by 
duoviri, and made cives sine suffragio. 
The establishment of the concentrative urban centres of Ligures 
Baebiani and Picentia also served the colonial purpose strategically 
surrounding potentially hostile states and peoples. Cicero later referred to 
colonies as the ‘bulwarks of empire’.705 The foundations of numerous 
colonies were predicated on their defensive functions: Narnia over the 
Umbrians; Minturnae and Sinuessa over the Aurunci; and Cremona and 
Placentia over the Gauls of the Po valley. However, while this was normally 
achieved by the sending out of citizens to strategic positions in Italy 
(deductio) to expand the sphere in which Rome could exert dominion, these 
cases saw the people surrounded through their induction further into the 
sphere of Roman dominion (traductio). It was therefore an inverse of 
colonisation, but informed by the same rationales and mentalities. These 
were, indeed, complex operations that required the committed deployment of 
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considerable resources, as well as requiring a worldview that see the 
geospatial arrangement of Italy, its settlement nodes, and its peoples as 
malleable. It was an available paradigm that increasingly saw Italy as a 
single spatial entity, subject to Roman imperialism. It was a symptom of self-
confidence in their ability to manipulate these relationships but also of fear in 
the potential challenge posed by the agency of other groups. The 
techniques, tools, and mentalities that enabled this manipulation were 
provided by their experience with colonisation. 
From highlands to lowlands 
Part of this paradigm of geospatial conceptualisation was predicated on the 
dichotomy of highland and lowlands. In each of the forced relocations 
discussed in this chapter the relocation was from the former to the latter. In 
the cases of the translational relocations of the cities of Volsinii and Falerii 
this difference is obvious, as they were shifted from their defensively-
advantageous elevations to nearby sites on the low plains. Situated near to 
their former sites, their relationship to the geography of their landscape was 
completely transformed. So too was the defensibility, or lack thereof, of their 
cities. Had the forced relocation of Carthage come to fruition, as well as 
being moved away from the sea, it would have been dislodged from the 
Byrsa, the great hill that housed its citadel.  
The concentrative relocations of the Apuani and the Picentes similarly 
featured transfers of the respective populations from highland to lowland 
areas. The Apuani were associated with their defensive use of their heavily 
forested mountains and ravines, as in their ambush at the Saltus Marcius. 
When it came to their deportation, Livy makes explicit that it was a 
movement down from the highlands: 
Cornelius and Baebius determined to move them down from 
the mountains to lands on the plains, far from home, that 
there might be no hope of return, thinking that there would 
be no end to the Ligurian war until this was done. […] they 
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issued an edict that the Ligurian Apuani should come down 
from the mountains.706 
One could compare M. Aemilius Lepidus’ transference from the hills to the 
local plains in 157 BCE of those Ligurian Freniates and Apuani who had 
previously used the refuge of the mountains in bad faith to evade having to 
comply with their submission to Roman fides.707 A similar motivation could 
probably be inferred from the creation of Picentia. While parts of the ager 
Picentinus—especially those on its northern headland, upon which 
Surrentum and Salernum lay—were undoubtedly hillier than parts of their 
home country, the site of Picentia itself was along the gentle coastal plain. 
Other than the port city of Ancona, all the major native Picene towns were on 
sites of substantial elevation, and their peoples highlanders. 
The relocation was practically from a highland to lowland elevation, but 
also matched Roman cognitive understanding of the geography of Italy and 
the types of peoples that it produced. Livy remarked that the Ligurians were 
an enemy ‘born […] to keep alive the military discipline of the Romans’, 
through the union of the challenges posed by the terrain, its people, and their 
fortified settlements, in contrast to the enervating effects of fighting in Asia 
because of the ‘delightfulness of its cities’ (amoenitate urbium) and its 
‘effeminate enemies’ (mollitia hostium).708 Mountain peoples could be of 
differing ethnicities but possessed the same ways of life.709 In Roman 
thought, highlands and lowlands bred peoples with different kinds of 
characters, as expressed by Strabo, who distinguishes hardy and warlike 
mountain-dwellers from more urbane, passive lowlanders.710 However, these 
were not seen as fixed traits in these highland ethnicities, but could be 
corrected. As the habits of life in upland areas produced the unwanted 
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aggressive traits, the transference of these peoples, in mentalities of the 
Romans, may have represented a way to condition them to peace under 
Roman rule. 
Conclusions 
The forced relocation of these communities dramatically changed them. The 
translative interventions at Volsinii in 264 BCE, and at Falerii in 241 BCE 
reshaped the relationship of the Volsinian and Faliscan groups to their 
environments. The concentrative transfers to Picentia in 268 BCE and to 
Ligures Baebiani et Corneliani in 180 BCE not only did likewise but did so in 
much more dramatic fashion. The pre-existing dynamic equilibria of these 
peoples were shattered, and new equilibria created of permanent, 
asymmetrical friendship. Forced urban relocation was an effective tool of 
achieving this altered relationship between these groups and the world. The 
subsequent invisibility of these groups in the Roman historical record 
suggests that these initiatives were an effective way of eliminating the 
agency of foreign peoples within the interstate anarchy, and therefore the 
chance of recidivist warfare with them.711 Where they are referred to later, it 
was typically in pastoral and idyllic contexts, rather than as formidable polity 
actors on the interstate scene. This is despite archaeological and textual 
evidence of their continued cultic and economic significance, especially for 
the cities of Volsinii novi and Falerii novi. Only for Picentia, which seems to 
have been destroyed in the Social War, does one of the cases of forced 
relocation seem not to have been successful, although we lack details about 
Picentia’s part in the conflict. The others had no significant role in the tumults 
of the Social War or the Civil Wars. From the point of their refounding they 
                                            
711 J. R. Patterson 1986, 312 cites evidence of Bacchanalian rites at Volsinii and Falerii and 
their destruction and refounding as being ‘linked with anti-Roman feeling’. More likely is that 
they had mixed populations following the refounding, which may have facilitated adoption of 
the cult. In any case, Volsinii and Falerii, far from being centres of unrest, do not show up in 
the histories as being vexatious to Rome from this time onwards, although the tradition does 
link the practice to the ager Faliscus; Cp. Gruen 1990, 49: ‘the capture of numerous 
Tarentine prisoners in 208 and the social dislocations wrought by Hannibal in the southern 
part of the peninsula created large numbers of refugees who brought their Hellenic religious 
baggage into central Italy and into Rome itself’. 
 190 
are remarkably loyal to the Roman imperial enterprise. Given this 
effectiveness, it should be of little surprise then that the Romans might seek 
to use this extraordinary procedure on their great imperial opponent 
Carthage; nor should it be of surprise that the Carthaginians rejected the 
ultimatum that they forcibly relocate.  
Falerii and Volsinii possessed substantial continuities despite the 
cleavage between their original and reborn selves and the purposeful or 
incidental discontinuities that resulted. There were religious, cultural, 
architectural, and linguistic links between past and new. While they found 
themselves in new topographies, they were geographically near to the 
original sites, the extra-mural sanctuaries of which being able to continue to 
play an important role in creating and continuing the group identities. Thus, 
there seems to have been a concerted attempt on the part of the Romans to 
preserve the groups. On the other hand, the cities fashioned for the 
Ligurians and the Picentines fulfilled Roman ideas of them, and ignored and 
obliterated any nuance in local- or city-ethnics. By concentrating people who 
did not necessarily live in the same urban settlement, the Romans showed a 
lack of nuanced understanding of or care towards the dynamics and 
settlement patterns of the relocated tribes. Nonetheless, the Romans went to 
substantial efforts to preserve the groups, albeit in a form as seen through 
Roman eyes. Perhaps the long-standing familiarity, cultural similarities, and 
ethnic ties of the Romans with the Volsinians and the Faliscans better 
disposed them to relocate them with more sensitivity, as opposed to the 
Ligurian Apuani and the Picentines.712 This chapter has provided evidence 
that supports the conclusion that, although partially destructive, neither the 
translative nor the concentrative forced relocations were genocidal. Forced 
relocation must have been a traumatic experience for those who lived 
through it, as the Carthaginians anticipated. However, with both types of 
relocative processes the Romans showed a clear intention to not destroy the 
                                            
712 Gallic and Iberian dedicants were not always so lucky Burton 2011, 268; Cf. Scipio 
Africanus distinguishing between killing Italians and Iberians: Liv., 28.32.4. 
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groups in question by relocating them. This provides further evidence that 
the Romans were not pursuing racial or ethnic conflict.713 Indeed, relocating 
seems precisely to have been intended as an alternative to destruction. This 
was an alternative that could only be an option under the circumstances of 
the total submission of these groups to Rome, through the ritual of the 
deditio in fidem populi Romani. 
If not genocidal, the forced relocations were unequivocally urbicidal, 
destroying Othered urban spaces and substituting them for those influenced 
by Roman urban planning. The process of destruction and recreation 
established new, unambiguous hierarchies of control and power, location 
and form being guided ultimately by Roman considerations. The ability to 
first imagine the feat of relocation and then to implement it owes itself to 
Roman colonisation and the expanding infrastructure that abetted Roman 
imperialism. This process might be considered part of Romanisation. This is 
a much-contested term that has been criticised for its Romanocentricism and 
its assumptions of top-down Roman paradigm of colonisation. Indeed, many 
of these criticisms of Romanisation pertain to the relocated towns. The new 
urban spaces demonstrated a substantial heterogeneity of influences, 
including local and indigenous, Greek, and Roman.714 They need not have 
included the Capitolian cults of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva.715 They were 
unmistakeably not created as part of any centralised imperial strategy or 
programme, but were ad hoc solutions to individual scenarios.716 The 
magistracies and governance of the relocated places varied. There seems to 
have been no concerted effort at the ethnic cleansing of the areas. What is 
more, they were inhabited by non-Roman groups, who continued to live 
modes of life that were expressive of non-Roman identities.717 Nonetheless, 
these new urban places were influenced by Rome in a way that their 
precursors were not, and this new equilibrium modified the culture of these 
                                            
713 Cornell 1995, 313. 
714 Sewell 2010. 
715 Lackner 2013. 
716 Coles 2017; Hampl 1966, 120–21; Heinze 1960, 30; Barton 2007, 251. 
717 Bispham 2006; G. J. Bradley 2006. 
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groups. Later, the increasing co-option of municipalia sacra into the radical 
and revivalist nostalgia of the Augustan period and beyond would serve to 
revitalise regional cult centres such as the Fanum Voltumnae and temple to 
Juno Curitis. It would also place these elements within a matrix of 
Roman(ised) identity, creatively using the process of commemoration and 
memory.718 This would have been impossible had these groups been 
genocidally wiped out during their forced urban relocation. 
  
                                            
718 Cf. G. J. Bradley 2008, 310–17. 
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Figure 2. Campo della Fiera, Orvieto 
Aerial view of the site. C. Bizzarri, in Margarita Gleba, ‘Archaeology in Etruria 2003–2009’, Archaeological 
Reports, 2008-2009 (2008), 103–21, Figure 20. 
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Figure 3. Relief vestiges of the urban area of Roman Bolsena visible to date in 1970 
T.F. Buchiccio, in 1. Pierre Gros, Bolsena I. Scavi della scuola francese di Roma a Bolsena (Poggio Moscini). 
Guida agli scavi, trans. by Laura Mascoli, Melanges d’archeologie et d’histoire supplements, 6 (Rome: L’Ecole 
Française de Rome, 1981), I, Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. Falerii novi street plan 
Simplified plan of the walled area showing the distribution of basalt (selce) blocks recorded in the 
extensive survey. Selce is indicative of paved surfaces. Simon Keay and others, ‘Falerii novi: A New 
Survey of the Walled Area’, Papers of the British School at Rome, 2000, 1–93. Figure 48. 
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Figure 5. Terracotta acroterion with pediment fragments, Falerii veteres  
Early fifth century BCE, from temple of Sassi Caduti, Celle, Falerii (Civita Castellana). Museo Nazionale Etrusco 
di Villa Giulia Room 30. 20/09/2013. 
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Figure 6. Sanctuary of Juno at Falerii veteres 
The sanctuary of Juno Curitis at Celle, Falerii veteres (Civita Castellana). Simon Keay and others, 
‘Falerii novi: A New Survey of the Walled Area’, Papers of the British School at Rome, 2000, 153, 
Figure 31.  
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Figure 7. Sanctuaries at Falerii veteres 
Letizia Ceccarelli and Simon Stoddart, ‘The Faliscans’, p. 143 Figure 25. 
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Chapter Six 
— 
Submission to Rome 
Introduction  
In discussing the typologies of Roman genocide, the issue of submission has 
been pervasive. Submission, performed through the deditio in fidem populi 
Romani, constrained the excesses of Middle Republican interstate violence. 
However, asymmetries of power meant that submitting to Rome was not a 
true safeguard, in some cases precipitating the submitting group’s 
destruction. Its precepts were moral and quasi-legal, operating in an 
interstate anarchy subject to no external, policed international law. 719  
Mechanisms that allow submission, and therefore de-escalation, are 
important to a study of genocide, as they provided a diplomatic route by 
which groups could seek to avoid destruction and violence when confronted 
by Rome. In his study of the relationship between ethnic cleansing and 
democracy, the sociologist Michael Mann posited that the ‘brink of 
murderous cleansing’ was reached either when the weaker party ‘is 
bolstered to fight rather than to submit (for submission reduces the 
deadliness of the conflict)’ or when the stronger party has ‘such 
overwhelming military power and ideological legitimacy that it can force 
through its own cleansed state at little physical or moral risk to itself’.720 The 
practice of receiving deditiones in fidem populi Romani was the ritual by 
which the Romans enabled other communities to submit, and therefore 
reduce the deadliness of the conflict. It provided an internationally 
recognisable protocol to seek to avoid destruction. It also placed the 
potential victim group within a moral category of patronage and protection, 
                                            
719 Eckstein 2006, 79–80. 
720 Mann 2005, 6–7; first in the working paper, Mann 1999, 16. 
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introducing a heightened moral hazard to Roman state actors in the 
eventuality that they destroyed them anyway. Without the normativity of 
moral risk, submission would have been avoided, deadliness of conflicts 
generally higher, and genocide more prevalent. 
The fides to which these groups submitted was, however, an 
ambiguous cultural institution. It will be shown that, while usually forestalling 
and preventing destruction, it provided a wide ideological mandate for the 
utter destruction of dedicants. Furthermore, processual defects in the 
protocol of deditio at times escalated the potential for genocidal violence, 
despite the intentions of the victims in seeking to yield. In this chapter, I 
outline how deditio prevented genocide, how its failure could escalate 
violence, and, subsequently, how parties used fides as a framework for 
restitution. 
Deditio in fidem populi romani 
Despite the importance of the deditio in fidem populi Romani to 
comprehending Republican imperialism, there have been few works 
exploring it in depth. Little has been written on this subject in English, except 
in passing or beyond a few journal articles of a narrower nature, which 
predominantly take an International Relations approach.721 There have been 
some attempts to treat the subject more fully from continental European 
schools with traditional philological approaches.722 Burton’s Friendship and 
Empire, a processual study of Middle Republican interstate amicitia, is not 
about fides but is relevant to it throughout.723 Perhaps, the paucity of 
                                            
721 Eckstein 2009; Burton 2009; Eckstein 1995; Gruen 1982. 
722 Freyburger 1986; Piganiol 1950; Boyancé 1972a; Boyancé 1972b; Flurl 1969; Nörr 1991; 
Nörr 1989; Ziegler 1991; Bellini 1964; Hölkeskamp 2000; and most recently Sanz 2015; 
Piganiol 1950, 345–46 gives a summary of some of the formative historiography; Morgan 
2015, 5 ff. provides useful bibliographic discussion; as does the review of Nörr’s works by 
Eckstein 1994; Valsan 2017 for incorporation of religious and social fides into Roman law in 
substantiative and arbitrary forms. 
723 Burton 2011. 
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academic treatments lies behind the frequent mistranslation of fides into 
English. In interstate contexts, it does not translate well to the English ‘faith’ 
or ‘good faith’ by which it is often rendered. The Oxford Latin Dictionary 
glosses it as ‘the condition of having trust placed in one’, and to submit to it 
was to place one’s community into the Roman protectorate and their 
suzerainty.724 The substitution of postestas (power) or dicitio (jurisdiction) for 
fides in some deditio formulas formerly led some to suppose that they 
represented different codified, legal practices, by which the dedicants were 
treated with more severity or clemency, but this is no longer the case.725 
Entering into Roman fides was, at least by the second century BCE, also to 
submit to broad Roman authority and the expectation that Roman will was to 
be obeyed.726  
Total submission 
The formula of the deditio typically included a list that emphasised the totality 
of what was being surrendered to the Romans. It included the land, the 
people, the temples and religious precincts, buildings, portable goods, rivers, 
and geographic features. The effect was not lost on ancient commentators; 
the Greek historian Polybius aimed to make the implications of deditio to 
Roman fides unambiguous: 
Those who thus commit themselves to Roman authority 
surrender in the first place the whole of their territory and the 
cities in it, next all the inhabitants of the land and the towns, 
male and female, likewise all rivers, harbours, temples, 
tombs, so that the result is that the Romans enter into 
possession of everything and those who surrender remain in 
possession of absolutely nothing.727 
                                            
724 Oxford Latin Dictionary 1982, s.v. fides, 1; cp. Lewis and Short 1879, s.v. fides. 
725 Dahlheim 1968, 31–33 aptly deconstructs the apparent dichotomy between types of 
deditio. 
726 Astin [1989] 2003, 8:300–301, 310. 
727 Polyb., 36.4.2-3, trans. Paton: οἱ γὰρ διδόντες αὑτοὺς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιτροπὴν 
διδόασι πρῶτον μὲν χώραν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτοῖςκαὶ πόλεις τὰς ἐν ταύτῃ, σὺν δὲ τούτοις 
ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας τοὺςὑπάρχοντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἅπαντας, ὁμοίως 
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Here Polybius uses the terminology of ἐπιτροπὴν, indicating the authority to 
decide matters, but the context and parallels show that he was describing 
what was in Latin called fides and in Greek usually πίστις.728 The intended 
meaning is clear: Polybius wanted his audience, presumably Greek, to know 
that the deditio in fidem populi Romani was totalising and permanently 
transferred the primacy of authority to the Romans. His gloss quoted above 
formed part of his account of the annihilation of Carthage, as well as 
obliquely commenting on Roman power in the context of the loss of Corinth, 
both of which were bound up in the failure of interstate fides. 
The totalising nature of deditio given by Polybius can be compared with 
a Livian gloss, which is in substance consistent with that previously given: 
The old custom of the Romans in establishing peaceful 
relations with a people neither on the basis of a treaty nor on 
equal terms had been this: not to exert its authority over that 
people, as now pacified, until it had surrendered everything 
divine and human, until hostages had been received, arms 
taken away and garrisons posted in its cities.729  
Note that Livy here overemphasises the garrisoning of dedicant cities and 
the confiscation of their arms to establish a rhetorical counterpoint to P. 
Scipio Africanus’ 206 BCE acceptance of the deditio of the Spanish rebel 
Mandonius, which immediately follows.730 In fact, Scipio’s treatment of the 
Iberian Ilergetes, in which he mulcted payment for his troops but otherwise 
made a great show of his performance of clementia by restoring their 
freedom without further confiscations or garrisoning, is in fact more in line 
with the use of deditio by that time than Livy suggests.  
                                            
ποταμούς, λιμένας, ἱερά, τάφους, συλλήβδην ὥστε πάντων εἶναι κυρίους Ῥωμαίους, αὐτοὺς 
δὲ τοὺς διδόντας ἁπλῶς μηκέτι μηδενός. 
728 See Gruen 1982 on the equivalency of πίστισ and fides. 
729 Liv., 28.34.7, trans. Moore: mos vetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere necaequis 
legibus iungeretur amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia 
divina humanaque dedidisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia urbibus imposita 
forent. 
730 Cf. Polyb.,21.11.7; App., Hisp., 37; Diod. Sic., 26.22.1; Eutr., 3.17.1; Zonar., 9.10. 
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Such was the potency of the formula to indicate omnifariousness, it 
outlasted the practice of the deditio itself: when the ninth-century CE 
Patriarch of Constantinople, Photius, wanted to comment on the 
completeness of the contents of Apollodorus’ Biblioteca, he did so in terms 
reminiscent of the ancient formula, remarking that it contained ‘all that time 
has given them to believe […] about the rivers, and lands, and peoples, and 
towns, and thence everything that goes back to the earliest times’.731 For 
Photius, as for his Republican forebears, these constituent parts 
synecdochally stood for the whole. However, we need not go that far forward 
to find the same sentiment. Plautus in the mid-190s BCE gave similar words 
to the Thebans in Amphitruo, acting as dramatic surrogates for the Romans, 
when they were made to receive the Teleboans with the terms of the deditio: 
The next day their leaders came from the city to our camp, 
crying, and with covered hands they asked us to forgive 
them their transgression. They all surrendered themselves, 
all their sacred and profane possessions, their city and their 
children, into the power and sway of the Theban people.732 
These formulas are echoed by Livy’s first, albeit historically dubious, 
interstate deditio in fidem in his history: representatives of the city of Collatia 
surrendered ‘[them]selves and the people of Collatia, city, lands, water, 
boundary markers, shrines, utensils, all appurtenances, divine and human’ to 
Tarquinius Priscus.733  
Each element was metonymic for the greater, civic existence of the 
community, which was thus reduced to its constituent parts. Having given up 
the physical, geographical, religious, and corporeal constituents by which the 
imagined community was embodied and performed, it symbolically ceased to 
exist and was thus destroyed through an act of auto-erasure. The laws and 
                                            
731 Trans in Hard [1997] 2008, viii. 
732 Plaut., Amph., 254-7: postridie in castra ex urbe ad nos ueniunt flentes principes: | uelatis 
manibus orant ignoscamus peccatum suom, | deduntque se, diuina humanaque omnia, 
urbem et liberos | in dicionem atque in arbitratum cuncti Thebano poplo; cf. 225-56: 
conuenit, uicti utri sint eo proelio, | urbem, agrum, aras, focos seque uti dederent. 
733 Liv., 1.38.3-4, trans. Champion: 'deditisne vos populumque Collatinum, urbem, agros, 
aquam, terminos, delubra, utensilia, divina humanaque omnia in meam populique Romani 
dicionem?'. 
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constitution of the community were simultaneously destroyed with the act of 
deditio. As the totality of the existence of the former community was placed 
in the power of the Roman commander receiving the deditio, there was 
therefore a broad scope for him, or those making decisions after him, to do 
what he wanted to them. This could hypothetically have included 
enslavement, urban destruction, expulsion, and mass killing. However, these 
genocidal outcomes were, by and large, averted in favour of constructive 
continuity.  
Suppliant agency 
Submission to Rome was founded on its voluntary nature, in which the 
dediticii themselves were the agents. Although overtures could be made, the 
Romans did not typically demand the surrender of those who were about to 
be besieged, as would be done in Medieval contexts, and the submission 
had to be made of their own agency.734 The language by which the deditio is 
described—accipere, redigere, se permittere, se recipere, se dedere, 
deditos, deditione, dare–is terminologically equivocal, but reflect the 
suppliant agency of the dedicant.735 The words, gestures, and clothing of the 
dedicant and dedicand situated their performance of the deditio within the 
ritual paradigms of oaths, contracts, and the religious observance of the 
goddess Fides.736 As in other forms of supplication,737 the offer, on the part 
of legitimate representatives of the community, was subject to arbitration by 
the representative of Rome, who had the power to accept or reject it. 
The suppliant agency of deditio made the resulting fides into a powerful 
fiction. As Livy had M. Furius Camillus say, 'that imperium is by far the 
strongest to which its subjects are gladly obedient’.738 The Romans 
understood well that those who symbolically offered up themselves rather 
                                            
734 Gilliver [2001] 2005, 154–56. 
735 Dahlheim 1968, 25 esp. n.2. 
736 Liv., 1.1.8, 36.20. Cp. Tib., 1.10.67 in which white robes and spica adorn the figure of 
Pax. For an example of hands covered in white cloths during deditio, see Plaut., Amph., 
254-7. Naiden 2006, 82–84; Naiden 2003; Hölkeskamp 2000. 
737 Naiden 2006, 4. 
738 Liv., 8.13.16: id firmissimum longe imperium est quo oboedientes gaudent. 
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than being taken by naked force (vis) were more likely to display long-term 
and meaningful loyalty rather than to foster seditious resentment. Likewise, 
Sallust opined that:  
The Roman people from the beginning of their rule have 
preferred to seek friends rather than slaves; they have 
thought it safer to govern the willing than those forced to 
obey.739  
Polybius describes a similar general principle when he contrasts the hatred-
engendering rule through fear of a tyrant in opposition to that of a king, who 
should rule beneficently over willing subjects.740 Imperialism for the Middle 
Republic was a matter of the hegemonic maintenance of a network of socii 
et amici; former enemies could be put to better uses by being made friends 
than being destroyed, and were to become crucial as Rome came into 
increasingly larger conflicts, enabling her to weather out the Pyrrhic and 
Hannibalic invasions of Italy and the First Punic War in no small part due to 
the strength of its interstate hegemony.741 
The extent to which the Romans were invested in the success of the 
mechanism of submission can be seen in their willingness to be amenable to 
negotiation in the settlement of the deditio. It was trust-building process that 
aimed to induce permanent reciprocal relationships, and thus avoid 
genocidal violence. When the Aetolians retracted their deditio to M. Acilius 
Glabrio in 191 BCE, not having understood the unconditionality of their 
surrender, they were allowed an armistice to seek out consensus among 
their communities, and were even offered a foedus iniquum instead of the 
                                            
739 Sall., Iug., 102.6, trans. Rolfe: populo Romano iam a principio imperi melius visum 
amicos quam servos quaerere, tutiusque rati volentibus quam coactis imperitare. See also, 
Sal., Cat., 9.5 ; Liv., 8.1.7. 
740 Polyb., 5.11.6: τυράννου μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς ποιοῦντα τῷ φόβῳ δεσπόζειν 
ἀκουσίων, μισούμενον καὶ μισοῦντα τοὺς ὑποταττομένους· βασιλέως δὲ τὸ πάντας εὖ 
ποιοῦντα, διὰ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν ἀγαπώμενον, ἑκόντων ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ 
προστατεῖν. See also, Polyb. 10.35.5-7; Ter., Ad., 57-8; Sen., Clem., 1.8.6-7; Plin., Ep., 
8.24.6. 
741 Plut., Pyrrh., 21.10 is telling on recognising the ability of Rome to defeat Pyrrhus through 
attrition. 
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deditio.742 The only contemporary epigraphic evidence mentioning a deditio 
from this period confirms the consensus seeking: the imperator Caesio 
thought it apt to ask the council of a Lusitanian settlement surrendering to 
him ‘what they should consider reasonable for him to demand from them’.743 
His demands of them were for what that they themselves had recommended 
that he demand, articulating the locus of authority on the one hand while 
ensuring the assent of the subjugated people on the other. The 
memorialisation of this act led to this being set up on a tablet in situ. The role 
of the Pontifex C. Papirius Maso in helping to author the 241 BCE deditio of 
the Faliscans also demonstrates this process of negotiation and consensus 
seeking.744 In most cases the legal constitutions of the dedicant community 
were reinstated, on the condition of the supremacy of Rome, perhaps minus 
a mulcting of land.745  
As well as serving the need for consensus with the suppliants 
themselves, the acceptance of the submission by the imperium-holder was 
conditional to acceptance and ratification by the Senate and People of 
Rome. Both the inscription above found at Alcántara, which directly attests a 
deditio, and the one found at Hasta Regia, which is best interpreted as 
recording a deditio, include conditional clauses at the end that made the 
submission valid ‘so long as the People and Senate of Rome wish’.746 A 
negative reaction in the Assembly back in Rome could be disastrous for the 
dedicants, the Faliscans for example nearly being extirpated, we are told, 
were it not for the intervention of Papirius on their behalf, as well as on 
                                            
742 Polyb., 20.9-10, 21.2; Diod. Sic., 29.4; Liv., 36.27.4-29.3, 37.1.1-7. 
743 HEpOL, 22832.: L(ucius) Caesius C(ai) f(ilius) imperator postquam [eos in deditionem] | 
accepit ad consilium retolit (sic) quid eis im[perandum] | censerent de consili sententia 
imperav[it ut omnes] | captivos equos equas quas cepis(s)ent. Cp. HEpOL, 1755.  
744 Val. Max., 6.5.1. Broughton 1951, 220. 
745 Cp. the issuing of town charters, Riccobono 1941 1.16, CIL 12.590; On mulcting, see 
Roselaar 2013, 31–63 for a wealth of examples. 
746 Alcántara: HEpOL 22832.: dum populus [senatusque] | Roomanus vellet; J. Richardson 
1986, 199–201; Melero, Abal, and García Jiménez 1984, 265–83; Hoyos 1989; Hasta 
Regia: HEpOL, 1755 = CIL, II 5041.: dum poplus senatusque | Romanus vellet; Curchin 
1991, 32; Riaza 2006, 177–78. 
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behalf of the deditio he himself helped to write.747 These Romans had a 
stake in the success of the submission. The annulment of these agreements 
was politically damaging. The successor to Q. Pompeius rejected the terms 
on which the former had accepted the Numantines into Roman fides and so 
referred the matter to the Senate, who rejected it and renewed the war 
against them, albeit ineffectually.748 The Senate would deal more forcibly 
with C. Hostilius Mancinus and M. Claudius Clineas for making treaties in 
Spain in 137 BCE and Corsica in 237 BCE respectively, considering them to 
have overstepped their authority in giving overly lenient terms. Both were 
handed over to their erstwhile opponents when the Roman Senate renewed 
hostilities, thereby cancelling the contract of submission with an act of 
propitiation.749 It was as in the interests of Roman commanders as in that of 
the dedicant community to generate an acceptable solution, and in most 
cases this would have been achieved. 
Interstate and sociocultural normativities 
There was no external source of international law in the Mediterranean 
anarchy through which Rome was ascending. That is not to say, however, 
that there were no understandings between nations that formed customary 
frameworks analogous to modern international law. The ius gentium, which 
was the ‘law observed by all nations’, somewhat corresponded to 
international law today.750 The practice of deditio in fidem populi Romani is 
considered to have been part of this international law. 751 The deditio in fidem 
was formally and practically different to the other peaceable forms of Roman 
                                            
747 Val. Max., 6.5.1. 
748 App., Hisp., 79; Cic., Fin., 2.54; Cic., Off., 3.109; Vell. Pat., , 2.1.5; Val. Max., 8.5.1. 
749 Mancinus: Plut., Ti. Gracch., 5.1-6; Liv., Per., 55; Vell. Pat., , 2.1.4, 90.3; Flor., 1.34.4-7; 
App., Hisp., 80; Gel., 6.9.12; [Aur. Vict.], De vir. ill., 59.1-4; Oros., Hist., 5.4.20, 5.1.11; 
August., De civ. D., 3.21; Obsequens, , 24; Claudius: Cass. Dio, 22 fr. 45; Zonar., 8.18; Val. 
Max., 6.3.3; Amm. Marc., 14.11.32; Briscoe 1974, 125–27; Curchin 1991, 34–36.. Cp. the 
early Republican example of the Roman consuls whose treaty with the Samnites was 
annulled and they themselves handed over to the Samnites after having been led under the 
yoke at the Caudine Forks ( Liv., 9.3.4-13). 
750 Gai., Inst., 1.1. 
751 Eckstein 2009; Burton 2009; Dahlheim 1968. 
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interstate relationships, truces (indutiae) and treaties (foedera).752 Both the 
indutia and the foedus were conditional and did not involve the supplicatory, 
totalising surrender of the corporate existence of the community. At times of 
existential threat from Roman forces presenting overwhelming military 
power, neither indutia nor foedera were acceptable to the Romans compared 
to unconditional surrender.  
The deditio in fidem populi Romani arose in a context of Italic cults that, 
although diverse, would have ensured the mutual intelligibility of the form of 
surrender.753 There was a broadly understood set of ritual, Italic behaviours, 
such as the use of fetials to initiate war and the practice of sending 
vanquished foes under the yoke. The divine personification of the goddess 
Fides had likely spread and localised by about 300 BCE, and continued to do 
so in the third and second centuries BCE.754 The effectiveness of fides as an 
international custom can be seen in the reticence of most of the socii italici to 
renege on their relationship with Rome when Hannibal entreated them to join 
him.755 As the Romans’ hegemony grew, they increasingly came into contact 
with states outside the international customs of the Italians, leading in some 
cases, as with the Aetolians above and other cases dealt with below, to 
problems with understanding the rite. Polybius for this reason sought to 
explain to his Greek-reading audience what deditio to the Romans 
entailed.756 It must, however, have been broadly intelligible to a large 
number of actors within the customs of international law. Indeed, it was 
sometimes enthusiastically sought out, in the way smaller states often flock 
to larger poles in an interstate anarchy for protection.757 In many cases, 
                                            
752 Of the two forms of foedus, the unequal or foedus iniquum was closer to the submission 
of the deditio in fidem, in that it required the recognition of Roman maiestas, than the equal 
foedus or foedus aequum. However, it was still substantially different to the complete 
submission of the deditio in fidem. Cp. Dig., 49.15.7.1. States could also submit via sponsio, 
as Oriculum did in 308 BCE ( Liv., 9.41.20), but this was rare. 
753 de Cazanove 2011. 
754 Miano 2015. 
755 Polyb., 3.90. 
756 Champion 2004. 
757 E.g. Polyb., 2.11.5-6, where the Corcyreans volunteered a deditio unprompted, to afford 
them protection against future Illyrian attacks. Cp. the so-called second Romano-
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however, it was a matter of last resort, to be used when the Romans 
possessed overwhelming military advantage over a vanquished, or about to 
be vanquished, foreign community. At times, the Romans could be 
demanding, as in 308 BCE when Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus rejected 
overtures from Nuceria Alfaterna, leaving them with the binary options of a 
siege or deditio. They chose the latter.758 
In situations where Romans did possess overwhelming military 
advantage over a dedicant community, there was no external international 
authority that could compel the clemency and good faith of the Roman 
commander. The good functioning of fides, and of the de-escalatory 
submission to it, relied on the adherence of such commanders to 
international and Roman mores. Due to the totality of their surrender and the 
discretion over their fate placed offered by the dedicants, dedicands could in 
theory do as they wished with them. This could have been interpreted as 
giving free reign to sack, murder, and pillage, just as if the community had 
been taken by storm. However, most did comply with the internal and 
external expectation that they could demonstrate their clementia, and 
sensible commanders would use these capitulations to their own political 
self-interest, as well as the interest of the Roman state.759 Even when 
Roman soldiers could not be restrained from the disorderly sacking and 
looting of a city, their general could make good their duties to their dedicants 
as best as they could by protecting the lives of the inhabitants.760 
This relationship of trust was generated not by any external legal 
agency, but constituted a form of habitus. Sociologist and philosopher Pierre 
Bourdieu, in characteristically periphrastic style, defined habitus as: 
The structures constitutive of a particular type of 
environment […] produce habitus, systems of durable, 
                                            
Carthaginian treaty of 348 BCE ( Polyb., 3.24.3), which implied the de facto protection of 
those Latin states that had formally submitted to Rome. 
758 Liv., 9.41.2-5; Diod. Sic., 20.44.8; Suet., Vit., 1.3. 
759 Cp. early modern customs of the treatment of those who surrendered, Childs 2012, 155–
57. 
760 As Regillus did at Phocaea: Liv., 37.32.12-14. He subsequently made good the city, 
fields, and laws, i.e. the elements surrendered by the deditio. 
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transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed 
to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of 
the generation and structuring of practices and 
representations which can be objectively ‘regulated’ and 
‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience 
to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express 
mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, 
being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.761 
Otherwise expressed, habitus is the process by which members of any 
society are socioculturally constituted as beings within society, autonomous 
within but indivisible from their cultural existence.762 It was habitus that 
ensured that the behaviour of Roman generals was consistent with the fides 
expected of them. Therefore, the behaviour of elite Romans towards other 
communities surrendering to them was governed by the expectations of 
Roman patrician culture, which is to say by the mos maiorum. In this way, 
fides functioned as a tool of international relations to forestall genocide 
principally through intra-social morality. Simply put, destroying a people who 
had placed themselves into their fides constituted taboo and unbecoming 
behaviour.  
By accepting a community into fides, they assumed certain customary 
obligations towards them. This parallels the creation of intra-societal 
contracts, of the sort that individuals could possess between each other.763 
Of course, what one might deem friendship another might call clientage as, 
even though the relationship was guaranteed by cultural custom, it did not 
imply equality of the contracting parties.764 The assumed patronage role was 
also paralleled in the creation or extension of fora and other civic centres 
along the burgeoning Roman road network, sponsored by elite Romans and 
                                            
761 Bourdieu 1977, 72. 
762 Webb, Schirato, and Danaher 2002, 36–37; Kögler 2013. 
763 Fiori 2012. 
764 Badian 1958 is most influential here, though note the criticisms of Burton 2003; and 
Burton 2011, 3–6; Hölkeskamp 2010, 33–34. 
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henceforth connected to their families.765 The patronage that resulted from 
the deditio was guaranteed by the moral and religious ‘superstructure’ of 
fides rather than any clear legal definition,766 and enmeshed the fortunes of 
these Romans as much as it might do their suppliants. This sort of guarantee 
through sociocultural expectation is inherently fallible, and its successful 
functioning as an effective preventive regime was dependent on the moral 
constitution of individuals wielding massive amounts of power through their 
imperium. The mutability of society and the variability of humans meant that 
interpretation and implementation of broader cultural mores would not be 
consistent. Thus, the weak, moral-based regime of fides could not function 
as a true guarantor against the destruction of communities. 
Failing to prevent genocide 
The sociocultural and normative functions of fides, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
were insufficient to ensure wholly that those states who had nominally 
entered Roman protection were indeed safeguarded from the predations of 
their supposed protectors. The wide mandate and totalising nature of this 
mode of submission may have contributed towards instances of genocidal 
behaviours. Some of the failures of fides demonstrably lay in its inability as a 
moral mechanism to adequately police the behaviour of Romans and to 
restrain excessive uses of violence enabled by their position of power and 
the imperium that came with it. In such cases, the habitus that generally 
restrained genocidal behaviours was insufficient, and submission to Rome 
could enable the unleashing of destructive violence against these subjugated 
communities. The paradox of the deditio in fidem populi Romani contained 
within it the force of preservation but also that of destruction. 
Furthermore, instances of the flouting of maxims surrounding the 
attendant expectations of fides, particularly in those that obliged Roman 
                                            
765 Laurence 1999. 
766 Badian 1958, 11. 
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state actors to protect and recognise those under it, may represent 
generational shifts in the modes of production of the habitus.767 What was 
thought to be possible, impossible, or probable shifted as the Roman state 
ascended to its remarkable hegemony over the Mediterranean interstate 
system during the timespan of the Middle Republic. It might have risked 
becoming a true ‘unlimited revisionist state’, one that saw its emerging role 
as a unipolar superpower in the 180-60s BCE as an expression of, or prompt 
for, the desire for a complete overthrow of the interstate system and the 
establishment of a new, globalising order.768 Actors within such states are 
more likely to have the desire and capacity to wield their power and impunity 
to effect revisionist aims, and it is this revisionism that led to attempts in the 
twentieth century to produce mono-ethnic territorial states through genocide. 
While it is doubtful whether Roman state behaviour was yet influenced by 
pretentions towards universalist power,769 some Roman state agents 
evidently privileged the benefits of destroying communities over the 
sociocultural norms of fides in this period of rapid expansion. These benefits 
were measured in terms of economic boons from sacking cities, satisfying 
the soldiers by giving them chance to likewise benefit from looting, and in 
opportunity for military glory. There may have been increased peer 
competition among the elite to access these benefits, and a willingness to 
engineer the opportunities to do so should they not present themselves. The 
expansion of Roman authority itself resulted in the flocking of many small 
communities to the suzerainty of the newly unipolar Rome, leaving in turn 
fewer legitimate targets within any allotted provincia from which economic 
and status benefits could be extracted through conquest. This may have 
increased the competition for benefits and the temptation to flout the 
sociocultural habitus of fides. The result was an apparent generational shift, 
testing the assumptions of Roman obligation to those states within the orbit 
of Roman fides. This shift can be detected in the moral backlash by other 
                                            
767 Bourdieu 1977, 77–78. 
768 Eckstein 2006, 26; on the aims of revisionist states in International Relations Realist 
theory, see Schweller 1994. 
769 Although ideas about Rome’s mastery were current to Polybius, see Walbank 1964; 
universalist ideas grew again in the Augustan age with the concept of Rome as the urbs 
aeterna, for sources see Moore 1894. 
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members of the elite against those who flouted international and 
sociocultural norms of protection.  
The short period of the 180-60s BCE, and the late 170s BCE in particular, 
saw a shift towards behaviours that resulted in the egregious destruction of 
communities contrary to the norms of fides in a manner that suggests this 
sort of generational change in doxa. Consuls M. Popilius Laenas and Gaius 
Cassius were both embroiled in scandals for attacking communities to the 
north of Italy: Laenas for an assault against the otherwise unattested 
Statiellate Ligurian settlement of Carystus;770 and Gaius Cassius for attacks 
against Alpine Gallic tribes, the Carnians, the Histrians and the Iapydes.771 
Both events are known about in consequence of complaints made to the 
Senate. The assault of Laenas is presented by Livy as a typical battle 
narrative: the gathering of a grand Statiellate army at Carystus; preparations 
for battle; the engagement of the forces, the ebb and flow of combat and the 
turning of the Ligurians by a Roman cavalry charge; and finally, the numbers 
killed or captured and the standards taken. The enumeration seems prima 
facie to be high, at 10,000 slain and 700 captured on the Ligurian side, which 
may indicate an inflated figure presented by the consul in dispatches to the 
Senate to support his demand for a triumph. Likewise, Gaius Cassius was 
accused of visiting destruction on communities of Alpine Gauls, the Carnians 
and the Histrians, subjecting ‘many thousands’ of them to reduction into 
slavery and carrying out ‘general slaughter, pillage and burning’.772 In both 
cases, approbation was attached in the first place to the fact that the victims 
were not legitimate targets, which is to say that the destructions resulted 
from the waging of unjust wars. While Laenas attacked a community that 
                                            
770 Liv., 42.6.3-9, 10.9-15. Ligurian Carystus is not to be confused with its more notable, and 
abundantly attested, namesakes in Euboea or Arcadia. Ligurian Carystus likely did not 
survive Popilius Laenas’ assault, and hence is now obscure and known only from this 
section of Livy. 
771 Liv., 43.2.1-4, 43.5. 
772 Liv., 43.5.2: Alpinorum populorum agros, sociorum suorum, depopulatum C. 
Cassium esse et inde multa milia hominum in servitutem abripuisse; Liv., 43.5.4: caedes 
passim rapinasque et incendia facta. 
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was on good terms with them and ‘who alone of the Ligurians had not made 
war on the Romans, who even on this occasion had been attacked although 
they had not begun a war’, Gaius Cassius had attacked communities that 
were not only friendly to Rome but had recently rendered assistance to his 
own army on the outward leg of his campaign.773  
The unjustness of their campaigns was in both cases aggravated. 
Laenas maltreated the Statiellates when he accepted their (possibly 
renewed) deditio, using the wide mandate that it permitted him to compel 
their total destruction through enslavement and the destruction of their 
city.774 While this produced an immediate benefit in the form of booty and 
slaves, it incensed the opinion of Laenas’ peers in the Senate as an unfair 
and unjust treatment of his suppliants, especially when they had given no 
cause to warrant such a harsh implementation of the deditio. At least as 
preserved in Livy, whose level of detail suggests access to earlier material 
and possibly to speeches, there was an explicit link between the Senate’s 
reaction and the breaching of the obligatory expectations of protection that 
the submission should have entailed. The opprobrium levelled against Gaius 
Cassius, on the other hand, was amplified by his disregard of his allotted 
provincia, his campaign being wrought on the return leg of an abortive 
attempt to forge an overland route to Macedonia, for which the victims had 
innocently provided guides when he first passed through. This campaign 
was therefore outside the remit of his provincia, and not authorised by the 
Senate. No doubt first hearing about his foray from foreign delegations did 
not make the Senate well-disposed to Gaius Cassius. In both cases, the 
legitimate holder of imperium, consuls no less, were considered by their 
peers to have acted outside the international and sociocultural norms obliged 
by fides. In both cases, too, the actors were themselves unrepentant, and 
the Senate moved to reassert their authority and to reply positively to the 
complaints put before them. We will return to the issue of the punishment of 
                                            
773 Liv., 42.7.5, trans. Sage and Schlesinger: qui uni ex Ligurum gente non tulissent arma 
adversus Romanos, tum quoque oppugnatos, non ultro inferentes bellum. 
774 Expressed metonymically as the surrendering of arms, of property, of the razing of the 
city, and the enslavement of the populous. 
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Laenas and Gaius Cassius and restitution for their victims later in this 
chapter.  
 The end of the 170s BCE provides us with several cases of attempts to 
punish and offer restitution for the genocidal flouting of the norms of fides: 
These claims were not brought in a vacuum, but among an apparent flurry of 
diplomatic activity in Rome because of her increasing prominence on the 
international scene. Licinius Crassus was accused of razing the few Greek 
cities, most notably the Boeotian city of Coronea, that he managed to 
capture in his 171 BCE campaign against Perseus, selling the captives.775 
The incensed reaction (‘ἠγανάκτησαν’ in Zonaras) back in Rome, the 
liberation of the captured cities, and the repurchase of the enslaved, or at 
least those that could be located in Italy, from their buyers has all the 
hallmarks of a senatorial reaction to a breach in fideal obligations towards 
dedicant communities. The objections of the Senate make most sense if we 
infer that Zonaras’ use of ‘ἐχειρώσατο’ refers to subduing by acceptance into 
Roman fides, unless the author considered the act of attacking them in the 
first place rather than seeking to establish a more amicable solution to have 
been itself taboo. As at other loci of violence, this betrayal seems to have 
come at a low point in military operations, the war against Perseus then 
going badly, and most of the Greek towns having repulsed Crassus’ 
assaults. It shows that the habitual obligations of fides were more likely to 
have been flouted under times of stress to achieve glory, military objectives, 
or acquire booty.  
The generals C. Lucretius Gallus and L. Hortensius were associated 
with one another in reports that survive, accusing them of crimes against the 
states of Greece, with Hortensius continuing in 171 BCE in the style that 
Lucretius had established the year previously in their successive predations 
of Chalcis, the principal city of Euboea. Livy explicitly contrasts their 
behaviours to the co-temporal leniency of the praetor of Spain towards 
                                            
775 Liv., 43.4.5; Liv., Per., 43; Zonar., 9.22. 
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seditious towns.776 It would have been safer, the Chalcideans claimed, for 
them to have not allowed the Romans into their city, as those who had 
refused to do so had escaped unharmed. The Chalcideans are implied to 
have considered themselves to be in a state of perpetual sack, despite 
undergoing the trust-building measures of the deditio in fidem populi 
Romani. While stopping short of complete group destruction, the crimes 
committed in breach of the mores of fides were comprised of the familiar 
elements: plundering, temple despoliation, and enslavement. More explicitly 
genocidal were the accusations of the envoys from Abdera: 
Who wept before the senate-house and complained that 
their city had been stormed and plundered by Hortensius; 
the reason for the destruction of the city had been, they said, 
that when the praetor had ordered a hundred 
thousand denarii and fifty thousand pecks of wheat, they 
had asked for a stay, during which they might send envoys 
about the matter to the consul Hostilius and to Rome. Hardly 
had they come to the consul when they heard that their town 
had been stormed, their leading men beheaded with the 
axe, and the rest sold at auction.777 
The beheading of the principals and the enslavement of all the other 
inhabitants fits the genocidal patterns of community destruction outlined in 
the relevant typological chapters. The negative judgement of the sources is 
related to the fact that the decision to destroy the community was made 
illegitimately, the process of submission still being negotiated as per the 
process outlined above.  
Roman commanders, whose authority derived from the religiously-
sanctioned imperium with which they were invested, were supposed to wage 
                                            
776 Which praetor is slightly unclear, as the Livian account (43.4) opens with a lacuna, and 
the epitomisers gave only scant details for Spain for 171 BCE and the preceding year. Likely 
to be L. Canuleius Dives, who was praetor of both provinciae Hispaniae in 171 BCE and who 
was likely prorogued until 169 BCE, Broughton 1951, 416, 421. 
777 Liv., 43.8-11: Abderitae legati flentes ante curiam querentesque oppidum suum ab 
Hortensio expugnatum ac direptum esse: causum excidii fuisse urbi, quod, cum centum 
milia denarium et tritici quinquaginta milia modium imperaret, spatium petierint, quo de ea re 
et ad Hostilium consulem et Romam mitterent legatos. Vixdum ad consulem se pervenisse 
et audisse oppidum expugnatum, principes securi percussos, sub corona ceteros venisse. 
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war in a just manner, or at least to provide suitable pretext to justify warfare. 
Not doing so was stereotyped as being characteristically un-Roman, and the 
killing of those who were under one’s fides thereby ascribed negative 
exemplarity. It was in this manner that Sallust used the rhetoric of infidelity to 
condemn Jugurtha in his killing of Adherbal and the Italians who surrendered 
to him at Cirta.778 It was supposedly an act of a ‘spirit blinded by cupidity, 
[which] impelled him to undertake the wicked crime’.779 The cases in which 
Romans destroyed dedicant communities with no attempt to proffer any kind 
of pretext for doing so appear to have been rare, however. Most instances of 
such genocidal force can be implicated in one or more failure points, either in 
the process of engaging fides or in mistrustfulness of the actors involved.  
Processual failure 
The process of submission into Roman authority could present critical points 
of failure that could lead to destruction. Some of these failures are to be 
located in the process of establishing the deditio, either due to unclear 
communication or due to cultural misunderstandings or misgivings. While the 
Romans were agent in the resultant extirpation, being the ones ready, 
willing, and enacting the killing, some of these instances were almost 
farcical. This can be seen in examples discussed in chapter two on mass 
killing, whereby portions of the enemy were slaughtered while attempting to 
surrender due to miscommunication of their intentions. This is not, of course, 
to blame the victims of Roman aggression in such circumstances, which had 
clear capacity for murderous execution of imperialist objectives. However, it 
does show the fraught nature of the structural issues of warfare and peace in 
this period. Lacking clear intelligence on the mind-set of the enemy meant 
that actions intended for peaceable ends, aiming to signify supplication and 
submission, could be interpreted as indicators of aggression, or not 
interpreted as carrying an active signification either way.780  
                                            
778 Sall., Iug., 25-27; See Morstein-Marx 2000 for discussion. 
779 Sall., Iug., 25.7. 
780 On military intelligence, and lack thereof, see Austin and Rankov 1995, 87–108. 
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Fundamental cultural misunderstandings could arise in the process of 
deditio, particularly where the level of safeguards expected by the Romans 
were not aligned with those of the dedicants. This was a key problem 
pertaining to the abortive deditio of the Aetolians to Glabrio in 191 BCE.781 It 
is in relation to this affair that the deditio in fidem has received most attention 
in English-language scholarship.782 Destruction could have ensued had not 
first Glabrio and then Scipio Africanus been more interested in pursuing the 
war against Antiochus to the East than committing more military resources 
towards the siege of Aetolian-held Amphissa.783 The root of the problem, 
according to Polybius, was that the Aetolians did not understand the nature 
of committing to Roman fides (‘δόντες αὑτοὺς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν’) and 
so had not anticipated the omnifariousness of the commitment discussed 
above.784 When they objected to the demands made of them subsequent to 
presenting their submission to Glabrio, arguing that they were ‘neither just 
nor Greek’,785 the Aetolians were threatened with chains to illustrate the 
range of actions that were therefore available to the Roman general. The 
threat of enslavement and deprivation of liberty that the manacles 
represented could be interpreted as being made against the delegates, or as 
signifying the mass enslavement of the community as a whole. This cultural 
clash in the expectations held by the two parties could have resulted in the 
destruction of the community, yet the parties were able to use the flexibility 
of the process to seek a solution that would prevent annihilation. In this case 
Glabrio agreed with the Aetolian representatives that they should seek 
internal consensus, with the deditio being suspended in the meantime, 
tantamount to an admission that they indeed lacked the plenipotential 
authority to ensure the utility of the deditio. 
                                            
781 Polyb., 20.9-11; Liv., 36.26-30; Zonar., 9.19; App., Syr., 21. 
782 Eckstein 2009; Eckstein 1995; Burton 2009; Gruen 1982; Moreno Leoni 2014. 
783 Polyb., 21.4.1-6; App., Syr., 23. While Lucius Cornelius Scipio formally succeeded 
Glabrio in command as consul, he was inexperienced and accompanied by Publius Scipio 
Africanus who took a lead in decision-making. 
784 Polyb., 20.9.10. 
785 Polyb., 20.10.6: ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε δίκαιον,” ἔφησεν, “οὔθ᾿ Ἑλληνικόν ἐστιν, ὦ στρατηγέ, τὸ 
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The Carthaginians were less fortunate. While the destruction of 
Carthage in 146 BCE was, and indeed still is, usually seen as determined by 
the genocidal agitations of M. Porcius Cato, this view is overly teleological, 
giving too much credence to the supposed desires of a man who was 
already dead three years before Carthage fell. Indeed, this teleology ignores 
the very crucial fact that upon Rome’s declaration of war against them in 151 
BCE, Carthage immediately submitted via the deditio in fidem populi Romani. 
This should normally have de-escalated the scenario, and thus have 
prevented the annihilation of the city and its population. However, a tipping 
point, was reached when the consul L. Marcius Censorinus issued the 
ultimatum that the city was to be evacuated and relocated. This demand is 
often, following Appian, seen as an attempt to deliberately push Carthage 
into aborting their deditio, thus hastening their own demise.786 However, the 
Romans likely had good reason to believe that their request might be 
followed. They had, by and large, come to expect that their will would be 
followed by those militarily and politically subjugated by them. What is more, 
they had previously enacted the forced urban location of cities that had 
submitted to its fides, as at Falerii and Volsinii (see chapter five). Therefore, 
it is unnecessary to follow the Appianic view that there was a conspiracy to 
force the Carthaginians into providing the pretext for their own annihilation. 
Rather a simpler solution is to see the destruction of Carthage as resulting 
from a failed process of deditio, itself probably resulting from a compromise 
between pro- and anti-Carthaginian factions in the Roman Senate. 
Failures in trust 
There were times where failures of trust in the process of trusting led to the 
extermination of a group. It has been suggested that terroristic amputations 
carried out by Romans in the campaigns in Spain during the Middle Republic 
were related to use of the right hand being as a symbol of fides, the 
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amputation of which symbolised ignominy through the loss of the destrarum 
iunctio used to seal pacts.787 This reading supports the notion that the 
increasing barbarity of Roman state actors in the West was related to their 
inability to trust their erstwhile enemies when they had undergone 
submission in the Roman mode. Praetor Ser. Sulpicius Galba’s massacre of 
Lusitanians occurred because of this sort of breakdown in the general’s 
confidence that submission to Roman fides was enough to guarantee the 
compliance of the subjugated population.788 Indeed, a key plank of his 
defence against his accusers when he was brought to trial was, supposedly, 
that the Lusitanians could not be trusted. He adduced the evidence that they 
had sacrificed a man and a horse at their nearby camp as a propitiatory rite 
in preparation for an assault against his position.789 By extension we can 
infer that Galba attempted to justify his actions, and may have indeed felt 
that they were justified, in reference to the fundamental breakdown of trust 
between the contracting parties of the submission. In effect, Galba argued 
that his extirpation of a group under his fides was justified because their 
sureties could not be trusted. Other peace terms had been rejected 
unilaterally by the Spanish tribespeople once it had become favourable for 
them to do so, which did not fit with Roman understandings of what it meant 
to submit to their fides. Galba’s argument, and his stepwise extermination of 
a tribe, occurred in a context of long-term frustrations with what the Romans 
saw as the capriciousness, and fundamental unfaithfulness, of local ethnic 
groups.  
A similar ambiguity about when mass killing was legitimate is present in 
Sallust’s account of the mass killing of adults and enslavement of other 
inhabitants of the Numidian city of Capsa, who had offered their deditio to 
Marius following a surprise attack on their undefended town in 107/6 BCE. 
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The compounded ignobility of the event, which was ‘in violation of the 
usages of war’, was however excused by the historian, as it was  
Done neither due to the consul’s avarice nor his cruelty, but 
because that place was advantageous to Jugurtha, and 
difficult of access to us, while that race of men was fickle, 
unfaithful, and had previously been coerced neither by 
kindness nor terror.790 
Military requirements could necessitate the outcome, and in any case the 
fides into which these inhabitants had entered was inherently false and 
therefore need not be respected. In this case, the Roman interstate modi 
operandi of terror and friendship were inadequate to secure the necessary 
military objectives. It is likely that the Romans considered certain people, 
rightly or wrongly, to be inherently less trustworthy, meaning that there was 
an ethnic determination to some instances of annihilations. The issue of 
whether a city was considered to have been taken legitimately by force was 
a crucial deciding factor in the reception back in Rome. This problem of the 
validity of the use of force caused the political row over M. Fulvius Nobilior’s 
demand for a triumph following his sacking of Ambracia in 187 BCE, after 
what he claimed was a legitimate siege.791 A similar post-hoc legitimisation 
to that of Capsa is evident in L. Pinarius’ massacre of the Sicilian 
townspeople of Henna when they were at an assembly, ordered because he 
could not trust their fidelity.792 Attacking defended urban centres could be 
extremely hazardous. Any inhabitant could become a lethal enemy, as 
Pyrrhus found out when he was mortally struck by a roof tile thrown by an 
old woman at Argos.793 Accepting the deditio of a potential adversary 
lessened the threat to the Roman besiegers, and sometimes the justification 
of the use of ignoble tactics to secure the same end could be argued by 
                                            
790 Sall., Iug., 91.7: Id facinus contra ius belli non avaritia neque scelere consulis admissum, 
sed quia locus Iugurthae opportunus, nobis aditu difficilis, genus hominum mobile, infidum, 
ante neque beneficio neque metu coercitum. 
791 Liv., 34.4.11-12, 43.5; Pittenger 2008, 200–210. 
792 Liv., 24.37-39; Front., Strat., 4.7.22; Plut., Marc., 20.2; Polyaen., Strat., 8.21.1; CIL, I 
2057. D. S. Levene 2010, 342 notes that Pinarius’ justification was not endorsed by Livy. 
793 Plut., Pyrrh., 32-4. 
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Roman state actors where they felt they could not trust the reciprocal 
obligations of fides to guarantee their safety and objectives.  
Generally, the likelihood of mass killing seems to have been correlated 
with the difficulty of capturing a given site; the harder fought the siege and/or 
campaign, the more likely the soldiers would be ordered or permitted to 
massacre the inhabitants. This was especially true when there existed a 
recidivist relationship, particularly when a previously accepted dedicant into 
Roman interstate fides demonstrated unfaithfulness towards the Roman 
imperial enterprise, as was suggested at Capsa. This seems to have 
informed the decisions of some Roman generals, and destruction was 
therefore retributive. Indeed, the Romans seem to have been more likely to 
use the latitude for destructive behaviours against those who had 
surrendered when they had in some way demonstrated themselves as 
unfaithful previously. Aemilius Paullus showed this trend when he 
genocidally punished wholescale the Molossian tribe by mass enslavement, 
because they had reneged on a previous expectation of fidelity to Roman 
interests.794 The neighbouring Epirote regions, excepting some areas 
connected to Molossia, were spared because they had remained loyal to 
Rome. This episode must be interpreted as the intentional destruction in toto 
of a populace as a group to punish their lack of compliance to Roman fides. 
Paullus certainly was not above arranging the destruction of states, 
overseeing the dismemberment of Macedonia and ordering the destruction 
of several cities after the conflict had ended: Aeginium for unfaithfulness as 
an ally; Agasse for killing Roman soldiers when they mistook reports of the 
Macedonian defeat for a ruse; and Aeniae for showing ‘greater obstinacy 
than the surrounding cities’.795 This makes the interpretation that the 
Molossian enslavement was retribution for their unfaithfulness more secure, 
as it fits the pattern. When there was a fundamental breakdown of faith 
between the Roman aggressors and their would-be victims, fides could no 
longer act as a guarantor of the safety of either party. Therefore, the 
                                            
794 App., Ill., 9; Plut., Aem., 29; Polyb., 30.1.6; Liv., 55.34; Plin., Nat., 4.39; Strabo, 7.322. 
795 Liv., 45.27.1-4, trans. Roberts: quod pertinacius quam finitumae civitates in armis 
fuerant. 
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Romans were, under those conditions, more predisposed to annihilatory 
behaviours. 
Retribution could be sought against those who had potentially come 
into Roman fides by alternative means other than the deditio. For example, 
Falerii had been under treaty to Rome prior to 241 BCE. It had not formally 
placed itself into Roman suzerainty, as indicated by the existence of the 
treaty, which would have been pointless had a deditio been tendered. 
Therefore, the rebellion, for want of a better word,796 of the Faliscans may 
not have been a revolt from their point of view, but merely their assertion of 
independence following the expiry of their treaty obligations to Rome. 
However, the Romans, freshly victorious in the First Punic War, had other 
ideas. While these were undoubtedly the expectations of a state increasingly 
seeing itself in an imperial role, they considered Falerii to be under their 
fides, with attendant obligatory expectations. Hence, the Romans destroyed 
and relocated the city once it had been defeated in battle and had formally 
offered its deditio, dramatically demonstrating Roman authority to break 
permanently the pattern of recidivism between them. The alleged desire of 
the Roman people in the Assembly to completely extirpate Falerii and its 
people shows that perceptions of the latter’s betrayal were strong and 
prompted a genocidal reaction.  
The disincorporation of Capua falls into a similar, retributive model. 
Although the populace were not displaced and the city was not razed, the 
formal extinguishing of the civic existence of Capua was enacted to punish it 
for their disloyalty to Rome in siding with Hannibal.797 In that case the 
destruction of the city was purely symbolic in nature, but that is not to say 
that the other instances of retributive destruction were any less symbolic. 
                                            
796 Polyb., 1.65.2 describes it as ‘a civil war at Rome against the Faliskoi’, πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος 
Ῥωμαίους μὲν ὁ πρὸς τοὺς Φαλίσκους καλουμένους; other authors simply describe Rome 
as waging war against Falerii/the Faliscans without stating the nature of the war as either 
aggressive or counterinsurgent. 
797 Liv., 26.13-16,.33-34, 31.29.11; Cic., Leg. agr., 2.88. 
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Each was an act to assuage the status harm caused by disloyalty to Roman 
interests, and to send out a terroristic signal that such infidelity could carry 
with it grave consequences, even to those who later placed themselves back 
into Roman fides.798 It was the macro, polity-level, equivalent of the 
scourging and beheading of ringleaders of rebellions against Rome. 
Precedents of faithlessness could be used to justify the destruction of towns 
or peoples despite their deditio, to permanently secure Roman interests, 
either by annihilating the problematic community completely, or by realigning 
it in such a way as to secure its future loyalty.  
Punishment of génocidaires and restorative justice 
There were attempts back in Rome to punish some perpetrators and to offer 
restorative justice to their victims. This was prudent for the long-term 
constructivist and realist, to use IR parlance, interests of the Roman state, 
and therefore it was the Senate, as the most permanent institutional body, 
that showed the greatest concern in protecting Rome’s reputation. Although 
limited in their efficacy, the period shows adaptations and innovations in 
Roman legal and diplomatic processes that attempted to restrain and 
mitigate the impunity with which their generals could genocidally breach the 
mutual obligations of fides. These attempts at punishment and restorative 
justice were limited to those who had breached this moral code, but did not 
constitute a body of law against genocide as a crime in and of itself. Roman 
commanders had free reign to destroy communities without moral risk if they 
were not in breach of the sociocultural normativities of fides. Thus, 
communities which did not offer their submission had no legal or moral 
recourse available to them at Rome. Nor did those that submitted but were 
judged as undeserving of the protection of Rome and her representatives. 
For example, Aemilius Paullus’ genocidal enslavement of the Molossians is 
considered with only some small degree of unease by the sources, but he 
was evidently not subject to any censure or punishment for this act, nor were 
                                            
798 Cp. the settlement and punishment of rebellious cities following the Latin War, which 
were adjudicated separately depending on the level of betrayal felt by Rome ( Liv., 8.14). 
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those enslaved given any chance at restoration. Instead, the Roman state 
showed an interest only in those cases where its representatives had 
breached the sociocultural and international norms of the deditio in fidem 
populi Romani. Such cases were dealt with as part of a wider remit of 
adjudication on potential abuses made by those Romans invested with 
imperium by the state. The Middle Republic had no concept of a regime to 
prevent genocide nor of punishing its perpetrators beyond where this 
modern concept coincided with other, actionable, legal, and moral domains.  
While the Senate had the principal interest in pursuing the punishment 
of perpetrators and of offering restorative justice to its victims, it had limited 
direct judicial power, even where it possessed the greatest constitutional 
authority. Senatus consulta were, in the Middle Republic, advisory by nature, 
and required a magistrate to formally enact them.799 This presented a conflict 
of interest, because it was current or former magistrates who would be the 
ones prosecuted. The question of punishment and restoration was in part 
subsumed into the development of legal process at Rome during the early 
second century BCE. The senatus consultum de bacchanalibus evidences 
the shift in trials of some criminals from the comitia to a quaestio extra 
ordinem,800 and likewise 171 BCE provides the first attestation, among a flurry 
of supplicatory and diplomatic activity from both East and West,801 of an ad 
hoc quaestio de repetundis to deal with complaints from foreign states of 
abuses by Roman state representatives.802 The services of the boards of 
commissions of three or five recuperatores would later come to be available 
to private, Roman citizens.803 They were, however, originally created to deal 
with cases ‘when the law meets foreign peoples, kings, nations and 
                                            
799 Lintott 1999, 89–90. 
800 Beggio 2016, 45. 
801 Naiden 2006, 229–30. 
802 Liv., 43.2. Prior to the establishment, per the lex de pecuniis repetundis of Lucius Piso, of 
the quaestiones perpetuae in 149 BCE ( Cic., Brut., 106), all such proceedings had to be 
referred specifically to specially drawn up repetundae boards of commission.  
803 See Johnston 1987, 67 ff. on the later development of the repetundae court; also, Brunt 
1961; Sherwin-White 1949; Balsdon 1938. 
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citizenships, by which things might be restored by the reciperatores and 
recovered, and stolen things might be pursued among one another’.804 The 
recuperatores, or reciperatores, were drawn from the senatorial ranks.805 Its 
first attested usage, although Livy’s account does not rule out antecedents, 
saw M. Titinius, P. Furius Philus, and M. Matienus prosecuted. Of these the 
former-praetors Furius and Matienus were said to have been ‘accused of the 
most serious charges’.806 While the exact extent of their crimes is now 
unclear, evidence for pecuniary extortion made the quaestio de repetundis 
the appropriate tool through which to prosecute. The evident development of 
the repetundae courts notwithstanding, cases dealing with the perfidious 
destruction of communities by Romans were largely dealt with by ad hoc 
boards of commission or by public trial in the Assembly. The following 
sections deal first with the punishment of Roman individuals and then with 
the restorative justice offered to their victims through these means. 
Punishment 
The instances of the failure of submission to safeguard communities from 
Roman aggression are to a large extent known about because of the 
scandal and controversy that they caused in Rome. Complaints to the 
Roman Senate spurred attempts to punish the perpetrators. This served the 
twin goals of the desire to enforce what was perceived to be the traditional 
values of the mos maiorum on the one hand, and to protect and project a 
positive image to current and potential allies on the other. Punishing 
perpetrators would have sent a signal that the Romans took seriously their 
interstate obligations, even to the extent of being willing to prosecute those 
who had reached the curule magistracies. Cases would be brought on an ad 
                                            
804 Festus, Gloss. Lat., 342 s.v. 'reciperatio': Reciperatio est, ut ait Gallus Aelius, cum inter 
populum et reges nationesque et civitates peregrinas lex convenit, quomodo per 
reciperatores reddantur res reciperenturque, resque privatas inter se persequantur. Cp. 
Festus, Gloss. Lat., 343 Pauli Excerpta s.v. 'reciperatio' : Reciperatio est, quum inter 
civitates peregrinas lex convenit, ut res privatae reddantur singulis recuperenturque. 
805 Badian and Lintott 2012; J. M. Kelly 1976, 40 ff. 
806 Liv., 32.2.10: Gravissimis criminibus accusati ambo ampliatiqu. 
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hoc basis, using rogationes, senatus consulta, or the developing quasi-civil 
law of the quaestio de repetundis.  
There were potentially dire consequences if found guilty. At their most 
severe, such malfeasance could result in capital sentences. The 
propraetorial legate Q. Pleminius may have been executed for his 
maltreatment of the inhabitants of Locri Epizephyrii.807 Whilst not meeting the 
test of genocide as defined in the present study—i.e., a set of actions and/or 
outcomes resulting from an intention to destroy a group, wholly or in part—it 
was subsumed into the same conceptual category by contemporary 
Romans. Therefore, events surrounding Pleminius provide a valid model for 
what could happen to génocidaires who abused the subjects over which they 
governed. In 205 BCE, the Senate assigned a commission to investigate the 
crime alleged by a Locrian deputation. They were also tasked with 
considering accusations that his superior, Scipio the Elder, had succumbed 
to immorality, philhellenism, and un-Roman behaviours.808 They proceeded 
to Locri to detain Pleminius.809 Finding him and thirty-two others guilty at a 
preliminary hearing, they brought them back to Rome. The extant record of 
the case is complex and ambiguous.810 Pleminius either died there in prison 
before his trial was concluded,811 or was at the order of the Senate 
‘transferred to the Tullianum', which is to say, executed.812 This latter 
                                            
807 Liv., 29.8.6-22.12, 31.12.2-3, 34.44.6-7, 38.52.7; Diod. Sic., 27.4.1-8; Val. Max., 1.1.21; 
Cass. Dio, fr. 57.62; Plut., Cat. mai., 3.5-7, 32.4; App., Hisp., 55. 
808 The presence of an aedile along with two plebeian tribunes accompanying the praetor 
and his decemviral commission is adduced as evidence by Livy that they were in fact 
prepared in the case that they should meet resistance from Scipio in the matter of the 
apprehension of Pleminius, and so had ensured that legitimate magistrates were present 
should they have to arrest Scipio as one of the serving consuls. 
809 Doing so, according to Liv., 29.21, either by intercepting Pleminius as he fled into exile, 
or was arrested peremptorily at Scipio's orders and then turned over to the commission. 
Diod. Sic., 27.4.6 gives only the version with Scipio acting before their arrival. 
810 See further discussion in Brennan 2000, 142. 
811 Liv., 29.22.9; According to Val. Max., 1.21 he was consumed by a divinely ordained 
‘taeterrimo […] morbi’. 
812 Liv., 29.22.10: patefacto dein scelere delegatum in Tullianum ex senatus consulto, 
34.44.6. Execution seems to have been the punishment originally intended by Q. Fabius 
(29.19.5): Sententiam deinde aeque trucem orationi adiecit: Pleminium legatum vinctum 
Romam deportari placere et ex vinculis causam dicere ac, si vera forent quae Locrenses 
quererentur, in carcere necari bonaque eius publicari. 
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version, which Livy attributed to the no-longer extant historian Clodius 
Licinus, was supposedly a response to a series of fires set around the city in 
a bid to engineer his escape in 194 BCE. This would imply either that he had 
been found guilty and imprisoned, which is unlikely, or that he had been 
allowed to languish without trial for up to ten years.  
The first, and more plausible, version however is more immediate to the 
crimes alleged, with the case being put before the people on three non-
consecutive days by the tribunes, and finally put to a deciding vote of the 
comitia centuriata four weeks later.813 It also recorded the waning interest of 
the people in desiring the conviction of Pleminius. There are similarities with 
the trial of Galba, which was also brought before the Assembly following the 
issuing of a plebiscite against him by the tribune Lucius Scribonius Libo, and 
supported by Cato.814 His acquittal was only secured during the final day of 
the trial, and this only because he could induce pity among the onlookers by 
displaying his dependents. A similar performative influence was effected by 
Pleminius’ disfigured visage. His nose and ears had earlier been slit during 
scuffles with Roman soldiers who supported his rivals the military tribunes at 
Locri.815 While ambiguities abide about the ultimate verdict on Pleminius, 
who either died before the trial’s conclusion or was later executed, there is 
none about the fate of Galba who ultimately escaped punishment. Pleminius’ 
scurrilous reputation to subsequent generations is at odds with their lauding 
of Galba as a great rhetorician of his generation, a reputation little affected 
by his near conviction for the genocide of the Lusitanians who had submitted 
to him.816 
The record of success in prosecuting these crimes was poor, and later 
commentators such as Livy could only conclude that there was a 
                                            
813 On association of trial for perduellio, the tribunes and the comitia see Lintott 1999, 122, 
150 ff.; Cloud 1994, 502. 
814 Liv., Per., 49; Val. Max., 8.1.2; App., Hisp., 59-60; Cic., Brut., 89-90. 
815 Liv., 29.9; Diod. Sic., 27.4.4. 
816 Suet., Galb., 7.1; Cic., Brut., 89-94 attest the reputation of Galba in later times. Cp. the 
general opprobrium of App., Hisp., 60. 
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degeneration of morality among the Romans from this time.817 Licinius 
Crassus was found guilty, but only had a fine imposed on him, for ‘attacking 
and savagely pillaging many cities in Greece’, during which he carried out 
mass enslavements.818 He did not suffer further punishment. Some 
magistrates may have taken steps to avoid punishment, or indeed to prevent 
themselves being brought to trial at all. While Pleminius might have taken 
the drastic step of attempting to flee into exile, which would have been an 
unprecedented action for a magistrate with imperium,819 Gaius Cassius took 
the canny precaution of taking up a military tribunate in Macedonia in the 
year after his own consulship. He had been censured for overstepping his 
authority as consul and was likely attempting to make himself indisposed for 
trial by continuing his public service by whatever means he had available.820 
Furius Philus and Matienus took the opportunity of the adjournment of 
their own trials to flee into exile. They thus incurred the penalty of losing their 
Roman citizenship in favour of the Latinity of their asylums, but avoided 
being condemned and sentenced. They were prosecuted by means of the 
quaestio de repetundis of 171 BCE, and were not the only ones to ultimately 
escape its justice. Indeed, it was afterwards tainted with a reputation that 
suspected that there was reluctance on the part of the presiding praetor L. 
Canuleius Dives to prosecute the most serious offenders, who were ‘men of 
rank and influence’.821 Instead, he abruptly held the levy and departed for his 
province, forestalling further proceedings. The only known legal outcome of 
the trials was that of M. Titinius, who was acquitted after several 
adjournments. The ineffectiveness, and suspicions of corruption, resulted in 
                                            
817 Lintott 1972; Mellor 2002, 69–70.; cp. the encroachment of luxuria from the East at Liv., 
39.6.3, 7, 9; Sall., Iug., 10, 11.5, 41. 
818 Liv., Per., 43: complures in Graecia urbes expugnavit et crudeliter corripuit: ob id captivi, 
qui ab eo sub corona venierant. The Livian epitome omits the punishment completely and 
the relevant sections of Livy’s full text have been lost. Further details, including the fining are 
found in Zonar., 9.22. Clearly identified as proconsul in the summary of Livy, but is unlisted 
as such in Broughton at p. 421, for the year following his consulship in 171 BCE. 
819 G. P. Kelly 2006, 164–65. 
820 Schlesinger 1951, XIII:19 n. 1. 
821 Liv., 43.2.11, trans. Schlesinger: fama erat prohiberi a patronis nobiles ac potentes 
conpellare. 
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attempts to reform the court process under the Gracchi, who recognised its 
weakness, liability to corruption and the senatorial reluctance to condemn 
their peers, and so instituted a standing court that could draw its jurors from 
the equites as well.822  
It must be concluded that members of the senatorial elite were reticent 
to punish their peers on behalf of foreigners. Implicit and explicit biases 
generally cause individuals to favour those of a familiar background to those 
more dissimilar. The senators, however, also had specific motivations to 
stymy these cases, fearing damage to their social networks or retributive 
legal cases resulting from punishing prominent individuals. In the 
prosecution of M. Popilius Laenas for the destruction at Carystus, the trial 
was eventually sabotaged by the prosecutor.823 Licinius scheduled the third, 
and final, day of the trial for the Ides of March. This was the date that the 
magistrates were due to change, and he thereby contrived to indefinitely 
postpone proceedings but still save face. He supposedly did so out of 
respect to the reputation of the serving consul, Laenas’ brother Gaius 
Popillius Laenas, and due to pressure from the Popillii. However, that was 
only the end of the attempt to bring Laenas to justice. It was preceded by a 
series of oratorical attacks traded between the Senate and him during his 
173 BCE consulship and 172 BCE pro-consulship, which escalated to a series 
of vetoes between himself and other magistrates that brought the Senate 
and the executive into a political impasse. This continued into the following 
year, when his brother was elected consul. While Laenas was eventually 
compelled to stand trial, it demonstrated the ‘impotency of the senate when it 
did not have the backing of the highest magistrates in office’.824 Combined 
with the constitutional lack of accountability, and the influence of powerful, 
networked families, Laenas escaped the concerted efforts of the Senate with 
little but a temporary cost to his public reputation.825 Even this penalty was 
slight, not damaging the election chances of his brother in 172 BCE nor his 
                                            
822 The lex acillia repetundarum: Bruns [1919] 1958, 1.3.10. 
823 Liv., 42.6.3-9, 10.9-15, 21-22. 
824 Golden 2013, 170–71. 
825 Pittenger 2008, 244–45. 
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own election to the censorship in 159 BCE. The apparent incompatibility of 
his destruction of the Ligurians in contravention of the international and 
sociocultural norms of submission to Rome and the role of arbiter of public 
morality did not seem to have induced any cognitive dissonance in the 
Romans.  
Given the reticence of Roman officials to prosecute their peers for 
genocidal breaches of fides obligations, one must wonder how many 
destructions occurred that did not survive in the record, lacking the 
sensationalism of a political scandal.  
Restorative justice 
Attempts to provide redress to victims were somewhat more successful than 
the attempts to punish those who had victimised them. Broadly speaking the 
process of redress and punishment adopted several measures, which 
essentially attempted to address the primary metonymic elements of the 
former corporate existence of the destroyed state. This is aptly expressed in 
the following senatorial decree: 
The senate decreed that the consul Marcus Popilius should 
restore to liberty the Ligurians themselves, returning the 
purchase-price to the purchasers, and should see to it that 
their property, such of it as could be recovered, should be 
given back to them; that their arms also should be returned 
to them; and that all this should be done at the earliest 
possible moment; and that the consul should not leave his 
province until he had re-established the surrendered 
Ligurians in their homes.826 
The restitution of those unjustly destroyed even though they had submitted 
to Roman fides therefore presents a mirror image to the formula of the 
deditio itself, offering back to the inhabitants the elements that they should 
                                            
826 Liv., 42.8.7-8, trans. Schlesinger: Quas ob res placere senatui, M. Popilium consulem 
Ligures, pretio emptoribus reddito, ipsos restituere in libertatem, bonaque ut iis, quod eius 
reciperari possit, reddantur curare; 8arma quoque reddi, eaque omnia primo quoque 
tempore fieri; nec ante consulem de provincia decedere quam deditos in sedem suam 
Ligures restituisset. 
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have had reinstated under the customary expectations of fides. The effects 
were therefore intended to be both practical and symbolic.  
The restoration of the community, where deemed morally necessary, 
was generally carried out by means of the Senate issuing a senatus 
consultum asserting that the enslaved members of the victim community 
should be restored to liberty.827 This would have been at best partial, and in 
some cases restricted specifically to those that could be found in Italy,828 
presumably having been brought there prior to sale rather than being sold in 
situ.829 The specifics are not given, but probably apply to the centralised 
processing of slaves captured during war, or possibly those for whom good 
records of sale had been kept and who were therefore locatable. They may 
have only referred to those slaves who were sold to Italian owners, and were 
therefore more directly under what the Senate considered to have been its 
jurisdiction. In at least one circumstance, on the other hand, it appears that 
slaves sold outside Italy were supposed to be restored: the plebeian tribune 
L. Scribonius Libo in his rogatio against Galba proposed the liberation of 
Lusitanians that he had sold in Gaul.830 We do not, unfortunately, know the 
outcome of this measure. The detail of the enslaved is contained only in the 
Periochae of Livy, with all the extant sources predominantly interested in the 
prosecution, and eleventh-hour acquittal, of the renowned orator. Inevitably 
there would have been those who were irrecoverable and who remained 
enslaved, but a critical number were evidently considered recoverable to the 
extent that the restoration of the destroyed community was thought possible. 
A similar set of issues applied to the commitment to restore the 
possessions of those unfairly destroyed in breach of fides. Excepting items 
of a large scale or of significant enough value to have been retained in 
                                            
827 E.g. the redress offered for Pleminius’ crimes: Val. Max., 1.21; Liv., 29.8.6-9.12. 
828 Zonar., 9.22. 
829 K. Bradley 2011, 246; Scheidel 2011, 288–89, 296. 
830 Liv., Per., 49: cum L. Scribonius tribunus plebis rogationem promulgasset, ut Lusitani, qui 
in fidem populo R. dediti ab Ser. Galba in Gallia venissent, in libertatem restituerentur, M. 
Cato acerrime suasit. 
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expectation of triumphal display, it must surely have been impossible to 
retrieve items looted by individual soldiers or already sold.831 We should 
probably read the restoration of possessions in part symbolically, as the 
restoration of their right to their possessions, whether or not they were 
returned to them. This was a key element of their existence as an 
autonomous community under the protection, and control, of Rome. Of chief 
importance among the assets of a people were their weapons and the right 
to possess them.832 Returning them consequently restored the ability of 
those communities to safeguard their own autonomy. Any inability to fully 
recover monies, possessions or weapons that had been taken from them, 
would in some cases have been ameliorated by gifts granted to them from 
the state Aerarium on the orders of the Senate. This would have facilitated 
the re-establishment of the friendly reciprocal relationships of normative 
states. It may also have helped allay any sense of guilt among the Roman 
elite for the breach of religious fides, diverting any religious stigma away 
from themselves as well as the moral dishonour.  
Overall, it is not easy to estimate how effective these restorations were, 
but they were resisted and denounced by the generals who had carried out 
the destruction, suggesting that they did have some efficacy, at least 
symbolically. It undid the erasure of the civic identity of the community. This 
symbolism reconfirmed the autonomy of the community, and their 
relationship in submission to Rome. This re-established the normative 
interstate hegemonic associations so desired by the Middle Roman 
Republic’s mode of imperialism. These are confirmed by the re-assertion of 
the Senate of Rome’s obligation to them as its suppliants, reaffirming the 
fides, and therefore both the protection but also the suzerainty of Rome, that 
had been flouted. However, as with the process of punishment, even these 
could be stymied. The magistrate who had destroyed a community against 
the customary expectations of fides could refuse to comply with the Senate’s 
wishes, powerful political allies could thwart the process, or those tasked 
                                            
831 Ziółkowski 1993, 90. 
832 Liv., 26.40.8-13; 39.3.1-3; 37.60.4-6; 39.54.8; 40.16.4-6; App., Hisp., 15.95. 
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with pursuing the matter could fail to do so in fear of offending their peers. 
Undoing the actions of a magistrate was a form of symbolic attack upon 
them, and thus it was in their interests to prevent the passage of restorative 
justice. It delegitimated and contested the narrative that these individuals 
created about their public service, threatening their right to demand a 
triumph from the Senate. This was a sticking point with M. Popilius Laenas. 
Such matters were not trivial, contributing to the reputation of not just the 
individual but also their family through association with the coveted title of 
imperator and the memorialisation consequent to the triumphal procession 
and addition of their name to the fasti triumphales. Reputation and fame, 
which could be created through the record of service, was an important 
source of social capital to the Roman elite, and any threat to it jealously 
guarded against.833  
Conclusions 
Fides was a causal mechanism for destroying out-groups as well as, 
paradoxically, for preventing their destruction. This should not be considered 
a true contradiction, despite its apparent contradictoriness. Fides was a 
regulatory and symbolic framework. It guided, though did not dictate, the 
behaviour of individual imperium-holders in their interaction with outsider 
communities by means of the sociocultural norms of the habitus. It was a 
mechanism through which trust could be built, bridging either the 
distrustfulness inherent to anarchic interstate systems or mutual ill-feeling 
resulting from militaristic imperialism. This trust was built by the symbol auto-
erasure of the dedicant community as an incorporated entity. Such a 
community would then owe its subsequent existence to the largesse of the 
Romans who re-granted it its former existence. This relationship could, 
indeed, be parallel to and akin to the way amicitia could be established 
between individuals within Roman society. It was also like the persistent 
patronal relationships that could be established by the founding or re-
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founding of coloniae, fora, mansiones and so forth. This affiliation was 
ingrained into elite behaviour as part of an ideology of state augmentation, 
but also played to self- and familial-interests through the creation of 
persistent connections that could confer economic and status boons.  
This mechanism emerges as a sociocultural strategy that restricted and 
de-escalated the violence of warfare. This is incredibly important to the 
crafting of hegemony, and had become a core part of the cultural and 
military outlook of the Roman state in seeking to absorb, assimilate, and 
augment their span of control though durable alliances. Trust-based, fideal 
relationships were more reliable, resilient, and crucially needed fewer 
resources to maintain Rome’s hegemony than direct coercion by force. The 
effectiveness of this strategy can be seen in the reluctance of many Italian 
states to side with Hannibal against Rome. Even the greatest test of the 
relationship between Rome and her allies, the Social War, was not initially 
predicated on a secessionist movement, but one that sought greater 
recognition and rights within the Roman hegemony. 
Failures in fides could however lead to the escalation of warfare to 
destructive ends. This occurred in several ways. Roman state actors could 
choose to ignore the expectation that they would restore a submitting 
community, and treat these communities as no different than if they had 
been captured through force as at the storming of a city. In some cases, 
such destruction in toto of a community could be claimed to have been 
justified, thereby not just removing the moral bar on destruction but providing 
a moral impetus for it. Typically, this argument was made on the grounds of 
the untrustworthiness and faithlessness of the submitting group, based either 
on recidivist precedents or on base stereotyping. By betraying the good faith 
of Rome, or being imagined to be prone to do so, Roman state actors could 
consider themselves no longer obligated to abide by the strictures usually 
imposed by fides. The reception of these arguments varied between 
complete acceptance, unease, and denunciation depending on the actors in 
question and the context.  
 238 
Fides furthermore provided the moral basis for correctives to the 
behaviours of those Romans that abused it, in the form of punishment of the 
perpetrators and the restoration of the victims. These were of mixed success 
in avoiding genocide, but attempts to regulate the behaviours of the elite do 
demonstrate a broad cultural awareness of the need for prevention and a 
willingness to take steps to do so, however ineffectual. Despite a general 
desire to effect punishment for the genocidal abuse of dedicant communities, 
as evidenced by evolving legal and civil mechanisms, they were seldom 
effective in convicting the accused. Individuals serving as prosecutors had 
conflicts of interest and were reticent to condemn their peers for the sake of 
foreigners. The peer group of Roman nobles colluded to prevent justice from 
being achieved.  
Perhaps most interestingly, the restitutive steps taken—by the Senate 
through senatus consulta or through lawsuits initiated by magistrates—
provided a means by which genocide could in effect be undone. This is a 
surprising feature of Roman genocide, and a major way in which it was 
dissimilar to the genocidal dynamics of other societies. The undoing of 
genocide could be attempted because of the prevalence of mass 
enslavement in the Roman mode of warfare. Because the former members 
of at least part of the community still existed, there was the possibility of 
freeing them and reconstituting the formerly-destroyed group. The 
effectiveness of this undoing of genocide was probably limited however, at 
least in cases where the group had suffered an effective, as opposed to 
symbolic, destruction. These communities tend not to reappear following 
their putative restoration and lack later evidence for their continued existence 
as groups. While this absence of evidence is not a positivist indication that 
these communities failed to be re-established, it suggests the communities 
remained destroyed, even if some of its constituent members were free. 
In summary, fides was a significant component of the Roman 
worldview, involving Roman conceptions of interstate relations, imperialism, 
and ethnicity. The performance of the praxis following from fides could have 
very real consequences, preventing or precipitating mass violence. 
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Communities lived or died by its strictures and its potential for interpretation 
into concrete, genocidal actions. 
  
  
Chapter Seven 
— 
Conclusion 
In this study, we have seen how the Romans, between 343 BCE and 146 
BCE, enacted the destruction of other groups through mass killing, mass 
enslavement, and urban annihilation. The usage of these types varied from 
case to case, and, in many examples, they complemented each other in 
sequence. The greatest portion of this mass violence was directed at 
populations in urban centres. The customs of war (belli iure) dictated that at 
the moment of the storming of a settlement, the lives of the inhabitants were 
forfeit and liable to destruction either through killing or enslavement. The 
slaughter could be indiscriminate, and this not only achieved an immediate 
goal of securing the urban environment through a maximal application of 
force, but was also symbolically effective as a method of advancing the 
Roman imperialist agenda by terrifying other peoples into compliance. In 
acutely bitter conflicts, the entirety of the population might be killed during 
the storming, although that was rare and considered exceptional by our 
sources. The killing of fighting-age males and the enslavement into social 
death of the survivors, especially women and children, was considered 
usual, although we have seen examples where the selective criteria differed.  
Broad trends in the Roman use of genocide, annihilation and 
destruction can be discerned, but the incidents are themselves highly 
variable. This phenomenology resists the giving of a universal description of 
what the Roman destruction of others entailed, as well as of uniform 
statements about its development over time. Generally, the end of this 
period of the Middle Republic contained more genocidal incidents, and they 
were of a larger scale than at the beginning. The biases of our sources, and 
the happenstance of their survival, can account somewhat for this, but the 
trend is nonetheless likely an indicator of real change over time. Indeed, 
Rome at the time of the so-called Samnite Wars had little competency to 
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carry out the largescale, resource-heavy operations that could destroy other 
peoples, except against some unfortunate nearby rivals such as Veii. The 
incidence and the scale of destruction generally increased concomitant to 
Rome’s wars with others. While Rome was indeed generally waging war in 
some fashion in any given year in this period,834 the nature of these varied 
greatly. Single campaigns against small foes were dissimilar in many ways 
from the pluriannual and multidecadal wars against Carthage or Macedonia, 
for example. In general, small campaigns featured less destruction, whereas 
larger ones featured more. This was not the rule, however; during the 
Second Macedonian War, for example, the destruction of groups was kept to 
a minimum despite the war between two large, hegemonic powers. There 
was also seemingly a generational shift in attitude about the potential uses of 
imperial power. Roman magistrates and the Senate became increasingly 
aware of their ability to fashion the geospatial and political landscape of their 
world. Building roads and colonies was one way of furthering this revisionism 
and augmenting their imperial hegemony; destroying communities was 
another.  
In looking at these aspects of Roman destructive behaviours, we can 
draw several conclusions: about whether they were genocidal; how far they 
were characteristic of the interaction of Rome with other communities; and 
we can begin to reconcile the apparent dissonances within them. In doing 
so, we have seen that these phenomena were complex, that the same 
habitus of fides and the customs of interstate relations underpinned the 
contradictory impulses to destroy and to preserve foreign communities, and 
that ethnocultural alterity did not define the use of destruction but could 
influence it. 
Rome, genocide, and genocidal states 
It has been demonstrated throughout this study that much of this destructive 
behaviour was genocidal. The state actors involved, imperium-wielding 
                                            
834 W. V. Harris [1979] 2006, 9–10. 
 242 
Romans and the Senate, knowingly and intentionally caused the destruction 
of other groups. Hundreds of thousands of people were enslaved or killed; 
we will never know how many. The conclusion that the Romans carried out 
genocide, however, relies on an understanding of genocide as defined in the 
introduction as a set of actions and/or outcomes resulting from an intention 
to destroy a group, wholly or in part. This broad definition conforms to most, 
but not all, of the scholarly usage within Genocide Studies, as well as the 
internationally-recognised UNGC. Yet, public understandings of the concept 
and meaning of genocide differ enormously from these, denoting the 
systematic, lethal extirpation of an ethnicity or race. The labelling of 
behaviours in the Middle Republic as genocidal should be used with caution 
in non-academic, public contexts, marking them with appropriate caveats so 
as to neither devalue modern systematic mass killing nor increase confusion 
about ancient praxis. 
While the Romans can be said to have carried out genocide in the 
Middle Republic, they did not comprise a ‘genocidal state’.835 The instances 
of genocide discussed in this study were discrete events, spread across the 
course of about two hundred years, and directed at various types of peoples. 
The incidents do not belie a systematic programme of destruction. Indeed, 
the Roman state at that time does not seem to have been capable of the sort 
of centralisation and bureaucracy required. Nor was there a propaganda 
platform that aimed to spur potential Roman génocidaires into distributed, 
non-centralised genocide or pogroms. The closest that we see to this, Cato, 
seems to have been relatively ineffective at drumming up enthusiasm for the 
destruction of the Carthaginians. The mid-Republican Romans probably 
lacked the requisite concepts of ethnicity, race, nationhood, and 
territorialisation to have conceived of such an ideological programme of 
ethnic cleansing. As such, Roman group-destructive acts were 
predominantly carried out during the waging of war against external threats 
                                            
835 Kuper 1990. 
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and were not directed inwards at domestic groups as has been characteristic 
of modern genocide.836 The Romans did not desire to create a monoethnic 
territorial state.837 Only the Bacchanalian Affair saw a substantial 
suppression of an internal religious group, but was not repeated as a model 
of internal state cleansing. The absence of ideological motives contradicts 
the findings of Ben Kiernan, who concluded that the annihilation of Carthage 
resulted from Roman ideologies of agrarianism. It has been shown in this 
study that the destruction of Carthage should not be thus explained, but 
instead resulted from an unpredictable mix of internal and international 
political agency and failed compellence diplomacy. Roman genocidal 
behaviours were usually adaptations to the needs of strategy or revenge. 
Helen Fein influentially proposed four categories of genocide: 
developmental; despotic; ideological; and retributive. Of these, the last best 
fits Roman behaviours, which were related to struggles of orders and 
dominance.838 Roger Smith identified Roman genocide as a form of 
‘institutional genocide’, which was ‘routinized […] motivated by the desire to 
create terror, to display one’s power, and to remove the possibility of future 
retaliation’.839 This seems, broadly, to have been the case. The lack of a 
defined ideology that promoted genocidal actions against ethnic, racial, or 
national groups supports the notion that there were fundamental differences 
between mass violence in the ancient world and in the age of the nation-
state.  
Genocidal behaviours of killing, enslaving, and destroying cities were 
normal but not typical for the Romans. They were considered appropriate 
tools to appropriate situations. The Romans were aggressive imperialists, 
having this in common with all the major powers of the interstate anarchy in 
which they participated. However, that aggressive imperialism does not 
mean that they were exceptionally bloodthirsty compared to their peers. 
                                            
836 R. W. Smith [1987] 2009, 42. 
837 K. Smith 2008, 131–32; Mann 2005, 4. 
838 Fein 1984; Charny 1999b, 1:5; Totten and Bartrop 2009, xii. 
839 R. W. Smith [1987] 2009, 41. 
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Dominance could be achieved in a multitude of ways, and often the best way 
of securing Roman imperial interests was to prefer diplomatic solutions, 
which, backed up by the threat of war, bloodshed, and destruction, were 
forms of compellence or coercive diplomacy.840 The assimilative hegemony 
of the Romans over other communities was the dyad to their mass killing, 
mass enslaving, and urban annihilation. Smith was incorrect to say that 
Roman institutional genocide was a ‘failure of political imagination’ and ‘a 
substitute for politics’.841 Both were diplomacy by alternative means. 
The prevention of genocide in the Middle Republic 
Although the Romans sometimes destroyed, in many cases they did not. 
Had they wished to—had they not only possessed overwhelming military 
power but also an ideology that legitimised genocide without moral risk— 
many more peoples would have perished. We have seen that the primary 
restriction on the use of violence was the habitus of fides and therefore this 
might be considered a weak analogue of a preventative regime. This 
inhibited further genocide by providing a way for threatened communities to 
de-escalate the potential for violence, obliging the Romans accepting their 
deditiones to extend patronage and protection. The Augustan Roman 
historian Livy, contemporary Greek historian Polybius, and mid-Republican 
dramatist Plautus described the process in very similar terms. The deditio 
worked by drawing on the symbolism of annihilation, ritually surrendering the 
totality of the community’s existence in the expectation that the general 
would reconstitute it upon acceptance. The deditio in fidem populi Romani 
was totalising and permanently transferred the primacy of authority to the 
Romans, particular in regards to agency in international relations and war. 
Inscriptional and literary evidence suggests that there could be in some 
circumstances substantial room for negotiation and consensus-seeking 
about the settlement that resulted. The Romans understood that such 
consensus was in their own best interests. The Romans well appreciated 
                                            
840 George 1991; Eckstein 2006, 121, 155, 166–67, 219, 229. 
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that those who symbolically offered up themselves instead of being taken by 
naked force (vis) were more likely to display long-term and meaningful 
loyalty rather than to foster seditious resentment. Or, as the Roman historian 
Sallust put it:  
The Roman people from the beginning of their rule have 
preferred to seek friends rather than slaves; they have 
thought it safer to govern the willing than those forced to 
obey.842 
In return for the good faith of the suppliant people, the Roman commander, 
and after him the Senate and People of Rome, were supposed to safeguard 
the dedicant from genocidal harm.  
Aggravating factors could make the acceptance of the submission of 
communities less likely, such as: a siege already having been commenced; 
previous infidelity following a prior deditio in fidem; or, excessive or cruel 
behaviour to Roman envoys or refugees. Each of these could reduce the 
moral hazard of rejecting a suppliant community and thence destroying 
them. Yet, even if a group was accepted in submission, the totalising 
surrender to the Romans placed the dedicants in an ambiguous position. 
While simultaneously having a forestalling effect through moral obligatory 
force, fides also, seemingly paradoxically, provided a wide mandate for the 
utter destruction of those who submitted to it. On other occasions, cultural 
misunderstandings in the process, meaning, or goals between the dedicants 
and the dedicands could lead to the failure of the procedure and an 
escalation of warfare. Several of the mass killings that we have looked at in 
this study fit this model, as does the retracted deditio of Carthage.  
While it was supposed to ensure protection, we have already seen 
some circumstances where dedicant communities were subsequently 
destroyed even after acceptance. In these cases, the habitus-based 
preventative regime failed. Some génocidaires would seek to rationalise their 
                                            
842 Sall., Iug., 102.6, trans. Rolfe: populo Romano iam a principio imperi melius visum 
amicos quam servos quaerere, tutiusque rati volentibus quam coactis imperitare. See also, 
Sal., Cat., 9.5 ; Liv., 8.1.7. 
 246 
actions within the moral framework of the suspected perfidy of the destroyed 
community, to varying success. In other cases, the destruction of 
communities through mass killing, enslavement, and urban annihilation was 
carried out with no reason other than avarice and the opportunity to claim a 
triumph. These magistrates challenged the morality-rooted norms of the 
preventative regime of fides, and therefore challenged the auctoritas of the 
Senate. Indeed, attempts to police the adherence of those Romans with 
power over their dedicants could only come from within. There was no 
superior source of international law, no The Hague, or United Nations, no 
UNGC. Besides, there was a strong moral impetus at Roman to at least 
appear to abide by the custom of fides. The strength of this impetus resulted 
in some attempts by members of the Roman Senate to offer restitution to 
unjustly targeted victim groups, and to prosecute their aggressors. These 
were only partially effective.  
Destroying the ‘Other’ 
While the Middle Republic was not a genocidal regime, and the cleansing or 
extermination of races, nations, ethnicities, or religious groups was not 
pursued, alterity did play a limited role in Roman genocidal behaviour. This 
was because of the arbitrary nature of the destruction, which was guided by 
the preferences and behaviours of the state actors in question. In 
behavioural economics, preferences describe the favoured strategies of 
agents, while behaviours describe what it is that they do given a scenario.843 
This model accounts for both the heterogeneity of actor behaviours and of 
outcomes given differing scenarios. 
Broadly speaking, the preferred outcome of a military campaign for 
Roman generals was the submission of the enemy, or a foedus if that was 
not possible. This spared the Romans from risking warfare, gave generals 
and their soldiers opportunity for gain, and augmented the state. This 
preference seems to have grown stronger through the two hundred years 
                                            
843 Sen 1973. 
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covered by this study, and in the early years’ time-limited treaties were much 
more common between the Romans and foreigners. The preference for 
deditio probably increased concomitantly with the overwhelming military 
power to demand it. Submission could be extracted either in lieu of or after 
battle, the latter being a second order preference to compel the first. If the 
scenario was such that the invaded refused to submit but persisted in 
resisting Roman preferences, then the next best preference was for the 
Romans to engage in behaviours that would result in the defenders’ 
destruction. Thus, genocidal behaviour was not the preferred response, but 
was situationally appropriate. Naturally, there was heterogeneity in the 
preferences of the actors involved. This has in part been explained by the 
generational shifts in habitus described previously. The existence of the 
Senate helped to provide an element of the wisdom of the crowd. This 
ameliorated and moderated more extreme preferences, and smoothed the 
effect of the heterogeneity. In circumstances where individuals abused their 
imperium to wage war in an unsanctioned manner, and therefore to risk 
broader state interests, the Senate’s reactions show their role in censuring 
and enforcing normative behaviours. 
The nature of the victim group seems to have had an attenuating effect 
on the behaviours and preference selection of the Romans. The alterity of 
ethnicities of greater liminality seems to have been correlated with the 
chance of them being subjected to destruction. In the Early Republic, this 
could mean Veii. By the later years of our period, this meant groups of the 
Lusitanians, Spanish, Ligurians and Celts, as well as those on the fringes of 
the Greek world. These were the peoples most marked out as of inherently 
treacherous character, and were more Other to the Romans in several ways, 
having different material cultures and cultural norms. This alterity amplified 
the likelihood of the preference seeking behaviours of the Romans to revert 
to violence. However, the greatest attenuation based on alterity was in the 
cases where the Romans decided not to destroy. As their hegemony spread, 
peoples previously perceived as more Other came to be seen as less so. 
The relations developed with these peoples militated against their utter 
physical destruction when it came to it. Thus, Falerii, Volsinii, and Capua 
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were only symbolically destroyed. Roman perceptions of the ethnic 
characteristics of other groups were therefore important if generals, the 
Senate, and People of Rome were willing to base their behaviours on them. 
Some peoples were considered inherently more perfidious than others, and 
the Romans’ mistrust in them due to stereotypical and prejudicial 
constructions of Othered ethnicities could lead to their destruction. 
In summary, we have seen how the application of the concept of 
genocide can be used in a novel fashion to address gaps in the scholarship, 
interrogating the intersection of ethnicity and imperialism in the Middle 
Republic, and generating a specific and informed set of findings to contribute 
to historiographical narratives of mass violence. The Romans of the Middle 
Republic did not necessarily seek to destroy other groups, and show a 
longstanding preference to build their interstate hegemony through alliance 
and friendship. However, genocidal destruction was a normal and customary 
tool of Roman international relations, to be used when the scenario justified 
it. Their genocidal behaviours were not exceptional nor definitional. These 
situations were failures of preferred peaceful means of crisis resolution 
backed up with compellence diplomacy. Therefore, each case of genocidal 
destruction was phenomenologically distinct. Nonetheless, the Romans of 
the Middle Republic carried out genocides that, through mass killing, 
enslavement, and urban annihilation, destroyed the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of people. 
 
  
Bibliography 
Abed, Mohammed. 2006. ‘Clarifying the Concept of Genocide’. Metaphilosophy. 37, 
no. 3–4: 308–30. 
Adam, Jean-Pierre. [1994]. 2005. Roman Building: Materials and Techniques. 
London: Routledge. 
Agnati, Ulrico. 2006. ‘I Piceni. Corpus Delle Fonti. La Documentazione Letteraria’. 
Rivista Di Cultura Classica e Medioevale. 48, no. 1: 183–85. 
Agostiniani, Luciano. 2003. ‘Le Iscrizioni Di Novilara’. I Piceni e l’Italia Medio-
Adriatica.: 1000–1011. 
Ahram, Ariel I. 2015. ‘Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS’. Survival. 57, no. 3: 
57–78. 
Aidi, Hishaam D. 2005. ‘Slavery, Genocide and the Politics of Outrage: 
Understanding the New Racial Olympics’. Middle East Report. no. 234: 40–
56. 
Allen, Beverly. 1996. Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia. University of Minnesota Press. At 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttt37p, accessed 8 April 2017. 
Allen, Joel. 2010. Hostages and Hostage-Taking in the Roman Empire. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2017. ‘The Aesthetics of Ethnicity in Plautus’ Poenulus’. Oral presentation 
presented at the Celtic Conference in Classics 2017, July 21, Université de 
Montréal. At https://www.celticconferenceclassics.com/calls-for-papers. 
Alston, Richard. 2011. ‘Rereading Ancient Slavery’. In Richard Alston, Edith Hall, 
and Laura Proffitt, eds., Reading Ancient Slavery. London; New York: Bristol 
Classical Press, 1–33. 
Anderson, Benedict Richard O’Gorman. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections 
on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London; New York: Verso. 
Anderson, Ralph V., and Robert E. Gallman. 1977. ‘Slaves as Fixed Capital: Slave 
Labor and Southern Economic Development’. The Journal of American 
History. 64, no. 1: 24–46. 
Andreopoulos, George J, ed. 1997. Genocide: Conceptual and Historical 
Dimensions. University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Ash, Rhiannon. 1998. ‘Waving the White Flag: Surrender Scenes at Livy 9.5-6 and 
Tacitus, “Histories” 3.31 and 4.62’. Greece & Rome. 45, no. 1: 27–44. 
Astin, Alun Edgar. 1978. Cato the Censor. Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; 
Oxford University Press. 
———. , ed. [1989]. 2003. The Cambridge Ancient History: Rome and the 
Mediterranean to 133 B.C. 2nd ed. Vol. 8. 14 vols Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Austin, N J E, and N B Rankov. 1995. Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence 
in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
Baaz, Maria Eriksson, and Maria Stern. 2009. ‘Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, 
Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC)’. ISQU 
International Studies Quarterly. 53, no. 2: 495–518. 
Badian, Ernst. 1958. Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 B.C. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Badian, Ernst, and Andrew William Lintott. 2012. ‘Repetundae’. Edited by Simon 
Hornblower, Antony Spawforth, and Esther Eidinow Oxford Classical 
Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 250 
Bagnall, Roger, Richard J. A. Talbert, Sarah Bond, Jeffrey Becker, Tom Elliott, 
Sean Gillies, Ryan Horne, et al. 2006. ‘Pleiades: A Community-Built 
Gazetteer and Graph of Ancient Places’. Stoa Consortium. At 
http://pleiades.stoa.org. 
Bakkum, G. C. L. M. 2009. The Latin Dialect of the Ager Faliscus: Part 1: 150 Years 
of Scholarship. Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA : Amsterdam University Press. 
Balsdon, J. P. V. D. 1938. ‘The History of the Extortion Court at Rome, 123–70 B. 
C.’ Papers of the British School at Rome. 14: 98–114. 
Banti, Luisa. [1968]. 1971. Etruscan Cities and Their Culture. Translated by Erika 
Bizzarri London: Batsford. 
Barker, Graeme, and Tom Rasmussen. 1998. The Etruscans. Oxford ; Malden, 
Mass: WileyBlackwell. 
Baronowski, Donald Walter. 2011. Polybius and Roman Imperialism. Bristol: Bristol 
Classical Press. 
Barth, Fredrik, ed. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of 
Culture Difference. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Barton, Carlin A. 2007. ‘The Price of Peace in Ancient Rome’. In Kurt A. Raaflaub, 
ed., War and Peace in the Ancient World. Ancient World: Comparative 
Histories. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Barzano, Alberto. 1995. Il Trasferimento Dei Liguri Apuani Nel Sannio Nel 180-179 
AC. Vita e Pensiero. At https://publicatt.unicatt.it/handle/10807/38577, 
accessed 23 August 2017. 
Bastien, Jean-Luc. 2007. Le triomphe romain et son utilisation politique: à Rome 
aux trois derniers siècles de la République. Rome: École Française de 
Rome. 
Bazyler, Michael. 2017. Holocaust, Genocide, and the Law: A Quest for Justice in a 
Post-Holocaust World. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Beard, Mary. 2007. The Roman Triumph. Cambridge, Mass.; London: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press. 
Becker, Hilary. 2013. ‘Political Systems and Law’. In Jean MacIntosh Turfa, ed., 
The Etruscan World. London ; New York: Routledge, 351–75. 
Beggio, Tommaso. 2016. ‘Epigraphy’. In Clifford Ando, Paul J. du Plessis, and 
Kaius Tuori, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 43–55. 
Bell, Kimberly K. 2008. ‘“Translatio” and the Constructs of a Roman Nation in 
Virgil’s “Aeneid”’. Rocky Mountain Review. 62, no. 1: 11–24. 
Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew. 1996. Ethnic Cleansing. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Bellini, V. 1964. ‘Deditio in Fidem’. Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger. 
42: 448–57. 
Benedettini, G., Claudia Carlucci, and Maria Anna de Lucia Brolli. 2005. ‘I depositi 
votivi dell’agro falisco. Vecchie e nuove testimonianze a confronto’. In 
Annamaria Comella and S. Mele, eds., Depositi votivi e culti dell’Italia antica 
dall’età arcaica a quella tardo-repubblicana: atti del convegno di studi, 
Perugia, 1-4 giugno 2000. Bari: Edipuglia, 219–28. 
Berman, Marshall. 1987. ‘Among the Ruins’. New Internationalist. At 
https://newint.org/features/1987/12/05/among, accessed 8 March 2017. 
———. 1996. ‘Falling Towers: City Life after Urbicide’. In Dennis Crow, ed., 
Geography and Identity. Critical Studies in Community Development and 
Architecture 2. Washington D.C.: Maisonneuve Press, 172–192. 
Bernard Harris, and Waltraud Ernst. 1999. Race, Science, and Medicine, 1700-
1960. London: Routledge. 
Bertoncini, S., G. Ferri, G. Busby, L. Taglioli, M. Alù, C. Capelli, G. Paoli, and S. 
Tofanelli. 2012. ‘A Y Variant Which Traces the Genetic Heritage of Ligures 
Tribes’. Journal of Biological Research - Bollettino Della Società Italiana Di 
Biologia Sperimentale. 85, no. 1. At 
Bibliography 
251 
http://www.pagepressjournals.org/index.php/jbr/article/view/4087, accessed 
24 August 2017. 
Biondi, Martha. 2007. ‘The Rise of the Reparations Movement’. Edited by Marilyn 
Yaquinto and Michael T. Martin Redress for Historical Injustices in the 
United States: On Reparations for Slavery, Jim Crow, and Their Legacies.: 
255–69. 
Bispham, Edward. 2006. ‘Coloniam Deducere: How Roman Was Roman 
Colonization during the Middle Republic?’ In Guy Jolyon Bradley and John-
Paul Wilson, eds., Greek and Roman Colonization: Origins, Ideologies and 
Interactions. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 73–160. 
———. From Asculum to Actium: The Municipalization of Italy from the Social War 
to Augustus. Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Blanch, José-María. 2017. ‘La Tabula De Los Ligures Baebiani: Un Testimonio 
Epigráfico De La Administración De Trajano (Tabula of Ligures Baebiani: An 
Epigraphic Testimony of Trajan’s Administration)’. Revista Digital De 
Derecho Administrativo. no. 17. At 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2921261, accessed 24 August 2017. 
Blomart, Alain. 1997. ‘Die “Evocatio” Und Der Transfer Fremder Götter von Der 
Peripherie Nach Rom’. In Jörg Rüpke and Hubert Cancik, eds., Römische 
Reichsreligion Und Provinzialreligion. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 99–111. 
Bloxham, Donald, and A. Dirk Moses, eds. 2010. The Oxford Handbook of 
Genocide Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bloxham, Donald, A. Dirk Moses, and Benjamin Lieberman, eds. 2010. ‘“Ethnic 
Cleansing” versus Genocide?’ The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 42–60. 
Bodel, John. 2000. ‘Dealing with the Dead: Undertakers, Executioners and Potter’s 
Fields in Ancient Rome’. In Valerie M Hope and Eireann Marshall, eds., 
Death and Disease in the Ancient City. London ; New York: Routledge, 128–
151. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. At 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812507, accessed 13 December 
2016. 
Boyancé, Pierre. 1972a. ‘«Fides Romana» et la vie internationale’. Publications de 
l’École française de Rome. 11, no. 1: 105–19. 
———. 1972b. ‘La Main de « fides »’. Publications de l’École Française de Rome. 
11, no. 1: 121–33. 
Bradley, Guy Jolyon. 1997. ‘Archaic Sanctuaries in Umbria’. Cahiers Du Centre 
Gustave Glotz. 8: 111–29. 
———. 2006. ‘Colonization and Identity in Republican Italy’. In Guy Jolyon Bradley 
and John-Paul Wilson, eds., Greek and Roman Colonization: Origins, 
Ideologies and Interactions. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 161–87. 
———.2008. ‘Romanization: The End of the Peoples of Italy?’ In Guy Jolyon 
Bradley, Elena Isayev, and Corinna Riva, eds., Ancient Italy: Regions 
Without Boundaries. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 295–322. 
———. 2014. ‘The Nature of Roman Strategy in Mid-Republican Colonization and 
Road Building’. In Tesse Stek and Jeremia Pelgrom, eds., Roman 
Republican Colonization: New Perspectives from Archaeology and Ancient 
History. Papers of the Royal Netherlands Institute in Rome. Rome: Palombi, 
62:60–72. 
Bradley, Guy Jolyon, and Gary D. Farney, eds. forthcoming. The Peoples of Ancient 
Italy. Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Bradley, Guy Jolyon, Elena Isayev, and Corinna Riva, eds. 2008. Ancient Italy: 
Regions Without Boundaries. Exeter: University of Exeter Press. 
 252 
Bradley, Keith. 1987. Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social 
Control. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2011. ‘Slavery in the Roman Republic’. In Paul Cartledge and Keith 
Bradley, eds., The Cambridge World History of Slavery: The Ancient 
Mediterranean World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1:241–64. 
At http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521840668. 
Brennan, T. Corey. 2000. The Praetorship in the Roman Republic. Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Briscoe, John. 1973. A Commentary on Livy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———. 1974. ‘Supporters and Opponents of Tiberius Gracchus’. The Journal of 
Roman Studies. 64: 125–35. 
Broadhead, William M. 2011. ‘Colonization, Land Distribution, and Veteran 
Settlement’. In Paul Erdkamp, ed., A Companion to the Roman Army. 
Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World. Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 
148–163. 
Broughton, Thomas Robert Shannon. 1951. The Magistrates of the Roman 
Republic. 1. 509 B.C. - 100 B.C. New York: American Philological 
Association. 
Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. ‘Ethnicity without Groups’. In Andreas Wimmer, Richard J 
Goldstone, Donald L Horowitz, Ulrike Joras, and Conrad J Schetter, eds., 
Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 34–52. 
Bruns, Karl George, ed. [1919]. 1958. Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui. 7th ed 
Tübingen: Siebeck. 
Brunt, P. A. 1961. ‘Charges of Provincial Maladministration under the Early 
Principate’. Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte. 10, no. 2: 189–227. 
Brunt, P.A. 1965. ‘Reflections on British and Roman Imperialism’. Comparative 
Studies in Society and History. 7, no. 03: 267–88. 
Bruschetti, Paolo. 1999. ‘Indagini Sullo Scava a Campo Della Fiera Presso Orvieto’. 
In Giovanii Pugliese Carratelli, ed., Volsinii e Il Suo Territorio. Annali Della 
Fondazione per Il Museo Claudio Faina v. 6. Orvieto (Terni) : Roma: 
Fondazione per il Museo Claudio Faina ; Quasar, 159–81. 
Burian, Jan. 1978. ‘Ceterum Autem Censeo Carthaginem Esse Delendam’. Klio-
Beiträge Zur Alten Geschichte. 60, no. 60: 169–176. 
Burton, Paul J. 2003. ‘Clientela or Amicitia? Modeling Roman International Behavior 
in the Middle Republic (264-146 BC)’. Klio. 85, no. 2: 333–369. 
———. 2009. ‘Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of 
Surrender during the Roman Republic: A Constructivist View’. The 
International History Review. 31, no. 2: 237–52. 
———. 2011. Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the 
Middle Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cabanes, Pierre. 1976. L’Épire de la mort de Pyrrhos à la conquête romaine (272-
167 av. J.C). Paris: Les belles Lettres. 
Calapa, Annalisa. 2013. ‘Sacra Volsiniensia: Civic Religion in Volsinii after the 
Roman Conquest’. In Annabel Bokern, Marion Bolder-Boos, Stefan 
Krmnicek, Dominik Maschek, and Sven Page, eds., TRAC 2012: 
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology 
Conference. Frankfurt 29 2012. Oxford; Oakville, CT: Oxbow Books ; David 
Brown Book Company, 37–48. 
Calhoun, Craig. 2003. ‘The Variability of Belonging: A Reply to Rogers Brubaker’. 
Ethnicities. 3, no. 4: 558–68. 
Campbell, J. B, and Lawrence A Tritle, eds. 2013. The Oxford Handbook of Warfare 
in the Classical World. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bibliography 
253 
Cancik, Hubert, Helmuth Schneider, Manfred Landfester, and Christine F Salazar, 
eds. 2006. Brill’s New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World. 28 vols 
Leiden; Boston: Brill. 
Card, Claudia. 1996. ‘Rape as a Weapon of War’. Hypatia. 11, no. 4: 5–18. 
———. 1997. ‘Addendum to “Rape as a Weapon of War”’. Hypatia. 12, no. 2: 216–
18. 
———. 2003. ‘Genocide and Social Death’. Hypatia. 18, no. 1: 63–79. 
———. 2008. ‘The Paradox of Genocidal Rape Aimed at Enforced Pregnancy’. The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy. 46, no. S1: 176–89. 
———. 2010. Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Carlucci, Claudia. 2013. ‘Linee di sviluppo della coroplastica Falisca’. In Gabriele 
Cifani, ed., Tra Roma e l’Etruria: cultura, identità e territorio dei Falisci. II 
Università degli studi di Roma. Rome: Quasar, 135–72. 
Carlucci, Claudia, Maria Anna de Lucia Brolli, Simon Keay, Martin Millett, Kristian 
Strutt, P. W. Clogg, Paola Moscati, and Rachel Opitz. 2007. ‘An 
Archaeological Survey of the Faliscan Settlement at Vignale, Falerii Veteres 
(Province of Viterbo)’. Papers of the British School at Rome.: 39–121. 
Carlucci, Claudia, Maria Anna De Lucia, and Museo nazionale di Villa Giulia. 1998. 
Villa Giulia Museum: The Antiquities of the Faliscans. Roma: ‘L’Erma’ di 
Bretschneider : Ingegneria per la cultura. 
Ceccarelli, Letizia, and Simon Stoddart. 2007. ‘The Faliscans’. In Guy Jolyon 
Bradley, Elena Isayev, and Corinna Riva, eds., Ancient Italy: Regions 
without Boundaries. Exeter: University of Exeter Press. 
Chalk, Frank Robert, and Kurt Jonassohn. 1990. The History and Sociology of 
Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Champion, Craige Brian. 2004. Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
Charny, Israel W., ed. 1984. Toward the Understanding and Prevention of 
Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust 
and Genocide (1982, Tel Aviv, Israel). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
———. , ed. 1999a. Encyclopedia of Genocide. Vol. 2. 2 vols Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-Clio. 
———. , ed. 1999b. Encyclopedia of Genocide. Vol. 1. 2 vols Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-Clio. 
Childs, John. 2012. ‘Surrender and the Laws of War in Western Europe, c. 1650-
1783’. In Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, eds., How Fighting Ends: A 
History of Surrender. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 153–69. 
Chorbajian, Levon, and George Shirinian. 1999. Studies in Comparative Genocide. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cifani, Gabriele. 2013. ‘Per una definizione storica dei Falisci tra identità, cultura e 
territorio’. In Gabriele Cifani, ed., Tra Roma e l’Etruria: cultura, identità e 
territorio dei Falisci. II Università degli studi di Roma. Rome: Quasar, 1–53. 
Ciuccarelli, Maria Raffaella. 2012. Inter Duos Fluvios: Il Popolamento Del Piceno 
Tra Tenna e Tronto Dal V Al I Sec. a.C. BAR International Series 2435. 
Oxford: Archaeopress. 
Clark, Jessica Homan. 2014. Triumph in Defeat: Military Loss and the Roman 
Republic. New York: Oxford University Press. At 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199336548.001.0001. 
Clausewitz, Carl von. [1832]. 1997. On War. Edited by F. N Maude. Translated by J. 
J Graham Ware: Wordsworth. 
Cloud, Duncan. 1994. ‘The Constitution and Public Criminal Law’. In Andrew 
William Lintott, Elizabeth Rawson, and J. A. Crook, eds., The Cambridge 
Ancient History: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146–43 BC. The 
 254 
Cambridge Ancient History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
9:491–530. Cambridge Core. At 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-ancient-
history/constitution-and-public-criminal-
law/26F3CDB51DE9C0967B1FD33B6B178343. 
Coles, Amanda J. 2017. ‘Founding Colonies and Fostering Careers in the Middle 
Republic’. The Classical Journal. 112, no. 3: 280–317. 
Comella, Annamaria. 1986. I materiali votivi di Falerii. Cormus delle stipi votive in 
Italia, I. Regio VII, I. Archaeologica 63. Roma: G. Bretschneider. 
Connor, W. R. 1985. ‘The Razing of the House in Greek Society’. Transactions of 
the American Philological Association (1974-). 115: 79–102. 
Cornell, Timothy J. 1995. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze 
Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC). London and New York: Routledge. 
———. 1996. ‘Warfare and Urbanization in Roman Italy’. In Timothy J Cornell and 
Kathryn Lomas, eds., Urban Society in Roman Italy. London and New York: 
Routledge, 127–40. 
———. 2004. ‘Deconstructing the Samnite Wars’. In Howard Jones, ed., Samnium: 
Settlement and Cultural Change. Archaeologia Transatlantica 22. 
Providence, Rhode Island USA: Center of Old World Archaeology and Art, 
Brown University, 115–32. 
———. 2005. ‘The Value of the Literary Tradition Concerning Archaic Rome’. In 
Kurt A. Raaflaub, ed., Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives 
on the Conflict of the Orders., 2nd ed., orig. 1986 Malden, MA ; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 47–74. 
———. , ed. 2013. The Fragments of the Roman Historians. Vol. 1. 3 vols. 
Cornell, Timothy J, and Kathryn Lomas, eds. 1996. Urban Society in Roman Italy. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
———. , eds. 1997. Gender and Ethnicity in Ancient Italy. London: Accordia 
Research Institute, University of London. 
Coward, Martin. 2007. ‘“Urbicide” Reconsidered’. Theory & Event. 10, no. 2. At 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/218081, accessed 9 May 2017. 
———. 2009. Urbicide: The Politics of Urban Destruction. London: Routledge. 
Culham, Phyllis. 1989. ‘Archives and Alternatives in Republican Rome’. Classical 
Philology. 84, no. 2: 100–115. 
Curchin, Leonard A. 1991. Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation. New York: 
Routledge. 
Cursi, Maria Floriana. 2014. ‘International Relationships in the Ancient World’. 
Funda Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History.: 186–95. 
Curti, Emmanuele, Emma Dench, and John Robert Patterson. 1996. ‘The 
Archaeology of Central and Southern Roman Italy: Recent Trends and 
Approaches’. The Journal of Roman Studies. 86: 170–89. 
Dahlheim, Werner. 1968. Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im 
dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr. Munich: Beck. 
Dakaris, Sotirios I. 1956. ‘Αρχαιολογικές Έρευνες Στο Λεκανοπέδιο Των 
Ιωαννίνων’. In Léandros I Vranoúsīs, ed., Αφίερωμα Εις Την Ηπειρον: Εις 
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Table 6. Comparison of typologies of incidents of group destruction, 343-146 BCE 
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Sources 
314 Luceria All    Liv., 9.26.2-3 
314 Sora ●    Liv., 9.24.1-25, 31.13 
313 Fregellae 200    Enn., Ann., 168-169; 
Diod. Sic., 19.101.1-3; 
Liv., 9.28.2-3, 31.13 
311 Cluvia Adult 
males 
   Liv., 9.31.3 
308 Allifae  7000   Liv., 9.42.7-8; Diod. 
Sic., 20.35.2 
305 Silvium  5000   Diod. Sic., 20.80  
296 Cimetra 830    Liv., 10.15.6 
293 Velia, 
Palumbinum 
& 
Herculaneum 
>5,000 
Killed/ 
Captured 
>5000   Liv., 10.45.11 
293 Saepinum  <3000   Liv., 10.45.14  
284 Senones Adult 
males 
Women & 
children 
  App., Sam., 13; App., 
Gallica, 9; Liv., Per., 
12; Oros., Hist., 
3.22.12-15; Polyb., 
2.19.11  
275 Caulonia   ●  Paus., 6.3.12 
265 Volsinii Servile 
class 
 ● ● Flor., 16.1; Liv., Per., 
16; Plin., Nat., 31.31; 
Zonar., 8.7 
261 Agrigentum  25000?   Diod. Sic., 23.9.1; 
Oros., 4.7.6; Polyb., 
1.19.5; Zonar., 8.1  
260 Mazara  All   Diod. Sic., 23.9.4 
259 Corsica and 
Sardinia 
 Several 
thousand 
  Eutr., 2.20; CIL, VI 
1287; Flor., 1.18.16; 
Front., Strat., 3.9.4, 
10.2; Oros., 4.7.11; 
Zonar., 8.11; Liv., Per., 
17.4; Sil., 6.670-72 
258 Myttistratum ● All ●  Diod. Sic., 23. 9. 4; 
Zonar., 8.11; Polyb., 
9.10.11 
258 Camarina  ●   Diod. Sic., 23.9.5; 
Polyb., 1.24.12; Val. 
Max., 6.5.1; Zonar., 
8.12  
256 Countryside 
around 
Aspis/Clupea 
 23500   Eutr., 2.21; Oros., 
4.8.9; Polyb., 1.29.7  
 276 
254 Panormus ● c. 13000   Diod. Sic., 23.18.5; 
Polyb., 1.38.9-10; 
Zonar., 8.14; Flor., 
1.18.12; [Aur. Vict.], 
De vir. ill., 39.2; Sen., 
Ep., 114.17; Cic., 
Rep., 1.1 
252 Lipara All    Zonar., 8.14 
241 Falerii   ● ● Eutr., 2.81; Liv., Per., 
20; Polyb., 1.65.2; 
Zonar., 8.18 
238 Cities inc. 
Caralis  
  ●  Flor., 1.22.35. Festus, 
Gloss. Lat., 430L; 
Polyb., 1.88.8-12; Liv, 
Per. ,20; Zonar., 8.18 
229 Illyrians ●    Flor., 1.21.4 
219 Pharos     App., Ill., 8.2; Polyb., 3. 
18. 12 
218 Malta  2000   Liv., 21.51.2  
215 Vercellium, 
Vescellium 
and 
Sicilinum, 
 > 5000   Liv., 23.37.13 
215 Sardinia  1500   Eutr., 3.13; Flor., 
1.22.35; Liv., 23.41.7  
213 Henna ●    CIL, VI 1281; Front., 
Strat., 4. 7. 22; Liv., 
24.39.4-6; Polyaen., 
Strat., 8.21 
213 Antinum  >7000   Liv., 24.47 
212 Turdetani  All ●  Liv., 24.42.11, 
28.39.5-8; Zonar., 9.3 
212 Syracuse ● ●   Diod. Sic., 26.20.1-2; 
Liv., 25.28.1-31.15, 
26.31-32, 31.31; Cic., 
Ver., 2.4.120; Val. 
Max., 5.1.4, 8.7; Plin., 
Nat., 7.125; Sil., 
14.627-683; Flor., 
1.22.33-34; Plut., 
Mor., 19.7-12, 21.1-7; 
Zonar., 9.5; Cass. Dio, 
15.5 
212 Telesia, 
Compsa, 
Fugifulae, 
Orbitanium, 
Blandae, 
Aecae 
25000 
killed or 
captured 
25000 
killed or 
captured 
  Liv., 24.20 
211 Antikyra  All   Polyb., 9.39.2; Liv., 
26.26.3 
211 Capua     App., Hann., 43; Liv., 
26.14.1-4, 16.6, 34.1-
13; Oros., 4.17.12; 
Zonar., 15.6  
210 Agrigentum  All   Eutr., 3. 14; Liv., 
26.40.13; Oros., 
4.18.2; Zonar., 9.7  
210 Aegina     Polyb., 22.8.10; OGI, 
281 
Appendix 
277 
209 Carthago 
Nova 
● c. 2000 of 
artisan 
class 
  App., Hisp., 23; Cass. 
Dio, 16.57.42; Diod. 
Sic., 26.21.1; Eutr., 
3.15; Flor., 1.22.37-40; 
Liv., 26.49f; Polyb., 
10.17.6; 19.8; Oros., 
4.18.1; Zonar., 9.8 
209 Tarentum  25-30000   App., Hann., 49; Brut. 
72; Diod. Sic., 26.21.1; 
Eutr., 3.16; Liv., 
27.16.7; Oros., 4.18.5-
6; Plut., Fabius, 22.4; 
Plut. Mor., 195f; 
Polyaenus, Strat., 
8.14.3; Zonar., 9.8 
209 Manduria  3000 
(4000?) 
  Liv., 27.15.3 
207 Orongis ●    Liv., 28.4.4; Zonar., 
9.8 
206 Iliturgi / 
Ilurgia 
All  ●  Liv., 28.19.1-23.5; Val. 
Max., 9.11 ext.1; Sil., 
16.277-591; App., 
Hisp., 32-33; Eutr., 
3.16.2; Jer., Ab Abr., 
1813; Zonar., 9.10 
204 North Africa  5-8000   Liv., 29.29.3; Oros., 
4.18.19; Zonar., 19.12 
203 Bruttians  All   App., Hann., 61  
200 Antipatrea All    Liv., 31.27.4 
200 Chalcis All    Liv., 31.23 
199 Dyme     Liv., 32.22.10  
193 5 Bergistani 
towns 
 All   Liv., 34.16.10  
188 Same  All   Liv., 38.29.11  
184 Corbio  All   Liv., 39.42.1  
183 A town 
twelve miles 
from Aquileia 
  ●  Plin., Nat., 3.131 
177 Histrian 
towns: 
Nesactium, 
Mutila, 
Faveria 
● 5632   Liv., 41.11.8 
177 Sardinia  80000   [Aur. Vict.], De vir. ill., 
57; Liv., 41.28.7-10; 
Festus, Breviarium, 
322 
173 Statelite 
Carystus 
10000 All ●  Liv., 42.7.8-9; Cic., 
Off., 1.36; Liv., 42.7.1-
9.6, 10.9, 21.6-7, 
45.15.10 
171 Haliartus ● 2500 ●  Liv., 42.63.11; Strabo, 
9.411 
170 Abdera  All   Liv., 43.4.10; Diod. 
Sic., 30.6  
170 A few Greek 
cities held by 
Philip 
  ●  Liv., Per., 43; Zonar., 
9. 22  
167 Antissa   ● ● Liv., 45.31.13-14; 
Plin., Nat., 5.39 
 278 
167 Epirus  150000   App., Ill., 29.4; Liv., 
45.34.5; Polyb., 30.15; 
Strabo, 7.7.3 
155 Delminium     Zonar., 9.25  
154 Aegina  All   Polyb., 33.10.3  
151 Cauca All    App., Hisp., 52 
150 Lusitanians All ?   App., Hisp., 59 
148 Macedonians     Ampelius, Liber 
Memorialis, 16.5; 
Flor., 1.30.5  
146 Corinth Adult 
males 
Women & 
children 
●  Oros., Hist., 5.3.5; 
Zonar., 9.31; Paus., 
5.10.5, 7.16.7-8; Flor., 
1.32.5; Oros., Hist., 
5.3.5; Festus, 
Breviarium, 7.2 
146 Carthage Majority 50-
55000? 
● Failed App., Pun., 127-133; 
Oros., Hist., 4.23.2-6; 
Zonar., 9.30-31; Flor., 
1.31; Polyb., 39.8.6; 
Cic., Leg. agr., 2.51; 
Diod. Sic., 32.4; Liv., 
Per., 51; Liv., Epit. 
Oxyrh., 51.137-39; 
Vell. Pat., 1.12.5; Val. 
Max., 1.1.18; Dig., 
7.4.21; Jer., Ab Abr., 
18.71 
146 Chalcis and 
Thebes 
  ●  Liv., Per., 52; Polyb., 
40.11 
 
